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Ladies and Gentlemen:
Wilbur Smith Associates (WSA), in association with Strgar-Roscoe-Fausch (SRF) and
K.T. Analytics (KTA), is most pleased to submit this report documenting the results of
our preliminary Congestion/Road Pricing Study for the Twin Cities area. The study was
conducted on behalf of the Minnesota Department of Transportation, the Metropolitan
Council and the Center for Transportation Studies at the University of Minnesota.
The study was intended to provide a preliminary, broad-brush look at the potential
viability of congestion and/or road pricing in the Twin Cities area. This included an
overview of previous and current experiments in congestion/road pricing worldwide and
a summary of emerging technology options in electronic toll collection. Several
hypothetical pricing scenarios were identified, with a preliminary pricing and revenue
collection structure developed for each. In addition to estimation of traffic and revenue
impacts, the study also examined various other measures of effectiveness for each scenario
and identified several important issues which will need to be addressed if the concept of
congestion/road pricing is to move forward in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area.
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This study has clearly been a preliminary assessment and represents just the first step. A
more detailed evaluation will be needed before any type of pricing program could be
implemented. An important cornerstone of any future congestion road pricing program
will be a well-planned, carefully implemented program of public participation. A
preliminary outline of a public involvement plan is also included in the study.
Mr. Ferrol Robinson and others on the study team at SRF, and Mr. Kiran Bhatt of KTA
join me in gratefully acknowledging the valuable inputs of the Project Management Team
and Steering Committee throughout the course of the study. We have sincerely
appreciated the opportunity to participate in this study and hope the information included
in this report will provide a useful basis for discussion of the concept.
Respectfully submitted,
WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES
Edward J. Regan, III
Senior Vice President
EJR/kap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report summarizes the results of a preliminary feasibility assessment of
congestion/road pricing in the metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul. The study
was authorized under a contract with the Metropolitan Council; with funding and
administrative guidance provided jointly by representatives of the Council, the Minnesota
Department of Transportation and the University of Minnesota's Center for Transportation
Studies.
The study addressed the general viability of congestion and/or road pricing
concepts. The principal differences between the two concepts lie in the method and scope
of application and the primary motivation for implementation.
Congestion pricing, in the classical sense, is aimed explicitly at demand
management which might involve relatively high levels of toll charges in more
concentrated, congested areas. Road pricing would typically represent a more broadly
applied user fee, in which both demand management and revenue generation are key
objectives.
Study Objective
The primary objective of the study was to examine a broad range of issues and
impacts associated with congestion/road pricing, including estimation of traffic and
revenue potential, financial feasibility, social and economic considerations, electronic toll
collection technologies and more. The study also included a review of existing and
planned congestion/road pricing programs in other locations throughout the U.S. and
abroad.
The study was generally considered to be an initial phase in the evaluation and
planning for congestion/road pricing. It was a broad-brush analysis, aimed at providing
a preliminary indication of viability of the concept and provide sufficient background
information to determine if more detailed analyses are warranted. The study did raise a
number of issues which should be addressed in future studies. Overall, however, this
preliminary analysis has found that congestion/road pricing has the potential to influence
the future magnitude and distribution of demand on the Twin City Region's transportation
system, while at the same time generating significant revenues for needed transportation
improvements and other uses.
Rationale for Congestion/Road Pricing
Overall, transportation systems in most metropolitan areas provide considerable
highway capacity. Much of this capacity, however, is required to meet peak-period
demands which occur during the limited commuting hours of the week days leaving
substantial capacity available in the off-peak. On the other hand, some of the current
peak-period capacity goes under utilized for lack of adequate management. Still other
potentially available "capacity" is represented by the unused seats in buses and cars.
Unfortunately, more than two decades of national experience suggest that travel demand
management (TDM) and traffic system management (TSM) applications, as they are
generally understood today, can at best be only part of any solution. This is complicated
by the pattern of suburbanization in most major urban areas, including the Twin Cities,
which has continued to favor solo driving and limited use of public transportation.
The rationale for congestion pricing derives from the relationship between road
capacity, people's varying estimates of value on using that capacity, and the level of traffic
and congestion. Congestion pricing would be aimed at maximizing the efficiency of use
of the total transportation system. This could include: using pricing as a more flexible
tool to allocate limited capacity; providing a monetary incentive for ride sharing, shifting
to off-peak travel time and/or shifting to transit.
In theory, congestion pricing is intended to assess a charge for each road trip in an
amount equal or close to the cost occasioned by the trip. That is, each additional vehicle
entering a congested traffic stream causes additional congestion and delay to other users.
Road pricing would also serve as a demand management incentive but would
typically be more broadly applied than congestion pricing. Revenue generation would be
an important objective of road pricing. At least one potential use of this revenue would
be to create further demand management and network efficiency incentives, such as transit
subsidies, construction of carpool lots, etc. As such, road pricing might achieve many of
the same objectives of congestion pricing but would do so at toll levels which might be
considerably lower, albeit more broadly based.
Objectives of Congestion/Road Pricing
The Congestion/Road Pricing Study was coordinated by a Project Management
Team, with representatives of each of the sponsor organizations, and a broad-based
Steering Committee. At one of the two Steering Committee sessions held in St. Paul, the
following objectives of congestion/road pricing were identified and provided an important
foundation for the study:
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1. Reduce congestion on roadways:
Reduce vehicle miles of travel (VMT) during peak periods and/or at
congested locations.
Convert single occupant vehicle (SOV) use to high occupant vehicle
(HOV) use.
2. Increase the economic efficiency of transportation systems:
a Provide savings to travelers by reducing travel time, fuel
consumption and other costs.
a Reduce social costs related to pollution, infrastructure maintenance,
medical care and public safety.
3. Improve air quality:
a Reduce vehicle emissions.
4. Stabilize transportation financing:
a Produce revenues to meet needs for transportation facilities and
services.
Reduce the need for future roadway system expansion.
5. Support regional growth management policies:
a Encourage development within the Metropolitan Urban Services Area
(MUSA).
Improve regional access for central city/inner ring residents.
Other Current and Planned Congestion/Road Pricing Applications
The study included identification of previously implemented and planned
congestion/road pricing applications throughout the world. The study found that there
have been a relatively limited number of actual applications to date, all outside the United
States. These include:
a Singapore Area Licensing Scheme;
a Hong Kong Electronic Road Pricing Program;
i Norway-Bergen, Oslo and Trondheim Toll Rings;
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m The Swiss Motorway System; and
a The A-1 Motorway System in France.
Of the above, only the Singapore Licensing Scheme is a true congestion pricing
program in the classical sense. In that case, a relatively small, concentrated area at the
center of Singapore was "priced" in the late 1970s, with access restricted only to vehicles
which had prepaid a daily or monthly charge. Initially the program was limited to
morning peak periods; it ultimately was extended to the full day.
In Hong Kong, an electronic road pricing system was extensively tested and was
about to be implemented. However, following a change in government, and due to
concerns about privacy, the program was not implemented. The three Norwegian toll ring
projects were designed as revenue generators to fund necessary highway and transit
infrastructure programs, with little or no use of congestion or variable pricing strategies.
The Swiss motorway system application is limited to trucks, and uses a daily, monthly or
annual windshield pass for revenue collection. Its aim is more related to appropriate user
cost allocation within this small European country as distinguished from congestion
reduction or demand management.
In the United States, two major projects are now in the development stage. The
S.R. 91 median lanes toll facility in Orange County, California, is now under construction
and is expected to open by 1996. This will use fully electronic, highly variable tolls,
which will be directly related to congestion levels in the adjacent toll-free lanes of this
congested freeway. Vehicles with three or more occupants will be able to use the median
lanes toll free. The San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Demonstration project is the only
one of up to five congestion pricing demonstration projects yet to be authorized under the
provisions of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991.
The solicitation for demonstration projects has recently been extended for a third
time and additional proposals are expected in the near future. The ISTEA demonstration
program includes provisions for funding of up to five projects, up to three of which may
include placing of tolls on Interstate Routes. This is one of the few exceptions to the
normal prohibition of tolls on federally funded interstate highways.
Studies of congestion pricing have also been undertaken in the Los Angeles,
Seattle, Tacoma and other areas of the United States. Elaborate studies are now underway
in London and Cambridge, England, and road pricing systems are soon to be implemented
in Stockholm and on the entire British Motorway System.
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Electronic Toll Collection
A review was also made of existing toll collection technologies that could be used
to implement the various types of congestion/road pricing programs identified for the
Minneapolis/St. Paul region. The emergence of electronic toll collection (ETC) has
greatly enhanced the potential viability of congestion pricing. Under this plan, motorists
participating in the program would be able to equip their vehicles with transponder
devices which would allow the "collection" of toll charges directly from prepaid accounts,
without the need to construct toll plazas which would add significant costs and
congestion. Some technology options will also aid in dealing with potential concerns
about motorist privacy and other issues. Some of the options evaluated as part of this
study include construction of some conventional toll plazas. Other options rely
completely on fully automated, non-stop electronic toll collection.
Typical system concepts were identified for each of the different types of
congestion/road programs, along with typical hardware costs for transponders, readers and
a central system. While enforcement will always be an important factor in any electronic
toll system, it now appears that the technology to facilitate a high level of system integrity
and security does exist, and enforcement issues may relate more to legal and regulatory
matters than technological limitations.
Hypothetical Concepts Evaluated
Based on the input of the Steering Committee, a series of hypothetical alternative
concepts for potential implementation of congestion/road pricing system in the Twin Cities
area were identified. These fell into the following four overall categories:
a Spot Locations;
a Specific Facilities/Corridors;
a Areawide Pricing by Road Category; and
a Area Entry Pricing.
In each case, one or more "hypothetical" facilities or corridors were chosen
randomly for analysis. This was only for illustrative purposes, and the facilities selected
do not represent actual pricing proposals or recommendations.
Soot Locations - For the purposes of this analysis, existing and/or planned bridges
in the Twin Cities area were found to be ideal examples of spot pricing. Four individual
bridges were analyzed, including two existing bridges, the I-494 Wakota Bridge and the
Wabasha Street Bridge, and two new bridges, the Anoka bridge and the Stillwater Bridge.
Additionally, a hypothetical screenline covering five bridges along the Minnesota River
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between Trunk Highway 41 and Trunk Highway 77 was evaluated.
For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that tolls would not be charged to
vehicles with two or more occupants. Tolls would be assessed to commercial vehicles,
regardless of occupancy. Three levels of tolls were studied, including a $0.50 toll in each
direction, a $1.00 toll in each direction, and a $1.00 one-way toll. Offpeak tolls were
assumed to be discounted by half.
The analysis projected annualized costs ranging from $600,000 for tolling a single
bridge to almost $9.0 million to toll the five-bridge screenline. Projected annual revenues
for 2015 traffic conditions range from $2.7 million to $53.0 million for a single bridge
and five bridges, respectively. In all cases, annual toll revenue was estimated to be
considerably higher than operating costs.
The analysis also showed that of the five alternative locations studied, traffic
diversion from the toll bridges under the single facility scenario would be constrained by
the available capacity of the adjacent toll-free bridges. Diversions from the five-bridge
screenline over the Minnesota River would be limited due to the large area served by the
five bridges. Diversions to transit and carpools would be more attractive for the five-
bridge screenline scenario, where few alternative toll-free river crossings are available, and
where an HOV lane and LRT line is planned in the future (on I-35W).
Specific Facility/Corridor - For the purposes of this study, two limited-access
facilities within the Twin Cities region were analyzed separately as toll facilities operating
with peak period pricing. The existing 1-94 from Rogers to downtwon Minneapolis was
chosen to represent a hypothetical existing corridor for the purposes of revenue and cost
calculations, and the proposed Trunk Highway 212 from 1-494 in Eden Prairie to Carver
County was chosen to represent a hypothetical new facility. In both of these single
facility concepts, it would be possible to use electronic toll collection. However, the
study has found that the less broad the pricing application, the more likely it is that at
least partial traditional toll collection techniques may also be required.
On the proposed Trunk Highway 212 project, annual revenue at 2015 levels was
estimated at between $6.0 and $10.5 million, depending on toll levels. Considerably more
revenue potential exists in the existing 1-94 corridor, with estimated annual toll revenues
of $26 to $44 milllion, depending on the toll rate level assumed. The corresponding
estimated capital and operation cost, at 1994 levels, for implementation of a toll collection
system on TH 212 would be $2.6 million, and on 1-94, $10.9 million.
Areawide Pricing by Road Category - Two types of areawide pricing were
identified for this study: tolls on the full limited access roadway system, and tolls in
ES-6
HOV/LRT corridors. Tolls in HOV/LRT corridors would involve tolls on the single-
occupant vehicles traveling on the freeways immediately adjacent to existing or planned
HOV lanes or LRT lines or possibly tolls on non-HOV traffic using HOV lanes. In all
cases, revenue collection would be based on distance traveled and time of day, and would
be fully electronic.
Tolls on the limited access roadway system would involve application of
congestion/road pricing on all freeways within the seven-county region. Under this
innovative regional road pricing concept, all toll collection would be performed
electronically. For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that all vehicles registered
within the seven county region would be equipped with transponders capable of being
read at the various monitoring locations throughout the region. A series of border stations
would be established at the perimeter of the seven-county region to make temporary
transponders available to non-local traffic.
The full freeway pricing system would have the greatest potential for encouraging
carpooling and transit utilization. By pricing virtually all limited access facilities, the
overall level of toll charges would be greater and the number of alternative routes would
be reduced. As a result, transit or carpooling would be relatively more attractive. Annual
revenue at the lower of two toll rates tested was estimated at between $302 and $348
million, depending on the area and road classes covered by the tolls. At the higher of the
toll rates, annual revenues of $458 and $535 million were projected.
The cost of establishing and operating a regionwide freeway pricing system would
be substantial. This would include construction of border toll stations around the seven-
county metropolitan area and installation of electronic toll collection readers and other
devices at virtually all interchanges on the freeway system. The cost to equip all vehicles
in the Twin Cities region with electronic toll transponders is estimated at about $60
million, bringing the total capital cost of implementation to about $200 million, or more.
Assuming a ten-year life cycle for the capital investments, the total annualized cost for
the full freeway road pricing system would be between $60 and $70 million, at 1994
levels, depending on the scope of application.
Table ES-1 provides a summary of estimated traffic impacts along four selected
screenlines in the Twin Cities area. Two north-south screenlines and two east-west
screenlines are shown. Under this scenario, road pricing is assumed to be implemented
under two alternative toll rates on all freeways within the affected area. As might be
expected, implementation of this pricing would result in a reduction of traffic on the
freeways due to diversion to alternative routes and a net reduction of auto trips due to
shifts to carpools and transit.
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For example, at 2015 levels, an estimated 572,000 vehicles per day would cross
a north-south screenline located west of TH 100 on the various freeway routes. An
additional 395,000 vehicles cross the screenline on arterials and other local streets,
yielding a total of just under 1 million vehicle crossings per day. At the lower toll rate
($0.05 per mile in peak periods) freeway traffic would be reduced by about 8 percent,
with slightly more than half of this impact resulting from diversions to other routes. A
more significant impact is shown at the higher toll rate ($0.10 per mile), with a reduction
in freeway volumes of over 19 percent. The majority of this would result from diversions
to alternative routes, with the net overall reduction in screenline traffic estimated at 3.5
percent.
Similar results are shown for each of the four selected screenlines, with the low toll
rates resulting in freeway traffic reductions of between 5.4 and 9.4 percent and the high
toll rates resulting in freeway trip reductions ranging from 12.9 to 22.9 percent, depending
on locations. Overall regional traffic would be expected to be reduced between 1.9 and
4.1 percent depending on screenline and toll rate.
This overall category also included a preliminary evaluation of congestion pricing
in selected HOV and/or LRT corridors. In this case, tolls would be assessed only in those
segments of the regional freeway system which included carpool lanes. Two "sub-
options" were considered. In the first case, tolls would be assessed to all traffic using the
non-HOV lanes, to provide a monetary incentive for carpooling or LRT usage. This was
analyzed both on a full time tolling basis and as a scenario in which tolls would be
applied only during peak periods in the major travel direction only.
The second sub-option would allow non-HOV traffic to use designated HOV lanes
for a toll. This concept, often referred to as HOV "Buy-In", has gained increasing interest
in recent months following the successful financing of the S.R. 91 Median Lanes project
in California. Several HOV Buy-In proposals were submitted under the ISTEA
Congestion Pricing Demonstration project. While in the initial solicitations FHWA
determined that these proposals were not compliant with the provisions of the Congestion
Pricing Demonstration Program, they have since modified their stand and have indicated
the HOV Buy-In concept may be considered in certain cases. Given the current nature
of HOV lanes on the Twin Cities freeway system there would be enforcement difficulties
associated with the HOV Buy-In concept, which need considerably further review in
future studies. As such, traffic and revenue estimates were not developed in this study
for the HOV Buy-In concept.
MUSA Area Pricing - The final set of road pricing options involved the
hypothetical establishment of entry tolls around the Metropolitan Urban Services Area
(MUSA) boundary. Under this concept, MUSA border tolling stations would be
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established on all routes, including freeways and non-limited access. Vehicles registered
inside the MUSA area would be exempt from tolling; all other vehicles crossing the
MUSA line would be charged entry tolls. Three levels of hypothetical toll charges were
tested, ranging from $0.50 to $1.50, and it was assumed that annual passes at discount
rates would also be available.
Traffic impacts associated with the entry toll concept would be expected to be
relative minimal since all routes entering the area would be tolled. Revenue potential was
found to be relatively low, ranging from $15.7 million to $30.3 million depnding on toll
rate. The cost of implementing and operating the various toll plazas was estimated at over
$18.8 million per year, providing a very low ratio of revenue to cost.
This particular strategy was aimed at encouraging future development within the
MUSA boundary, rather than for demand management or for its revenue potential.
Revenue/Cost Summary - Table ES-2 provides a comparative summary of
estimated annual costs of implementing and operating toll collection facilities and
estimated annual revenue, at 2015 levels. A minimum revenue/cost ratio of 1.0 would be
needed to cover the cost of implementing and operating the toll facility. The higher the
ratio, the more net revenue which would be produced by the pricing initiative which could
ultimately be used for a variety of purposes.
The maximum revenue/cost ratios were found under the full freeway road pricing
system concepts. The overall lowest were found under the MUSA Line Entry Toll
Options. The HOV/LRT corridor pricing option, in which tolls would be assessed in peak
periods only, also show a low revenue/cost ratio, due to the large capital and operating
costs as compared with the limited scope and duration or price application.
Other Considerations
Beyond the traffic, revenue and cost implications discussed above, there are a
number of important additional factors that must be taken into consideration when
evaluating the viability of implementing congestion/road pricing.
Public/Political Acceptability - Congestion/road pricing options will be perceived
as more or less acceptable depending on the nature and extent of the pricing scheme. Past
experience suggests that several important issues can "make or break" pricing proposals.
These issues are: perception of fairness, proposed use of funds, possible impacts on
businesses and low income groups, and privacy concerns. Acceptability will be enhanced
by consulting with affected parties at the outset of planning, as well as developing liaison
with likely supporters. A revenue-neutral program may enhance acceptability as
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Table ES-2
REVENUE/COST SUMMARY
TOTAL
ANNUAL
COST
(000)
SCENARIO
LOW TOLL RATES
Annual
Revenue
(000)
Rev/Cost
Ratio
HIGH TOLL RATES
Annual
Revenue
(000)
Rev/Cost
Ratio
Spot Locations (1)
New Anoka Bridge
New Stillwater Bridge
Wabasha St. Bridge
1-494/Wakota Bridge
Minn. River Bridge
Screenline
Full Freeway System
MUSA Area Only
Full 7-County Area
Full Area with Expressways
Single Corridor Options
1-94
TH 212
HOV/LRT Corridors
(Tolling SOV Lanes)
Peak Period/Major Dir. Only
Full Time Tolling
MUSA Line Entry Tolls (2)
$600
600
700
3,000
8,950
59,540
60,950
71,000
10,850
2,550
41,890
45,890
18,650
$3,200
2,700
2,500
12,500
41,700
301,700
318,900
347,500
25,900
6,000
5.33
4.50
3.57
4.17
4.66
5.07
5.23
4.89
2.39
2.35
$4,000
3,300
2,700
16,300
51,600
457,500
482,000
534,700
44,000
10,500
26,000
-- 185,000
15,700 0.84 30,300
(1) All bridge scenarios assume 2-way toll collection.
(2) Includes a reduction of 50 percent in the cash-paying component at unattended
entry locations, and 10 percent at attended locations to account for toll evasion.
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6.67
5.50
3.86
5.43
5.77
7.68
7.91
7.53
4.06
4.12
0.62
4.03
1.62
compared with a program where pricing is perceived simply as a way to raise revenues.
Because active support of congestion/road pricing plans is vital to political
acceptability and approval of proposals, it is important to identify and involve possible
supporters early in the planning process. For those who may be opposed, areas of
possible opposition should be identified at the outset. Possible supporters include those
who benefit from reduced congestion including: neighborhoods where traffic might be
reduced; commercial enterprises highly dependent on goods delivery and traveling sales
force; environmental interests concerned with air quality; transit operators receiving
support for expanded capital stock and experiencing better speeds under less congestion;
and automobile organizations interested in expanded road facilities, provided
congestion/road pricing is part of a broader plan to add highway capacity at critical
locations.
Potential Uses of Revenue - Congestion/road pricing programs are likely to
generate a substantial revenue stream. The uses of these revenues can influence both
public support for the program and the effectiveness of the program itself. Decisions on
uses of revenues should be based upon principles that reinforce the overall objectives of
congestion/road pricing. They must also reflect a variety of public policy considerations
related to transportation needs, equity concerns, and jurisdictional priorities.
Implementation Costs - Revenues should first be applied to the annualized
operating and capital costs associated with the collection of tolls and fees, including the
costs of enforcement, public outreach, and administration.
Provision of TravelA Iternatives - Use revenues to provide reasonable transportation
alternatives to peak period SOV travel. Transit services and facilities, HOV lanes, and
improving alternate routes should be supported by program revenues. Providing attractive
options, particularly if they offer faster travel and/or less expensive travel, will help foster
support for congestion/road pricing.
Mitigation of Negative Impacts - Revenues could be used as direct subsidies in the
form of travel allowances to reduce cost impacts to low-income travelers. Such
compensation would need to be designed so as to maintain the incentive for changing
travel behavior. This use of revenues would address some equity concerns.
Implementation of the Regional Transportation Plan - Revenues could be directed
to further improvements identified in the regional transportation plan and would include
transit and highway improvements, in support of the dampened travel demand resulting
from congestion/road pricing. Highway improvements to mitigate the impact of traffic
diversion from the tolled routes to local non-tolled routes may also be required.
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Reduced Taxes - Revenues could be returned to travelers in the form of reduced
taxes. Toll revenues could substitute for a portion of revenues from current property,
gasoline and excise taxes used for transportation improvements. Opposition to
congestion/road pricing (because it might be viewed as a new tax and revenue source for
government), could be reduced by structuring a "revenue-neutral" program.
Other Uses - Revenues could be applied to non-transportation public uses.
However, this would weaken the "pay-as-you-go" approach to transportation financing and
would establish congestion/road pricing as another tax.
Consistency with Regional Goals - Congestion/road pricing can be structured to
support the following regional transportation goals.
Contribution to Region's Quality of Life - Among the congestion/road pricing
applications examined, the areawide and systemwide options have, by far, the greatest
potential for reducing congestion by improving travel time and improving the environment
in the region - thus contributing to the region's quality of life. Spot or facility
applications of congestion/road pricing such as on individual bridges or freeways will
have very localized beneficial impact on quality of life. In fact, because of the negative
impacts due to spillover of traffic onto parallel routes, the net benefit is likely to be small,
if any. The one exception might be the "HOV Buy-In" concept which would not be
expected to divert traffic to alternative routes.
Impacts on Business - The impacts of congestion/road pricing on business will vary
with the structure of the pricing program, the nature of the businesses, level of
competition, and other factors. Reductions in traffic congestion will create benefits by
reducing the travel time (and, therefore, costs) of goods delivery. These savings should
offset the direct increases in shipping expenses created by the pricing program. Concerns
about impacts on retail businesses relate to shoppers potentially facing high travel costs,
particularly if only some retail destinations are affected by the pricing program.
According to several federal studies, truck operators value their time at $25 to $30
per hour (this will vary for local delivery versus long-haul, etc.). If a relatively low truck
toll rate of $0.10 per mile is assumed for a 20-mile round-trip, only about five minutes
of overall travel time savings from reduced congestion would need to be realized in order
for the trucker to gain from the program.
Management of Existing Transportation System - One of the primary objectives of
any type of road pricing system is to manage the transportation system to satisfy travel
demand while making the most effective use of limited resources. All of the options
evaluated would provide some measure of demand management. The spot application of
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pricing would act to redistribute traffic between facilities, and, to a lesser extent,
encourage ridesharing or demand reduction. The concept of pricing mixed-flow lanes on
segments adjacent to HOV lanes would provide a more direct incentive to ridesharing and
thereby achieve a more balanced utilization of total available capacity while acting to
reduce vehicular miles of travel.
In general, the broader the application of pricing in the region, the greater the
ability to manage demand and thus achieve regional goals and policies. The placement
of congestion/road pricing on the entire limited-access freeway network would have the
greatest potential to achieve demand management objectives by both reducing and
redistributing demand more efficiently over the existing network. The use of electronic
pricing would make it possible to adjust rates by time of day and roadway section to
achieve the optimum balance and overall management of the system. If a portion of
revenues generated from the pricing system were used to create travel alternatives, such
as enhanced transit or ridesharing opportunities, the overall system management
capabilities would be further increased.
Strengthening of Transit - Congestion/road pricing would provide a direct, highly
visible, monetary incentive for increased use of transit and/or ridesharing. The extra
"price" placed on driving alone would, at a minimum, reduce the perceived relative cost
of transit fares, thereby increasing the transit share especially for work trips.
Congestion/road pricing applications would also provide opportunities for generating
revenue. Part of these revenues can be used to strengthen the transit system (regular
route, paratransit and rideshare). The better the transit system that is in place, the greater
the success of congestion/road pricing. The improved transit system will provide
increased choices for SOV users that are unwilling to pay the road pricing fee, which in
turn will make the transit system more cost-effective.
A vailability of Stable Funding for Transportation - Because of the dollars involved,
areawide or systemwide congestion/road pricing provides a "pay-as-you-go" revenue-
generating method that is relatively stable. Unlike gas tax revenues, which have
experienced a decline due to improved vehicle fuel efficiency, revenues from
congestion/road pricing would increase because of the historical growth in vehicle-miles
of travel. It would also be a good method of dealing with future transition to electric
vehicles and other alternative fuel sources.
Support Economic Development - The effect of congestion/road pricing on
economic development is not well understood. However, the following observations can
be made and should be evaluated in subsequent phases of the study of congestion/road
pricing:
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Central business districts (CBDs) could benefit from congestion/road pricing
because they have the best roadway and transit access and, thus, the most
choices. This is true of commuter trips. However, shoppers might be
unwilling to pay the additional fee to shop in the CBD.
a While the great majority of the region's population and employment is
within the Metropolitan Urban Services Area (MUSA) boundary, residential
and other development continues to occur outside the MUSA. One of the
main reasons for this occurrence is that there are no incentives to live closer
inasmuch as the transportation system currently provides relatively
congestion-free travel. Distance-based congestion/road pricing would make
it less attractive to live in the rural or developing areas and work, say, in the
CBDs.
Residents of counties adjacent to the seven-county area could be
discouraged from working or shopping in the region, particularly if areawide
or systemwide congestion/road pricing applications are implemented.
An unknown at this time is whether, under the areawide or systemwide
options, new businesses will make a different location decision, or whether
existing businesses would relocate, to avoid the tolls.
It is likely that specific geographic areas within the seven-county region could
experience an economic gain at the expense of other geographic areas but, overall, the
economic impact is likely to be neutral. The exception is the case where a business
would locate or relocate outside the seven-county area. Imposition of an entry fee at the
MUSA boundary might encourage some residents or businesses to move into the MUSA
area. Others, however, might decide to move into the rural areas and outer rings to avoid
the tolls. How these decisions are made will depend, to a large extent, on how adverse
impacts to commuters, residents and businesses, and geographic impacts, are mitigated.
Mitigation measures could include commuter rebates, peak-period-only charges, improved
services to affected business centers, various tax rebates, etc. It is quite clear that impacts
on development patterns and economic growth must be given considerable analysis in
future studies, regardless of the particular congestion/road pricing option selected.
Impacts on Low Income Travelers
The impact of congestion/road pricing on low-income travelers depends upon the
adopted price level, the time savings achieved, and employment locations, among other
factors.
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The lower the value that is placed on one's time, the less there is to gain, in an
economic sense, from congestion/road pricing. According to federal studies, travelers
making work trips value their time at $11.00 per hour; on average, those making non-
work trips value their time at $8.00 per hour. If, for a typical 20-mile round-trip, a
relatively low toll rate of $0.05 per mile is imposed and five minutes of travel time is
saved, then only workers whose annual incomes exceed $25,000 would stand to gain
based on their value of time. For non-workers, their income would need to be 25 to 50
percent higher.
The impacts on low-income travelers will depend on the availability of travel
alternatives and residential and employment characteristics. Low income residents are
more likely to live in areas where transit services are available (transit would tend to
improve under congestion/road pricing). Some would be induced to change from auto
travel to bus. However, many low-income travelers must use a car because transit is not
available, for child pick-up, etc; if employed, they may have little flexibility to alter work
hours and thus would face peak period charges. These changes could be significant to
the individual traveler especially if travel distances are long.
A carefully structured congestion/road pricing program that maximizes alternatives
and provides some form of subsidy would help mitigate these potential negative effects
on low income travelers. A portion of the revenue collected from the pricing program
could be used to reduce the negative impact on the poor.
Land Development Considerations
The implementation of congestion/road pricing might be expected to have some
limited impacts on future land development patterns, depending on the scenario and the
scope of application. For example, an area entry pricing scheme focused around a CBD,
such as in Singapore, might act to encourage utilization of businesses outside the
protected area and therefore might influence future commercial development patterns.
That particular scenario was not, however, among those selected by-the Steering
Committee for further review. The MUSA line entry toll program was explicitly designed
as an incentive to continued future development within the MUSA area. This is
consistent with regional transportation planning goals, which state that future highway and
transit services will be focused in the urban development area. This would be a direct
positive impact of implementing pricing on regional development patterns.
As noted previously, it is difficult to identify some of the more subtle economic
development impacts. For example, if all freeways in the region were subjected to tolls,
it would not be expected to result in a significant change in future development patterns.
However, if only one or a few of the freeways were tolled, this could affect development
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choice locations for both residential and commercial development. Potential impacts on
economic development patterns should be the subject of more detailed analysis in refined
studies.
Air Quality Considerations
Congestion/road pricing may reduce vehicle emissions by reducing ve t'cle trips.
Trip curtailment and shift from solo driving to HOV modes would result in reduced
vehicle trips and VMT and produce reductions in emissions. Changes in travel routes and
in trip times is likely to have more complex differential impacts on emissions and air
quality. These changes may not directly reduce VMT, but by shifting VMT away from
hot spots and hot periods, they could produce improvements at the worst locations and
times. In making the estimate of VMT reduction, evaluation analysts should be careful
to assess net reductions in VMT. This can be done by examining changes in trip volumes
and lengths not just on the priced facility, but on possible diversion routes, and comparing
results to changes in the same variables on control facilities not priced. Obviously,
improvements in running speed and the reductions in start-stop cycles from reduced
congestion should also be recognized in future studies.
Equity Considerations
An important consideration in assessing congestion/road pricing options in the
region is equity: how costs and benefits of the options affect particular groups. Such
considerations will help chart the most politically feasible course, help determine those
made worse off, and where compensation should be focused. Some categories to consider
include income group, peak versus off-peak travelers, and in- versus out-of-zone workers,
businesses and residents.
In general, one would expect positive benefits due to reduced congestion to accrue to the
following individuals or groups:
a Existing users of HOV modes and HOV service providers - A reduction in
congestion could significantly increase HOV mode speeds, productivity and
reliability. Existing HOV traffic in the mixed flow lanes would enjoy
improved service due to congestion reduction without being required to pay
tolls. The bus operating agency could benefit from increases in vehicle
productivity as speeds increase.
a Road users who shift from SOV mode to HOV due to pricing incentives -
Those who voluntarily are attracted to HOV modes due to enhanced service
levels would realize positive benefits from the opportunity to use a more
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desirable mode.
Road users who continue to drive and value their time highly (including
most commercial vehicles) - The value of time savings reduced by lower
congestion and increased speeds would outweigh the increased congestion
toll payments for these users.
a Businesses who would reap the benefits of more efficient delivery systems -
Businesses where trucking and delivery system costs are a significant
proportion of total costs of doing business would realize large savings in
delivery costs.
a Population segments who will enjoy cleaner air - Persons living/working
near high concentrations of pollutants produced by vehicle emissions would
enjoy cleaner air.
Major recipients of the revenues generated by the pricing program -
Congestion/ road pricing will generate new revenues, far in excess of
program costs. If revenues are used to expand HOV modes, the original
and new users of these modes would enjoy the benefits. If revenues are
used to reduce existing taxes such as registration fees, the affected motorists
would gain. If revenues are used to compensate particular road users or
businesses, they would benefit. Depending on the compensations, such
distributions could partly or fully mitigate negative impacts of pricing on
these groups.
Disbenefits due to congestion/road pricing could be experienced by the following
individuals or groups:
a Those who do not value their time highly and/or cannot afford the increased
charges - Those who are forced to pay more than their time savings, or who
involuntarily have to shift to other modes of travel, routes or time or travel,
would lose benefits, as well as those who must decide to forgo the trip
altogether. Low-income travelers are susceptible to the above effects.
a Certain businesses in the region who might lose competitive posture
compared to those in outlying uncongested areas - While many businesses
may benefit from improved speeds for goods delivery and employee
commutes, some businesses within the priced zone may experience greater
competition from businesses outside the priced zone. Again, how
complementary programs and actions are structured can change this picture.
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i Users of unpricedfacilities in the region - Travelers on certain facilities not
priced may experience increased costs of congestion if much traffic is
diverted from priced facilities.
a Neighborhoods - Certain neighborhoods may be affected by spillover traffic.
This is particularly true of neighborhoods where good alternative parallel
arterials or transit facilities are unavailable.
Comparative Impact Summary - The various hypothetical congestion/road pricing
scenarios evaluated in this preliminary study covered a wide range of applications. As
such, they would also vary considerably with respect to evaluation criteria established by
the Steering Committee at the outset of the study.
A comparative summary of the relative impact of each of the options under each
of the evaluation factors is presented in Figure ES-1. Given the preliminary nature of this
study, a simplified relative rating scale was considered appropriate, with impacts generally
ranging from unfavorable to favorable.
It was not the intention of this study to select on optimum implementation strategy
and no recommendations are made. The results of the study do provide considerable data
regarding a range of options which can be considered by decision-makers in planning
possible future initiatives.
The Next Steps
Considerably more detailed study would be needed before an actual pricing strategy
could be selected and implemented. This preliminary study identified a number of issues
which should be looked at in more detail in the future. The study team suggested a three-
phase level of future analysis, including:
i A Scoping Study;
a A Detailed Alternatives and Impact Analysis; and
a Preliminary Design and Implementation Plan.
A key element of all future work with respect to planning congestion/road pricing
initiatives will be a well-planned, carefully implemented program of public involvement.
This study included the development of a preliminary public involvement plan, which
will, no doubt, be a major focal point of any future studies of congestion/road pricing in
the Twin Cities area.
ES-19
EVALUATION SPOT LOCATIONS HOV / LT SINGLE FULL MUSA
Ind. Screen- Toll HOV CORRIOOR FREEWAY AREA
CRITERIA Bridges line Non-HOV Buy-In OPTIONS PRICING PRICING
CONGESTION RELIEF
* SOV Reducton 'O O 0 0
* Congestion Reduction C C C C C
STrawl Time Reduction O C 0 C C C
MODE SHIFT POTENTIAL
* Increas Transilt O C O C C
* Increaseo FIdeharing C O C C
REVENUE/COST
CONSIDERATIONS
* Revnue Pontal 4O 0 C 0
SRevenue/Cost Ratio () O
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
SEase of Use C 0 • O O
* Ease of Enforcement 0 0 4 O OC 0
PUBUC/POUTICAL
ACCEPTABILITY
* Equity/Avaablity of Options 4) 4 0 0 &
* Low Income pe 4ct O 4 4 4 0 4)
* eusine Impacb () O 4
* Local Tradmc leorm O) ) ) 0 O 0
AIR QUAUTY IMPACTS
* vMT Reductions 0 4 O O O0
SImprove Awrageo Speeds0 4)) 4) 0
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
GOALS O O O O *
* Fwrb .knp.
OVERVIEW OF
RELATIVE IMPACTS
WiLBUR SMITh ASSO~ATES FIGURE ES-i
FIGURE ES-1
WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1 INTRODUCTION 1
Scope of Study 2
Rationale for Congestion/Road Pricing 2
Congestion Pricing 3
Road Pricing 4
Twin Cities Setting 5
Objectives of Congestion/Road Pricing 6
Federal Pilot Program 7
Legal Considerations 11
Minnesota Legislation 11
Federal Legislation 11
2 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING AND PLANNED ROAD
PRICING PROGRAMS 13
Singapore Area Licensing Scheme 14
Hong Kong Electronic Road Pricing Program 16
Norway Toll Rings 18
Other Recent and Planned European Road Pricing Concepts 19
S.R. 91 Express Lanes - Orange County, California 20
London and Cambridge, England Proposals 21
Stockholm Zone Free 22
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Congestion Pricing Project 23
Summary 23
3 TOLL COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 25
Traditional Toll Collection Methods 26
ETC Overview 27
System Categories 28
Readers 31
Central System 31
Potential Applications in Congestion/Road Pricing 32
System Planning Issues 34
Application and Related Functions 34
Privacy 35
Enforcement 35
(Continued)
CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER PAGE
4 IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OF POTENTIAL
PRICING CONCEPTS 37
Methods Used for Transportation Charging 37
Road Prices Not Related Directly to Road Use 37
Prices Indirectly Related to Road Use 38
Road Prices Somewhat Related to Road Use 38
Direct Use-Related Charges 39
Market-Like Variations 40
Summary 41
Scope of Application 41
Spot Locations 41
Specific Facilities/Corridors 42
Areawide Pricing by Road Category 42
Area Pricing 42
Potential Uses of Revenue 43
Steering Committee Inputs 44
5 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL APPLICATION OPTIONS 45
Evaluation Criteria 45
Spot Locations 46
Estimated Traffic Impacts 47
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts 50
Revenue Potential 51
Capital and Operating Costs 51
Full Limited Access Roadway Pricing 54
Estimated Traffic Impacts 56
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts 65
Other Considerations 65
Revenue Potential 65
Capital and Operating Costs 67
Individual Facility Concepts 70
Estimated Traffic Impacts 71
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts 72
Revenue Potential 72
Capital and Operating Costs 74
(Continued)
CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER PAGE
5 (cont'd)
HOV/LRT Corridor Pricing 74
Estimated Traffic Impacts 76
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts 76
Revenue Potential 77
Capital and Operating Costs 77
"HOV Buy-In" Concept 77
MUSA Area Pricing 80
Estimated Traffic Impacts 82
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts 82
Revenue Potential 82
Capital and Operating Costs 84
Summary of Revenue/Cost Relationships 84
Comparative Impact Analysis 87
Other Considerations 89
Potential Uses of Revenue 89
Public/Political Acceptability 90
Consistency with Regional Goals 91
Contribution to Region's Quality of Life 91
Impacts on Business 92
Management of Existing Transportation System 93
Strengthening of Transit 94
Availability of Stable Funding for Transportation 94
Support Economic Development 94
Impacts on Low Income Travelers 95
Land Development Considerations 96
Air Quality Considerations 97
Equity Considerations 98
Benefits 98
Disbenefits 99
6 THE NEXT STEPS 101
Future Studies 101
1. Conduct a Scoping Study 101
2. Conduct Detailed Alternatives Analysis and Impact Analysis 102
(Continued)
CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER PAGE
6 (cont'd)
3. Conduct Preliminary Design and Develop Implementation
Plan 102
Public Involvement Plan 102
1 - Market Research 103
2 - Product Development 103
3 - Product Testing 103
4 - Product Marketing 104
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A - Project Management Team
APPENDIX B - Preliminary List of Organizational Stakeholders
ILLUSTRATIONS
FOLLOWS
FIGURE PAGE
1 Twin Cities Metropolitan Area 5
2 Automated Toll Collection Concepts 32
3 Spot Location Pricing 46
4 Estimated Daily Traffic Impacts - Spot Tolls on Wabasha
Street Bridge and Wakota/I-494 Bridge -
2015 Levels 47
5 Estimated Daily Traffic Impacts - Tolls on Bridge
Screenline - 2015 Levels 49
6 Full Freeway System Pricing 54
7 Single Facility Pricing 71
8 HOV/LRT Corridor Pricing 75
9 MUSA Entry Pricing 81
10 Overview of Relative Impacts 88
11 Public Involvement Plan 103
TABULATIONS
TABLE PAGE
1 Traffic Impacts - Spot Locations - Anoka and Stillwater
Bridges - 2015 Levels 49
2 Estimated Annual Revenue Potential - Spot Locations -
2015 Levels 52
3 Estimated Capital and Operating Cost - Spot Locations -
1994 Level Cost 53
4 Traffic Volumes on Screenline West of Route 100 58
5 Traffic Volumes on Screenline Between 1-35W and I-35E 59
6 Traffic Volumes on Screenline South of 1-694 60
7 Traffic Volumes on Screenline South of 1-394/I-94 61
8 Comparison of Volume-to-Capacity Ratios 64
9 Estimated Annual Revenue Potential Toll Freeways 66
10 Estimated Capital and Operating Cost 68
11 Estimated Annual Revenue Potential - Toll Single Facilities
TH 212 and 1-94 73
12 Estimated Capital and Operating Cost - Single Corridor
Options - 1994 Levels 75
13 Estimated Capital and Operating Cost - SOV Pricing in
HOV/LRT Corridors - 1994 Levels 78
14 Estimated Annual Revenue Potential - MUSA Line Entry
Tolls 83
15 Estimated Capital and Operating Cost - MUSA Line Entry
Tolls - 1994 Level Cost 85
16 Revenue/Cost Summary 86
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This report documents the results of a preliminary feasibility study of congestion/road
pricing in the metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul. The study was authorized
through a contract with the Metropolitan Council; with funding and administrative
guidance provided jointly by representatives of the Council, the Minnesota Department
of Transportation and the University of Minnesota's Center for Transportation Studies.
As denoted in its title, the study addressed congestion and/or road pricing concepts.
The two concepts are, indeed, quite similar and, to varying degrees, would each achieve
the same outcomes. As described in more detail below, the principal differences between
the two concepts lie in the method and scope of application and the primary motivation
for implementation. Congestion pricing, in the classical sense, is aimed explicitly at
demand management that would typically involve relatively high levels of toll charges in
more concentrated, congested areas. Road pricing would typically represent a more
broadly applied user fee system in which both demand management and revenue
generation are key objectives.
The primary objective of the study was to examine a broad range of issues and
impacts associated with congestion/road pricing, including estimation of traffic and
revenue potential, and financial feasibility, identification of social and economic
considerations and review, electronic toll collection technologies and more. The study
also included a review of existing and planned congestion/road pricing programs in other
locations throughout the U.S. and abroad.
The study is considered to be an initial phase in the evaluation and planning for
congestion/road pricing. It is a broad-brush analysis, aimed at providing a broad
indication of viability of the concept and sufficient background information to determine
if more detailed analyses are warranted. It is not anticipated that the results of this study
would be used to necessarily reach final decisions regarding implementation of
congestion/road pricing.
Considerably more detailed studies should be undertaken before any type of regional
road pricing system is implemented. This study did raise a number of issues which
should be addressed in future studies. Overall, however, this preliminary analysis has
found that congestion/road pricing has the potential to influence the magnitude and distri-
bution of future demand on the region's transportation system, while at the same time
generating significant revenues for needed transportation improvements or other uses.
Scope of Study
Consistent with the preliminary nature of this study, maximum use was made of
available information such as regional transportation models, previous research reports,
traffic statistics and documents regarding future plans for the Twin Cities area. A detailed
review of literature was made, documenting previous experiments and current studies now
underway for other congestion/road pricing programs.
A review was also made of emerging developments in the field of electronic toll
collection, which will be important in implementing any road pricing program of the
future. This was documented in a separate Technical Memorandum and is summarized
subsequently in Chapter 3 of this report.
The study included the inputs of a Steering Committee which was made up of a broad
array of governmental agencies and other groups concerned about transportation.
Participants in the Steering Committee, and the Project Management Team, are listed in
Appendix A to this report. The Study Team participated with the Steering Committee in
two extended workshop sessions during the course of the study, which during a limited
number of hypothetical pricing options were identified for further analysis. For each of
these five categories of options, most of which had several suboptions, the Consultant
Team developed estimated impacts on traffic demand, evaluated revenue potential, and
developed preliminary estimates of the cost of implementation and operation of the pricing
system. The study also addressed other considerations, such as potential impacts on
development, potential uses of toll revenue, consistency with regional development goals
and so forth.
Finally, the study also included development of a preliminary public information plan.
This phase of the study did not actually include a public outreach program; however, the
plan for such future public participation was prepared.
Rationale for Congestion/Road Pricing
Over the past 20 years, many metropolitan areas like Minneapolis/St. Paul have
experienced deterioration in travel conditions and mobility as congestion has increased
and spread to suburban areas. Suburbanization has continued to encourage solo driving
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and the growth in travel demand has continued to outpace the addition of new capacity.
While progress has been made in emissions technology, many urban areas continue to be
classified as non-attainment areas and future traffic growth threatens to keep the
attainment of air quality standards a difficult goal to sustain.
A significant proportion of new employment in the future is projected to go to
suburban locations. At the same time, traditional sources of funding for transportation
capacity expansion have become increasingly scarce. Even with additional funds, transit
expansion or usual transportation control measures are not likely to reduce or manage
traffic in suburban or urban locations. Even where these alternatives dampen traffic
congestion at first, many observers believe that growth in latent demand will clog up the
roads in a very short time.
These trends promise more and spreading congestion and decreasing mobility in the
future. Economic costs of such declines in mobility could be staggering, if innovative
approaches to address these problems are not considered. Congestion and/or road pricing
theoretically has the potential to play a role in helping the Twin Cities region meet future
demands for mobility.
Congestion Pricing - The rationale for congestion pricing derives from the relationship
between road capacity, level of traffic and congestion. Overall, transportation systems in
most metropolitan areas represent impressive and ample resources. And yet, these road
systems are not performing as well as they might. Typically, particular road segments are
clogged during morning and evening peak periods on weekdays. Except in a few
situations, the problem is not shortage of road capacity in aggregate. Furthermore, plenty
of auto capacity is available in terms of seats. The problem is, only a little over one of
these seats is utilized. Thus, if some peak period users of congested facilities were
persuaded to shift to off-peak times, to higher occupancy modes, or to less congested
roads, everyone could be better off. Also, since the relationship between the level of
traffic and congestion is nonlinear, relatively small reductions in vehicular flow can
produce much more improvement in speed and congestion delays. Shifts by relatively few
solo drivers can produce large benefits for others.
In theory, the aim of congestion pricing would be to charge each road trip an amount
equal or close to the cost occasioned by the trip. Currently, under congested situations,
road users, through existing user charges and taxes pay far less than the costs they
occasion. Road users pay for their own running costs and time spent traveling, but pay
only for a part of the road system construction, maintenance and operating costs. More
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importantly, they do not pay for the costs they impose on others, particularly in congested
situations, in terms of excess delays, running costs and pollution. Congestion pricing aims
to reduce or eliminate these subsidies enjoyed by the peak period road user through
surcharges for the use of congested facilities during congested conditions (peak periods).
Congestion pricing can reduce congestion significantly by encouraging peak period
travelers to shift to off-peak; to high occupancy modes; to less congested facilities; and
even by eliminating certain low value trips. It promises to increase peak period travel
speeds; to reduce delays and costs to auto and transit users; to enhance transit productivity
and reliability; to reduce pollution and energy use; and to make economic activities more
productive. It also is likely to enhance other transportation demand management (TDM)
measures such as telecommuting, staggered work hours, and compressed work weeks.
Reductions in traffic produced by transit expansion, high occupancy mode
enhancements (HOV lanes), conventional travel demand management strategies, such as
parking pricing and management policies may be dissipated over the near term as the
latent demand or normal traffic growth fills up the capacity made available. In contrast,
congestion pricing has the potential to reduce traffic and sustain the resulting
improvements in traffic flows over time.
Congestion pricing also holds the promise of generating revenues well in excess of
implementation costs. Despite its great promise, it appears that many institutional and
equity issues will need to be addressed before congestion pricing would be adopted
widely. The program revenues could help mitigate many of these concerns by enabling
funding of alternate mode programs or reducing existing user charges or taxes which
appear less equitable.
Road Pricing - As noted previously, there are obviously a number of similarities
between congestion and road pricing. The primary difference may lie in the motivation
for implementation of the pricing strategy. While congestion pricing would be more
heavily focused on its demand management capabilities, road pricing would typically be
more heavily oriented toward creating a user fee structure they would assess fees over a
broader segment of the region's roadway system, but typically at toll rate levels somewhat
lower than those used in congestion pricing.
For example, based on prior research, it might be necessary to establish toll rates of
-4-
$0.25 per mile or more to reflect the true cost of delays in severely congested areas, and
to have a sufficiently high demand management impact to eliminate the congestion. In
contrast, road pricing programs would tend to have toll rates closer to those traditionally
in effect on existing toll facilities, where per-mile toll rates range from about $0.03 to
$0.10.
There would be opportunities within a congestion/road pricing system to adjust toll
rates by time of day and, perhaps, by geographic location to at least partially influence
demand in congested areas. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the potential that at
least part of revenues generated under a congestion/road pricing system could be used to
finance needed improvements in the transportation system, such as capacity improvements,
additional carpool lanes, transit improvements, etc. In theory, the combined effect of
price-induced demand reductions and system capacity enhancements financed by
congestion/road pricing revenues could provide a strong basis for meeting future demands
while still preserving quality of life.
Twin Cities Setting
As shown in Figure 1, the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area of Minneapolis/St. Paul
encompasses seven counties, with a 1990 population of 2.24 million people. While area
congestion has not reached the critical level experienced in some other major metropolitan
areas, there is a great deal of concern that, unless something is done, severe congestion
will become inevitable. The following regional statistics point to the continued growth
in congestion. During the past 20 years, population grew by 30 percent while vehicle-
miles of travel grew by 130 percent. During the same period, even though 170 additional
miles of freeways and expressways were built, the regional highway system experienced
more than a four-fold increase in the number of miles of severe congestion. Finally,
despite improvements in vehicle emissions, the metropolitan area is still considered a non-
attainment area for carbon monoxide emissions.
The Metropolitan Council has defined four transportation goals in its Transportation
Development Guide/Policy Plan document. These transportation goals, which are intended
to influence the achievement of other regional goals, are as follows:
1. The transportation system should be maintained and developed in a manner that
contributes to the region's quality of life, furthers the coordination of the major
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regional systems and supports economic development, consistent with the
Metropolitan Development and Investment Framework.
2. Existing transportation services and facilities should be managed, protected,
adapted, reconstructed and reconfigured to satisfy travel demand, in the safest
practical manner, making the most effective use of limited resources.
3. Transit should be strengthened--regular route, paratransit, and ridesharing options--
to maximize the people-carrying capacity of the transportation system, to serve
needs of transit-dependent people, to be fully accessible to persons with disabilities,
to supplement the metropolitan highway system, to satisfy downtown-oriented
travel and to allow for intensified development.
4. Funding levels and sources, including local and private funds, should be adequate
and stable to ensure that appropriate investments are made in transportation
facilities and services.
The Metropolitan Council's Metropolitan Development and Investment Framework
indicates that the Council's regional growth strategy is to encourage growth to occur
within the Metropolitan Urban Service Area (MUSA). New development within this area
will be supported with regional facilities in line with the Council's forecasts.
Objectives of Congestion/Road Pricing
The Congestion/Road Pricing Study Steering Committee, at a two-day workshop
organized by the Project Management Team, (see Appendix A for membership of the
Steering Committee and Management Team) discussed the objectives of congestion/road
pricing for the region and agreed on the following objectives:
1. Reduce congestion on roadways:
a Reduce vehicle miles of travel (VMT) during peak periods and/or at
congested locations.
* Convert single occupant vehicle (SOV) use to high occupant vehicle
(HOV) use.
2. Increase the economic efficiency of transportation systems:
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m Provide savings to travelers by reducing travel time, fuel
consumption and other costs.
a Reduce social costs related to pollution, infrastructure maintenance,
medical care and public safety.
3. Improve air quality:
a Reduce vehicle emissions.
4. Stabilize transportation financing:
a Produce revenues to meet needs for transportation facilities and
services.
a Reduce the need for future roadway system expansion.
5. Support regional growth management policies:
a Encourage development within the metropolitan urban service area
(MUSA).
a Improve regional access for central city/inner ring residents.
Federal Pilot Program
Growing interest in congestion pricing is reflected in Section 1012 (b) of the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). In this section, the
Congress authorized a Congestion Pricing Pilot Program which will provide operational
tests of congestion pricing measures on highway facilities in the U.S. Section 1012 (b)
of the ISTEA requires the Secretary of Transportation to "solicit the participation of State
and local governments and public authorities for one or more congestion pricing pilot
projects."
The primary reason for the Congressional action was that testimony before Congress
had emphasized that the Nation's transportation system (particularly in urban areas) was
facing some key problems. Congestion was increasing, spreading to suburbs and resulting
in massive delays (on the order of 20 billion hours per year) with a corresponding large
detrimental impact on economic productivity. At the same time, air quality problems
were expected to get worse at a time when revenues available for alternative modes were
becoming increasingly scarce.
Clearly, many of these factors were taken into consideration in the development of
ISTEA. There was apparently a strong feeling within Congress that innovations like
congestion pricing may be needed to provide solutions in many urban areas; solutions
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aimed at reducing congestion and emissions, generating additional revenues and increasing
economic productivity through reduced delays.
Section 1012 (b) of the ISTEA provides funding and authorization for up to five
congestion pricing pilot program cooperative agreements involving state and local
governments. A maximum of $25 million is available each fiscal year from 1992 to 1997
under the program (for a total of $150 million), with no more than $15 million for any
one agreement (single or multiple projects - maximum available for any one agreement
is limited to $45 million). More than one project can be carried out under a cooperative
agreement between the Secretary of Transportation and project sponsors.
Eligible projects include pricing of roads, highways, freeways, arterials and streets for
purposes of reducing traffic congestion. Up to three of the five pilot programs may
involve tolling on the Interstate System, notwithstanding long standing bans on tolling of
interstate segments, as per 23 U.S.C. 129 and 301. Reductions in established tolls and fees
for road use, whether for carpools, transit, low-emission vehicles or other modes of travel,
are not eligible for funding. This is particularly important in the Twin Cities context since
a high proportion of the major urban freeway system is designated as "Interstate."
Parking pricing programs are not eligible. The exception to the rule is if parking pricing
or reduced tolls and fees are combined with increased prices for solo driving and/or peak
period vehicle travel. In short, price increases for vehicle use at congested times and
places are necessary under the pilot program, whether new pricing or boosts in existing
pricing, tolls or fees.
A primary consideration in evaluating pilot program proposals will be the prospect
of reducing congestion. Reduced congestion also may bring other benefits, including
improved air quality, reduced accidents and noise, improved business productivity and
increased property values. It is important to consider these possible benefits in designing
a pilot program and preparing an application. However, all else being equal, proposals
with the most promise to reduce congestion will receive top priority consideration.
The severity of congestion is an important but not critical consideration. Congestion
pricing in areas with severe congestion may bring more immediate benefits and be more
acceptable to travelers and decision makers. But areas without severe congestion are not
excluded from applying, provided at least some severe congestion now occurs and worse
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traffic conditions are likely in the future. In any case, proposed pricing levels must be
sufficient to reduce congestion, not merely raise revenues.
Pilot program funds may be used in direct support of program implementation and
evaluation. Funds may be used for design and planning, including detailed assessments
of probable impacts, preparation of enabling legislation, enforcement planning, public
relations and consensus building, technology assessments and specification, revenue
forecasting and finance plans, and other work necessary to specify program operations.
During implementation, funds may be used to support general administration and
operations, enforcement, pricing mechanisms (e.g. special permits or automatic vehicle
identification), monitoring of traffic and transit use, and gathering of reactions from
affected parties. Pilot program funds may not be used to support transit operations or
capital during implementation. Strong support for monitoring and evaluation is provided
for under the pilot program, since the program is intended to draw lessons useful to states
and localities other than the sponsor.
Concepts of interest include pricing of roads, highways, freeways, arterials and streets
for purposes of reducing traffic congestion, whether individually or collectively. Single
facility pricing may involve a bridge, tunnel, highway, arterial, freeway or intersection.
Multiple facility pricing may take place in a corridor or areawide. Corridor pricing might
include a major highway and parallel arterials. Areawide pricing would include pricing
for entering (or traveling within) a network of highways or streets.
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has developed official guidelines for
the Congestion Pricing Pilot Program. The guidelines have been published in the Federal
Register. An initial Notice announcing the program and soliciting public comment on a
number of implementation issues was issued on May 29, 1992 (57 FR 22857). A second
Notice, issued on November 24, 1992, presented program guidelines and solicited
applications for participation in the Pilot Program (57 FR 55293). A third Notice, issued
on June 16, 1993 (58 FR 33293) summarized the response to the November 24 Notice
(one of the 16 proposals was accepted for funding) and extended the solicitation
period for an additional four months from the date of the notice. Several revised proposals
were received in response to the extension. They are currently under review.
While the final decision is still pending, the indications are that the five congestion
pricing slots mandated by the Congress under ISTEA are not likely to be filled from the
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current applicants. FHWA along with the relevant Congressional Committees are in the
process of charting the future directions. Early indications suggest:
a The solicitation will be kept open indefinitely;
a FHWA probably will nurture and support potential comprehensive congestion
pricing projects that may take several years before full implementation; and
a FHWA probably will fund pre-implementation activities at selected sites with
serious intention about implementing road/congestion pricing in the future
In evaluating proposals for participation in the Pilot Program, the FHWA is giving
priority to proposals which involve:
a Significant charges aimed at curbing auto use at congested times and places.
Comprehensive applications of congestion pricing, including pricing of core
area streets, of principal segments of the freeway network, major facilities in a
corridor, and combinations of congestion and parking pricing. More narrow
applications, such as pricing of bottlenecks or single facilities also will be
considered if prices are significant.
m Congestion pricing as part of a broad program addressing congestion, mobility,
air quality and energy conservation.
Participation of public, business, rideshare and other affected parties in planning
for anticipating and overcoming possible implementation hurdles.
a The likelihood of early implementation of pricing projects to allow for
evaluation during the life of ISTEA.
Availability of reasonable transportation alternatives to peak period auto use,
including transit, ridesharing, alternative routes and alternative work hours.
Well designed monitoring and evaluation programs documenting pricing effects,
operations, costs, revenues and community impacts.
Use of advanced electronic toll and traffic management (ETTM) technologies
a Sound financial and management plans.
a Good prospects for adding to knowledge about design, implementation,
effectiveness, operations and acceptability of congestion pricing.
In this context, should it be deemed worthwhile, a Twin Cities congestion pricing
initiatives/proposal would stand an excellent chance of obtaining federal pilot program
funds for the detailed design, impact assessment, public outreach and other pre-
implementation activities in the next phase.
-10-
Legal Considerations
There are a number of regulatory and other legal limitations which may come into
play with respect to congestion/road pricing concepts. An overview of relevant state and
federal legislation is provided below.
Minnesota Legislation - While there presently is no specific state legislation that
relates directly to congestion/road pricing as a demand management strategy, the State
Legislature did enact a law in 1993 authorizing road authorities to develop, finance,
design, construct, improve, rehabilitate, own, and operate toll facilities and to enter into
agreements with private operators for the construction, maintenance, and operation of toll
facilities. Following are some key provisions of the law:
a No road authority and private operator may execute a development agreement
without the approval of the final agreement by the Commissioner of
Transportation.
The governing body of a county or municipality through which a facility passes
may veto the project within 30 days of approval by the Commissioner of
Transportation.
A development agreement for toll facilities may provide for any mode of
ownership or operation approved by the road authority, including ownership by the
private operator, with or without reversion of title, operation of the facilities under
leases or management contracts, toll concessions, build-operate-transfer (BOT), or
build-transfer-operate (BTO) facilities.
Residual toll revenues after payments are made belong to the private operator.
m After expiration of a lease for a BTO facility, or after title has reverted for a BOT
facility, the road authority may continue to charge tolls for the facility.
To provide money to acquire, develop, finance, design, construct, improve,
rehabilitate, and operate a toll facility and to establish a reserve for bonds issued,
the Commissioner of Finance, or a road authority by resolution of its governing
body, may authorize, issue, and sell revenue bonds payable solely from all or a
portion of the revenues derived from a toll facility, including any payments agreed
to be made by a private operator.
When a highway project in the metropolitan area has been scheduled in the
department's six-year work program but is designated as a toll facility, the
Commissioner of Transportation shall substitute in the work program a similar
highway project in the metropolitan area.
Federal Legislation
Both the FHWA and UMTA legal counsels provided legal opinions in the 1970s
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suggesting that carefully designed road pricing schemes could be legally feasible. Federal
statutes have undergone revisions in the last few years, probably making it less difficult
to implement road pricing.
On federally assisted facilities, either for existing facilities, or for facilities now under
construction, Federal law appears to prohibit collecting tolls. However, in the 1970s, the
Federal UMTA and FHWA legal counsels were of the opinion that Federal statutes might
allow states or local agencies to apply road pricing if the fees were not collected at the
time and place of passage. Fees for use collected elsewhere, such as state level
registration fees and gasoline taxes are obviously permitted, and road use without paying
such fees is illegal. Likewise, state weight-distance taxes, in which heavy trucks pay for
their actual miles of travel within a state, have been found to be constitutional and legal
under Federal laws. Further steps should include soliciting up-to-date legal opinions from
US DOT and Minnesota legal counsels.
Road pricing via supplementary visual permits or AVI, in which the financial
transactions take place elsewhere might thus currently be legal. This issue needs further
clarification. Another possibility is to develop Federal legislation that would specifically
exclude particular facilities from any potentially applicable restrictions. If Minnesota
policymakers decided to seek federal funding for a possible congestion/road pricing
program under the ISTEA Section 1210 (b) Pilot Program, and if the application were
accepted by FHWA, then this issue of restriction of tolls on federal roads would become
moot since ISTEA specifically exempts Pilot Program participants from the restrictions.
Another issue relates to the restrictions on the use of revenues generated from pricing.
Clearly, US Code 23 places many restrictions on the use of toll revenues. This may
foreclose the possibility of using revenues in the most acceptable manner from the local
standpoint. While the ISTEA Congestion Pricing Pilot Program allows much more flexible
use of toll revenues, some limitations do remain. This issue needs more careful
assessment.
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Chapter 2
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING AND PLANNED ROAD PRICING PROGRAMS
Road pricing systems in the United States have generally been limited to traditional
toll facility applications, where the revenues generated from facility user fees are
dedicated to the financing, operations and maintenance of the road. That is, the primary
motivational factor is revenue collection, not demand management/travel behavior
modification. Toll charges are typically constant throughout the course of the day and
peak period surcharges are normally not applied. The truer form of congestion pricing,
in contrast, is designed to influence travel decisions to the extent that the particular trip
is not made, is made at a different time or may be made by a mode other than the single-
occupant automobile.
Peak period pricing is not a new concept in the field of transportation, nor is it an
uncommon idea. The provision of services, and capacity, to satisfy a peak demand often
disproportionately increases the total cost of providing the service. To recognize this,
peak period surcharges are commonly applied in the provision of other services, such as
telephone, fuel and electricity. Most commuter rail facilities also charge differential fares
for time or direction of travel. These charges recognize both the elasticity of demand at
different times of day and the necessity of influencing behavior to reduce the cost of
providing services. Electronic toll collection technology has now advanced to a level such
that road pricing can be economically implemented.
There have been a limited number of road pricing schemes implemented in the past
which were at least, in part, aimed at reducing congestion or other modifications to
demand. All of these, however, are outside the United States, and include:
Singapore Area Licensing Scheme;
a Hong Kong Electronic Road Pricing Program;
Norway-Bergen, Oslo and Trondheim Toll Rings;
a The Swiss Motorway System; and
a The A-1 Motorway System in France.
There are a number of planned road pricing systems now under study in both the
United States and abroad. In addition to this preliminary study of congestion pricing in
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the Twin Cities area, other U.S. projects include:
a S.R. 91 in Orange County, California;
a The San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Demonstration Project;
A Proposed Los Angeles Basin Pricing Project; and
a Preliminary Studies of Congestion Pricing in the Seattle-Tacoma
Washington Area.
There is also considerable planning for future road pricing projects outside the
United States. Some of these include, but are not necessarily limited to:
a London and Cambridge England Congestion Pricing Programs;
a Stockholm Zone D System;
a Truck Road Pricing Program for the German Autobahn System; and
a Establishment of a Nationwide Road Pricing System on the Existing Toll-
Free British Motorway System.
A brief overview of some of the key characteristics of selected existing and/or
planned road pricing projects is provided below.
Singapore Area Licensing Scheme
The Singapore system is known as an areawide system. An imaginary cordon was
drawn around the Central Business District - an area of about 2.0 square miles.
Singapore, a city of 2.5 million, has operated this areawide road pricing program since
1975. The affected zone includes the downtown business area and two congested
corridors leading to the city center. In developing the cordon, main considerations were
traffic congestion, available opportunities for bypass routes around the area and the
availability of space just outside the fringe for parking and shuttle bus operation.
The pricing scheme was originally established to include only the most severe
congestion causers. However, for the purpose of simplifying the enforcement process and
reducing costs, it was decided to primarily discourage through and inbound trips which
constituted the most problematic traffic and created the major part of congestion. It was
found sufficient to monitor only the cordon crossing points, and to focus the charge on
the peak traffic only. Additionally, passenger cars with fewer than four occupants were
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required to purchase paper licensing for placement on windshields for travel into the
priced area. Large carpools were excluded from the charge. In addition, all public
transportation vehicles, buses, taxis and emergency vehicles were also excluded. Light
trucks were excluded, although heavy trucks were completely prohibited from entering the
zone during the morning peak. By 1989 all exemptions on private vehicles and taxis were
removed and only public transportation and emergency vehicles were allowed to travel
free.
In 1989 the pricing scheme was expanded to cover afternoon travel as well.
However, a single daily license was valid all day, so commuters who had already
purchased the license for use in the morning were generally not affected.
In 1979 the initial daily license fee was set at the equivalent of $1.25 (U.S.). There
was also a monthly pass available at about $25.00 (U.S.). In 1989 the fees were gradually
raised to slightly more than $2.00 (U.S.) per day or $42.00 (U.S.) per month. Income
levels in Singapore are about 75 percent of the U.S.
Enforcement is accomplished using traffic wardens at 28 crossing points into the
area. The license plate numbers of violators are noted by the enforcers and owners are
cited by mail. The fine for an initial offense is about $25.00 (U.S.), but is increased
sharply for repeat offenders. Photographic surveillance has also been introduced.
The system is now about to be converted to an electronic license plate scheme,
which will eliminate the need for visual enforcement. They are now underway with
development of the system which is expected to be in full operation by 1995.
The congestion pricing program, in conjunction with certain other demand
management strategies, has been extremely effective in reducing demand within the
Singapore Central Business District. The program reduced peak period traffic volume
entering the area by over 40 percent, based on some accounts. Before the pricing
program was implemented, the level of service on major facilities in the affected area was
very low, generally considered Level of Service F, and speeds on principal routes in the
area was about 8 MPH. After implementation of the pricing program, traffic moved more
freely and average speeds more than doubled. On the other hand, traffic on peripheral
bypass roads increased considerably as through trips were diverted to outlying routes.
-15-
Numerous factors led to the successful implementation of the program, including:
a Existence of severe congestion;
Significant accompanying expansion of transit services;
a A carefully designed and conducted public outreach program;
Careful timing of the program coinciding with attractive economic and land
use reform, including the opening of large scale new public housing and
massive slum removal programs;
a Lack of serious legal impediments; and
A strong authoritarian government.
It was reported that the congestion pricing program has apparently not measurably
affected business activity within the affected area and annual revenues from license sales
are estimated between $5 and $10 million (U.S.).
Singapore's Area Licensing Scheme was and remains incredibly successful. Its plan
is aimed at a 25 percent reduction in Central Area morning traffic; they achieved a 50
percent reduction. Indeed, the Central Area was so free of traffic that congestion delays
there were trivial. Bus and auto speeds within the priced zone increased more than 30
percent. However, the congestion levels and speeds deteriorated along the peripheral
bypass routes. The overall improvement in regional travel speeds was not as great,
however, since the priced area trip portion represented only a small part of total trips in
the greater Singapore region.
The large reductions in vehicle trips entering the priced zone during the A.M. peak
was more than had been anticipated. Some of the reductions may have been produced
by the fact that other policies accompanied area pricing - e.g., parking rates in the priced
zone went up significantly and transit service was expanded significantly.
Hong Kong Electronic Road Pricing Program
During 1983-1985, Hong Kong carried out a comprehensive assessment of the
potential and feasibility of region-wide congestion pricing using electronic license tags.
The objective of the project was to develop an effective and self-financing program for
competing traffic congestion by reducing auto traffic at central and inner areas.
Commercial vehicles and buses were to be excluded from charges. The program would
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have also reduced excise and vehicle ownership taxes with excess revenues developed
from the pricing program.
After a comprehensive study, a pilot pricing program was introduced in which
about 2,600 public service vehicles and volunteer autos were equipped with passive AVI
license tags. AVI is a form of electronic toll collection, to be discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3. Induction loops were set up in the road bed at 18 strategic locations that
the central computer established to process AVI tag information as the vehicles were
"charged" road user prices according to location and time of travel.
The pilot program showed that the sophisticated AVI technology for electronic
licensing worked efficiently and accurately. The superiority of AVI over supplementary
licensing like Singapore was clearly established. The cost of full implementation,
including the on-board vehicle equipment, was estimated to be about $30 million back in
1984. The revenue from road pricing was estimated to be many times over the operating
cost.
A multiple zone, cordon based pricing system was planned. Proposed charges
would have varied by time of day and location. This indicated significant potential
economic benefits, more than $100 million per year to road users in terms of reduced
congestion, in addition to $50 million in increased revenue to public transportation and
up to 17 percent reduction in vehicle emissions.
Despite the promise of strong technical and economic justifications, the full
program was ultimately not implemented after the pilot program was completed.
Apparently there were numerous reasons leading to the decision not to implement the
program on a permanent basis including:
a Government was apparently unprepared for the serious opposition that
materialized;
a Auto owners were typically high income and influential persons in Hong
Kong who put up strong opposition while the 90 percent of the population
who would have benefited, did not organize;
a Congestion pricing was one of the first issues to be brought before a newly
established self-rule government, who was eager to establish new found
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authority by rejecting any program which had been previously initiated by
the Colonial British authority; and perhaps, most importantly;
a There were privacy concerns regarding the ability to identify the time and
location of vehicles. This concern was particularly important as the 1997
"pass over" of the Hong Kong territory to China had just been negotiated.
The idea of road pricing is still alive in Hong Kong. The people were petitioned
in 1989 by the Hong Kong government about current public opinion about electronic
pricing. Continuing concerns about the invasion of privacy and the approach of 1997
(transition of Hong Kong ownership) forced the government to issue a 1990 statement that
electronic pricing was under consideration as a long-term option as it monitors
developments and applications globally. As an initial step into electronic technology,
however, two systems of electronic toll collection were implemented in 1992 at the
Aberdeen and Cross Harbor Tunnels.
Norway Toll Rings
The three largest cities in Norway have implemented cordons around the city
centers for the purposes of collecting tolls to enter the Central Business District areas.
Oslo is the heaviest populated, with 500,000 people. Bergen is the second largest, with
about 200,000 residents, followed by Trondheim at 140,000 people. In 1984, faced with
national funding constraints that would have stretched the completion of needed
comprehensive transportation improvements to more than 30 years, the city of Bergen first
developed the idea of a toll ring concept. Oslo followed in February 1990 and Trondheim
in October 1991.
From its inception, the toll ring concept in Norway has been based on revenue
generated for use in transportation infrastructure improvements, not necessarily direct
demand management. Eighty percent of the net revenues from the Oslo system is
earmarked for highway improvements and 20 percent are dedicated to construction and
improvements for busways. Revenues from the Trondheim system are also used for
programs to promote public transportation, bicycling and walking.
The Oslo system is, in a sense, a traditional toll collection system in that it has no
peak and off-peak pricing differentials. It differs from a traditional toll application,
however, in that it involves the charging of tolls in an entire area, on roads which were
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not originally financed as toll facilities. The Trondheim system attempts some measure
of off-peak discounts, to encourage changes in travel time. A combination of electronic
and manual toll collection is used at most locations. Enforcement in the electronic lanes
is accomplished by videotaping. Violators are mailed fines approximately equal to the
cost of a monthly pass.
Traffic reduction was not a stated goal in any of the three systems in Norway, and
the tolls have had minor impacts. In Oslo, for example, before and after studies suggest
a traffic reduction of about 3.5 percent. Impacts at the other cities were somewhat lower.
Peak period travel is generally less impacted than off-peak travel. The toll for entry into
the protected areas ranges from about $0.80 (U.S.) in Bergen to $1.60 (U.S.) in Oslo and
Trondheim. It is interesting to note that public opinion surveys conducted in Bergen
before the toll ring was opened found that 54 percent strongly opposed the tolls. One
year after implementation, however, a survey found that more than half of the respondents
favored the system and only 37 percent were opposed. Public fears of congestion at toll
plazas failed to materialize and infrastructure improvements financed by the tolls helped
to show immediate benefits.
In Oslo, most people surveyed after the tolls were implemented still opposed the
project, but with some slight improvement in public opinion. In Trondheim, 72 percent
of the people surveyed were opposed to tolls before implementation, this dropped to about
48 percent after the tolls were actually implemented.
Other Recent and Planned European Road Pricing Concepts
Switzerland implemented a motorway road pricing system based on a visually read
vignette, or windshield decal. Vignettes can be purchased at points of entry into
Switzerland or at various selected locations throughout the location. It is understood that
vignettes can be purchased on a daily, monthly or annual basis and are not directly related
to time of day or actual distance traveled.
While the system has been considered a success within Switzerland, most other
European countries that are now actively considering implementation of road pricing have
rejected the vignette concept in favor of more direct electronic charging techniques. For
example, the United Kingdom has recently issued a policy statement advising of its intent
to implement road pricing throughout the Motorway System by 1997. They will begin
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testing of alternative electronic toll needs to accomplish this during 1994 and 1995.
Similar conclusions have also been reached in the Netherlands. Most existing European
toll facilities already use a combination of conventional and electronic toll collection.
In Germany, the government recently announced a proposal to charge road pricing
to commercial vehicles only. This is intended to overcome significant inequities in the
share of road finance, which is currently borne by passenger cars under Germany's taxing
structure. Germany is contemplating use of the vignette system, now used in Switzerland,
since the charges will apply only to commercial vehicles.
S.R. 91 Express Lanes - Orange County, California
S.R. 91 is a heavily congested eight-lane, limited-access facility connecting Orange
and Los Angeles Counties with San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. Also known as
the Inland Empire, these counties have experienced exceptional levels of population
growth over the last two decades, with each county listed among the fastest growing in
the United States. Development patterns in the Inland Empire are primarily residential,
while major employment centers exist in Orange and Los Angeles Counties to the west.
As such, there is a huge and ever growing commuter movement between Riverside
County and Orange County along S.R. 91. Traffic on the route increased from about
91,000 vehicles per day in 1980 to well over 200,000 vehicles per day by 1991, an
average annual increase of better than 8.0 percent per year, compounded. As a result,
extremely high levels of congestion are routinely experienced, particularly westbound in
the morning and eastbound in the afternoon. Commuters leave their homes extremely
early in the morning, with the morning peak hour beginning at about 5:00 a.m. and
continuing until after 9:00 a.m.
Congestion problems on S.R. 91 are exacerbated by the lack of alternative routes
due to topographic constraints. The nearest competing freeways or major arterials are 10
miles away to the north and about 20 miles away to the south.
As part of California's landmark privatization legislation referred to as AB680, the
California Private Transportation Company (CPTC) was awarded a franchise to construct
a congestion priced roadway in the median of the existing congested S.R. 91 freeway.
The CPTC project will add four travel lanes, two in each direction, over a 10-mile
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segment between Riverside and Orange Counties. There will be no intermediate access
points and only through trips will be able to use the tolled lanes. No toll plazas will be
constructed and toll collection will be 100 percent electronic, with all vehicles to be
equipped with transponders on the vehicle windshield. Vehicles with three or more
occupants will be allowed toll-free travel during at least the first two years of operation
and, as a minimum, discounts from non-HOV toll rates in later years.
The CPTC project will monitor congestion levels on the adjacent toll-free lanes on
S.R. 91 and will charge tolls accordingly. With the use of electronic toll collection
techniques, variable toll pricing is possible, with tolls changing by time of day and travel
direction. Based on traffic and revenue studies conducted for the project, toll rates are
estimated to range from as low as $0.25 during off-peak times to as much as $2.50 during
peak weekday congestion conditions. This project, which is now under construction and
is scheduled to open in 1996, will be an excellent example of not only congestion pricing
but also fully electronic toll collection techniques which will be an essential ingredient in
virtually all future road pricing projects in the United States and abroad.
London and Cambridge, England Proposals
Congestion pricing has long been considered in and around London. As early as
the mid-1970s, plans were developed for various types of pricing schemes, generally using
daily or monthly passes.
In 1990, the study conducted by the National Economic Development Office
indicated that 62 percent of Londoners would support road pricing as part of an integrated
plan of transportation improvements. In early 1992, the British Ministry of Transport
revived the congestion pricing concept and initiated a five-year feasibility study. The
study, which is now underway, will assess the feasibility of implementing congestion
pricing within the area bounded by the M-25, a motorway encircling the greater London
area. It will also evaluate options in variation on charges by location, time of day, day
of week, vehicle type and different methods of measuring congestion.
In addition to congestion, economic efficiency and revenue potential have become
key objectives. AVI technology is under serious consideration, both in the London
context and at the national level as the British contemplate plans for placing tolls on the
entire interurban Motorway System. The major focus on the London study is on public
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interaction/outreach, so as to develop a package of improvements that would meet public
support. Considerable effort is being put into attitudinal surveys to find out what needs
to be packaged with congestion pricing to make it acceptable to the public at large.
In the city of Cambridge, traffic grew by almost 50 percent between 1980 and
1990. Traffic is projected to have increased by another 40 percent by the year 2000.
Peak period speeds in the city have reportedly been reduced to an average of just 12
MPH. As part of a comprehensive transportation package, the Cambridge City Council
has decided to consider congestion pricing as a demand management instrument. A
congestion metering plan was preferred over a general areawide pricing program based
on the premise that an areawide program would greater limit the developments that would
occur within the protected zone. The proposed system was to be developed under the
Pricing and Monitoring Electronically of Automobiles (PAMELA) project, one of the
European community's projects under the Dedicated Road Infrastructure for Vehicle Safety
(DRIVE) Research Program. Following a recent change in government in Cambridge, the
project is apparently currently under review. One interesting aspect of the Cambridge
proposal is that charging might not actually be implemented unless there was actually
some level of congestion on the street system. The level of congestion in the road
network would be measured based on the vehicle speed over a pre-determined distance
or the number of stops experienced over a given distance. Under this concept, the charges
would accrue even as the vehicle sits in gridlock, with no possible escape routes.
Stockholm Zone Fee
In 1992, agreement was reached on a master plan for transportation investments
in the Stockholm region. Implementation of the plan, referred to as the Dennis
Agreement, would improve environmental conditions, reduce congestion, and better
provide prospects for regional development. Key components of the Dennis Agreement
include:
a Upgrading and expanding the already expensive and widely used public
transport system in the Stockholm region;
a Constructing peripheral freeways (most notably a ring road and the Western
Bypass) to carry traffic around, rather than through, Central Stockholm;
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Reduction of roadway capacity within Central Stockholm to further
discourage vehicular traffic to and through the city; and
a The use of a toll-based roadway pricing system to discourage vehicular
travel into Central Stockholm, and to finance construction, operation and
maintenance of peripheral freeways and other related roadway and
environmental improvements.
Implementation of the Zone Fee tolling system is currently scheduled for 1996.
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Congestion Pricing Project
The Bay Bridge congestion pricing proposal was selected as one of the ISTEA
congestion pricing pilot projects by FHWA in the spring of 1993. This project would
replace the existing six tolls on the Bridge with variable tolls. Non-carpools would pay
a higher toll to travel during congested peak periods, while carpools and vanpools would
continue to be able to use the Bridge toll-free. Revenues raised would be applied to
improving and expanding options to driving alone in this corridor.
The San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge corridor, connecting the East Bay with San
Francisco, is one of the most heavily traveled corridors in the nation. Automobiles, bus,
truck, ferry and heavy rail operating in this corridor serve more than 135,000 person-trips
each day during the morning peak period alone (6:00 to 10:00 a.m.). Tolls are collected
in the westbound travel direction only.
The proposed congestion pricing demonstration program is structured such that
during specified peak periods when congestion normally occurs, non-HOV traffic will pay
an increased price to use the Bridge. Simultaneously, improvements to supporting and
parallel transit services and rideshare programs will be made. The hope is that the
congestion pricing strategy on the existing toll bridge will be sufficient to push more
single-occupant drivers into carpools or expanded transit vehicles.
Summary
In summation, actual experience with congestion pricing has been almost non-
existent in the United States and in limited other applications throughout the world.
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Without question, however, it is gaining support from transportation planners worldwide,
and, as summarized briefly in this Chapter, a number of new projects are moving forth
during the 1990s. It is likely, therefore, that by the turn of the century, there will be
many operating road pricing systems, including several in the United States.
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Chapter 3
TOLL COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
While road pricing has often been considered as a potential mechanism for
reducing congestion levels on urban freeways and other routes, the cost and delays
associated with the traditional toll collection process has been viewed as a major obstacle.
Simply stated, the potential value in terms of reduced congestion of a pricing strategy
would be significantly reduced if the collection process itself added congestion and
consumed much of the revenue collected through the pricing process.
The emergence of electronic toll collection (ETC) has greatly enhanced the
potential viability of congestion pricing. Also referred to as Automatic Vehicle
Identification (AVI) or Electronic Tolls and Traffic Management (ETTM), new ETC
systems are now in revenue use on several existing toll facilities in the United States and
abroad. When considering the potential joint application of revenue collection and the
broader field of traffic management and other IVHS applications, several major U.S. and
foreign companies have developed ETC systems and a wide range of technological
options are now available.
For the most part, the technology exists today to implement most types of
congestion/road pricing systems which could be considered in Minnesota. By the time
any program were actually implemented, this technology would likely be enhanced
significantly, including expanded integration with other intelligent traffic
management/information systems.
While there would be a significant cost associated with implementation of a
regionwide ETC system, available technology should not be considered a major obstacle
to implementation of road pricing. Further, it is reasonable to assume that it may be
possible to use fully electronic toll collection, although this would require widespread
participation in the pricing program by a majority of vehicles in the Twin Cities area.
The cost for on-board transponder devices, in total, will likely dwarf the cost of system
implementation, and there still may be exception vehicles which may be unequipped.
It would also be possible to provide limited opportunities for toll collection through
conventional means, either automatic or manual, under some of the potential pricing
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options. This would, of course, increase the cost of operation and potentially result in a
significant encroachments on limited right-of-way, etc.
Traditional Toll Collection Methods
Prior to the advent of electronic toll collection, revenues on toll facilities were
collected through manual means, for the most part, with some use of automatic coin
machines. Traditional toll collection methods have included open barrier type collection
as well as closed ticket systems.
Depending on the scope of application of potential road pricing programs in the
Twin Cities area, it may be necessary to consider at least partial traditional toll collection
methods. If, for example, the scope of pricing application were limited in nature, it might
not be practical to equip a majority of vehicles in the region for electronic toll collection.
Provisions would also need to be made for pricing of out-of-area vehicles or motorists
who use the priced facilities on a less frequent basis.
As the name implies, manual toll collection involves the use of toll attendants in
toll booths to actually collect and manually classify vehicle tolls. In a typical barrier
plaza application, all vehicles of the same classification would typically pay the same toll
rate. In some cases, where toll levels are sufficiently low, it may be possible to use
automatic coin machines in certain lanes, thereby eliminating the need for attendants in
those lanes. However, automatic lanes are typically limited to passenger car motorists
with exact change.
More sophisticated automatic coin machines are capable of actually making change
and issuing receipts to patrons. Recent advances in both the United States and abroad
have integrated magnetic stripe card readers in automatic coin machines (as well as in
manual lanes.) In some cases these magnetic stripe cards can be used as pre-paid fare
cards, with stored balance information on the magnetic stripe, decremented with each
succeeding trip through the toll plaza.
In some cases, it is necessary to establish toll plazas on ramps or other relatively
low volume locations. Some toll agencies have elected to collect tolls at these locations
using an "honor system," providing only an automatic coin machine and requiring
motorists to have exact change. In some cases, the "violation rate" in these unattended
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automatic lanes can be quite high, ranging from about 25 percent to as much as 65
percent of passing vehicles. At low volume locations, however, even with a high
violation rate, unattended toll collection is sometimes merited on a net revenue basis. The
operating costs associated with adding toll attendants at some locations can be
significantly greater than the potential revenue loss, even at relatively high levels of toll
evasion.
In the Minnesota congestion pricing application, traditional toll plazas may be
considered under spot pricing concepts or, other such limited pricing applications where
it may not be feasible to equip most vehicles for fully electronic toll collection. Ramp
toll facilities might be viable on new toll roads which might be constructed, but would
not appear to be advisable under any regionwide road pricing system.
By far the preferred alternative would be implementation of a full electronic toll
collection system as described below. During the study it was determined that the more
broad the application of pricing, the more viable it would be to implement a fully
electronic revenue collection system. As more and more limited access facilities are
added to the list of priced projects, total toll revenue potential increases significantly.
With this considerable revenue potential, it would be theoretically possible to equip a
majority of vehicles in the region, even if this expense was not passed on to users.
By contrast, a limited application such as tolls on one or more particular toll
bridge, would not lend itself to full regional wide equipping of vehicles for electronic toll
collection. However, electronic tolls should be made available to those who choose to
participate at all tolling locations, even if traditional means are also used.
ETC Overview
Generally speaking, the concept of electronic toll collection is simple. In all
existing systems now in use, motorists choosing to participate in an electronic toll
program enroll in the program and make a pre-payment. They are issued a transponder
device which is mounted on or in the vehicle. As the vehicle passes through a toll plaza
(or in some cases around a toll plaza in bypass lanes) the appropriate toll fare is simply
deducted from the pre-paid account balances.
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ETC systems have been in the development stage for more than 15 years. Current
generation ETC systems are presently in use in 10 toll agencies in the United States as
well as several facilities overseas.
U.S. toll facilities currently using modern generation ETC systems include:
s Dallas North Tollway;
a Harris County toll facilities;
a E-470 Toll Highway (Denver);
m Foothill Transportation Corridor (Orange County, California);
m Oklahoma Turnpike System (10 Turnpikes);
a Lake Ponchetrain Causeway;
m Crescent City Connection Bridge (New Orleans);
a New York State Thruway;
a Lincoln Tunnel (New York); and
a The Georgia-400 Tollway.
In addition, optical laser systems are in use in Maryland, Florida and the
Philadelphia area. These systems generally use bar-coded labels, mounted on the vehicle
window, and are used to identify patrons eligible for discounted tolls. The bar-code
systems have limited potential in a regional congestion pricing system, due to the multiple
lane environments and fully non-stop applications which would be needed.
System Categories
ETC systems may be generally grouped into one of three categories, including:
a Read-Only - A read-only system utilizes a transponder which is permanently
encoded with a specific account number and/or other information and the
contents of the on-board device is not in any way altered as each ETC
transaction is processed;
a Read-Write - Read-write ETC systems operate with some portion of the
transponder information being physically "rewritten" as each ETC
transaction takes place. There are several variations on the read-write
concept ranging from simple storage of "live" data from the current
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transaction only to maintaining "stored balances" with respect
to patron accounts; and
S Programmable Read-Write - Programmable read-write systems are presently
the most sophisticated type of system available, and provides an opportunity
for the patron to directly interact with the transponder device. Again there
are a wide range of manners in which this is possible, including small key
pads and, most often, interface for credit cards and smart cards.
Each of the systems listed above currently in use in the United States utilizes one
form or another of the read-only concept. As might be expected, read-only systems
feature the lowest cost for individual transponders, but also require account information
to be centrally maintained. Each time the vehicle equipped with a read-only tag passes
through the toll collection location, the appropriate toll charge is deducted from the
account balances maintained in the computer data base. The on-board device is used only
for identification of the vehicle and ETC account number. This arrangement can result
in considerable overhead for the operating agency, as large volumes of transaction data
must be communicated and processed daily. On the other hand, read-only systems have
the advantage of an easy account balance replenishment process, which can be handled
by mail, at conveniently located service centers, through direct linkage to credit cards,
electronic funds transfers, etc.
On those read-write systems which maintain "stored balances" in the transponder,
it is not typically necessary for the agency to maintain independent listings of balances
on off-line computer systems. This reduces overhead but does reduce the number of
options available for renewal. Since the only official record of the remaining balance is
stored in the transponder itself, it is necessary to physically bring the transponder unit to
the point of account replenishment.
In a traditional toll application, this can be accomplished in a manual toll lane.
Under a congestion pricing system, where most "toll collection" would typically happen
in a fully unattended environment, it will be more difficult to provide locations for
convenient replenishment of transponder accounts.
Another disadvantage of the stored balance arrangement is that a separate balance
will need to be maintained on each transponder, even if a single account has multiple
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transponders. Consider, for example, commercial vehicle accounts which may have
several hundred vehicles. A minimum balance, of say, $100, might be required for each
of the several hundred vehicles which may prove to be a significant problem for
commercial vehicle operators. Under an account-based system, a balance for the entire
fleet could be maintained at a single location.
It is also possible to use read-write technology without actually maintaining
balances on the transponder itself. One major advantage is that information about the
transaction in process can be "written" at a point of entry and exit to and from a "priced"
facility. For example, suppose tolls were to be implemented on the freeway system on
all or certain portions of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Further suppose that the actual
price charged would be a function of point of entry and exit from the freeway system.
A simplified read-write tag would allow the point of entry to be written onto the tag itself
at the time the vehicle enters the system. The appropriate toll could then be calculated
at the point of exit, real-time, by simply comparing the point of entry (as written on the
tag) with the point of exit information.
The most advanced systems will allow a greater level of direct user interface.
Many of the ETC manufacturers are now beginning to offer programmable read-write
devices. These are in more widespread use in Europe, particularly in France and Italy
where Smart Card interfaces are widely used.
There are several advantages to this type of system. First of all, it provides a
"feedback" mechanism to the user regarding the amount of balance remaining, upcoming
toll charges, etc. It also permits pre-paid balances to be stored on a Smart Card, for
example, which can be more easily brought to a point of replenishment, such as at banks,
shopping malls, etc. It is not necessary for the entire transponder device to be brought
to the particular location. It provides an additional measure of security, since the
transponder would be inoperable without the Smart Card and/or credit card and, perhaps,
most importantly, the more sophisticated transponder device may be more adaptable to
future traffic management and information systems which will undoubtedly emerge.
As might be expected, the more complex the transponder, the more expensive.
While there are several hundred thousand transponder devices now in use in the United
States alone, they are all of the read-only variety and it is generally believed that the
market is still in its infant stages. It is likely that costs per transponder will decrease
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significantly in the future. Transponders generally fall within the following price ranges:
Read-only - $20-$30;
a Read-write: $30-$40; and
a Programmable read-write: $40-$60.
If a regionwide pricing scheme were implemented in the Twin Cities area, it is not
unlikely that as much as two million transponders might be required, depending on the
nature and extent of the pricing program. In these types of quantities, it is likely that the
transponder costs would be significantly reduced, possibly by as much as 25 to 50
percent.
Readers - At each of the toll collection locations, it would be necessary to
implement some type of reader system. This generally includes an intelligent interrogator
device, some type of antenna device and, for a series of reader locations, controlling
computer equipment. It would also probably be necessary to implement some type of
video enforcement system at each potential revenue collection location. The video
systems are designed to record license plates and other distinguishing information from
other vehicles which violate the pricing program. It may also be necessary to provide
automatic vehicle classification equipment at each of the pricing locations. Depending
on the pricing concept used, toll charges may be different based on the number of vehicle
axles, etc. Equipment systems already exist for automatic vehicle classification, although
these become somewhat more complex in a multi-lane, open-road environment. It would
be relatively straightforward to implement a vehicle classification system on, for example,
freeway ramps where there is some control over the lateral placement of vehicle tires, etc.
A typical installation, including an antenna, reader, video enforcement system and
vehicle classification system would probably be in the range of $25,000. Where multiple
lanes are involved, such as freeway mainline sections at points of entry into a priced area,
the total equipment cost would be a multiple of the individual per-lane cost, although
some efficiencies would be possible.
Central System - If an account-based AVI system is utilized, a large central
system, or groups of central systems, would need to be established. It would be at this
location(s) where individual account data would be maintained on large computer files.
Under this configuration, a complex network of data communications would be needed
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between the Central System and each of the remote revenue collection locations.
If the system were designed such that balances could be stored on the transponder
itself, or on Smart Cards, the amount of actual data flow could be reduced. However, it
is likely that on-line communication capability would still be desirable, for purposes of
traffic statistical information, fault detection and so forth.
Potential Applications in Congestion/Road Pricing
There are a number of possible methods in which congestion/road pricing might
be implemented in the Twin Cities area. These will be delineated in subsequent chapters.
However, to better understand how electronic and/or traditional toll collection might be
applied, a few candidate options are discussed below.
In developing future plans for fully electronic toll systems under other road pricing
proposals, two generic concepts have been established. These are generally referred to
as the "open" electronic system, and the "closed" electronic system.
Under the open system, electronic toll antennas or other reading mechanisms would
be typically installed over or in the roadway pavement. As shown in the upper portion
of Figure 2, antennas would be designed to read the ETC transponders on all vehicles
subjected to tolls passing through a multi-lane "tolling zone." This tolling would be done
at full freeway speeds. In the example shown in Figure 2, provisions could also be made
for toll-free HOV bypass lanes. As will be noted subsequently, all of the hypothetical
congestion pricing scenarios evaluated as part of this study assume that multiple-occupant
vehicles would be allowed toll-free usage.
Under the open electronic concept, the various electronic tolling readers would be
installed in each mainline segment of the freeway system; that is between each
interchange. The actual toll associated with each tolling location would be based on the
per-mile rate and the distance between the interchanges.
The open tolling concept does, however, present some technological challenges.
First of all, multiple ETC transponders would need to be read at high travel speeds. More
importantly, in a multi-lane environment, it would be difficult to control the horizontal
placement of vehicles passing under the read zone. While this would not necessarily limit
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the effectiveness of the actual ETC process itself, it would make ancillary functions, such
as automatic vehicle classification (AVC) to be extremely difficult. It could also create
some problems with video or other types of enforcement system.
Perhaps a preferred alternative to the open tolling concept is the "closed" electronic
tolling concept. This would be a viable option under a pricing application which might
be applied only to freeways or other limited access facilities. Electronic reading
equipment would be established at all entry and exit ramp locations, as well as the end
points of a particular freeway. As vehicles enter the freeway system, their point of entry
would be noted in the ETC system and, depending on type of transponder, also
electronically written on the transponder itself. By providing bypass lanes of the tolling
locations on each ramp, it would be possible for HOV traffic to enter or exit the freeway
system without being tolled.
Another important advantage of this closed electronic system is that automatic
vehicle identification and enforcement would be improved. In most cases, the toll
collection process on the ramp can be consolidated to one travel lane, thereby ensuring
reasonable levels of control over horizontal vehicle placement, which would allow for
automatic vehicle classification. It would also permit improved enforcement, since the
travel speed of vehicles on entry and exit ramps would be much lower than actual freeway
speeds.
The toll amount would be based simply on the point of entry and the point of exit
from the regional freeway system. These rates could vary by roadway segment, such as
more congested areas being charged a higher per-mile rate. In addition, by use of
minimum tolls, there would be an important disincentive for use of the freeway system
for very short trips. This is consistent with the current strategy of ramp meters on the
Twin Cities area freeway system. Ramp meters add in "built in" delays, which amount
to time penalties, and which, among other things, discourages those making short trips
from bothering to use the freeway system. Ramp metering also physically limits the pace
at which vehicles enter the freeway system, and can theoretically ensure high levels of
service on the freeway mainline itself, while backing up traffic on ramps and into local
city streets.
If a regionwide electronic road pricing system was implemented on most or all
freeways in the Twin Cities area, it would be appropriate to reassess the advantages of
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ramp metering. The pricing strategies could be set in such a way as to discourage short
trips, thereby achieving much of the same advantages of ramp metering, without backing
up traffic onto local streets.
In a more limited pricing application, such as the establishment of tolls on existing
or new bridge facilities, it would probably be necessary to provide a combination of
traditional and electronic toll collection techniques. As shown in the lower portion of
Figure 2, provisions would be made in these toll plazas for full non-stop electronic toll
collection for vehicles which are properly equipped. Figure 2 also shows how special
bypass lanes could be constructed in the center of the toll plaza for toll-free HOV traffic.
Traditional cash toll lanes would also be made available for occasional users and others
who did not wish to participate in the electronic pre-payment tolling system.
The combination ETC/traditional toll plaza shown in Figure 2 would also be a good
configuration for toll stations which might be constructed at border locations if regionwide
freeway pricing was initiated. In that case, vehicles equipped with electronic toll
collection would simply pass through the plaza. The non-ETC user, would be
accommodated in the outer toll lanes. In this case, under a regionwide pricing system,
out of area users would be able to obtain a temporary electronic toll device at the point
of entry into the priced area. At the time of exit, the transponder would be surrendered
and the appropriate toll charges based on the amount traveled would simply be deducted
from pre-paid amounts.
System Planning Issues
In planning electronic toll collection systems, it is important to consider several
issues, such as:
Application and Related Functions - The intended application and any desired
related function. The nature of the system will be influenced by the nature of the
proposed congestion pricing program itself. Flat tolls versus variable tolls may well
influence the nature of the system. As importantly, the system should be planned in the
context of potentially greater regional IVHS considerations. The electronic toll equipment
does, in its most basic sense, provide for communication between the vehicle and the
roadside. That same communication linkage can be used for other data flow, including
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traffic management information, particularly if sophisticated transponders are used which
provide opportunities for feedback to the users.
Privacy - Privacy has been often raised as a major potential issue of concern in any
electronic toll system. When Hong Kong moved to implement congestion pricing during
the mid-1980s, an early generation electronic toll system was tested and implemented.
However, before the system was actually put in use, the program was dropped due to
political pressures, in part due to widespread public opposition on grounds of invasion of
privacy. Simply stated, motorists fear the "big brother" phenomenon where government
might have a mechanism for tracking and recording the presence of vehicles.
It should be noted that privacy has been of almost no concern in those systems
which have already been implemented in the U.S. on existing toll facilities. In many
cases, agencies offer an opportunity for "anonymous" enrollment into the AVI program.
They have received very few "takers." Motorists generally prefer the convenience of
account linkages to credit cards, etc., and are not particularly concerned about the privacy
issue.
At the same time, all the existing systems in current toll operations are "voluntary"
in terms of patron participation. Congestion pricing systems may, in the classical sense,
not give the patrons much of an option. Hence, if the patrons wish to use major portions
of the affected roadway system, they will need to be so equipped. It may no longer
appear to be so much a volunteer program.
Obviously, any system with stored balances eliminates the need for actually
recording information about the particular vehicle at the time it passes a revenue
collection location. The use of Smart Card interfaces can provide an enhanced means of
dealing with the privacy issue, by providing capability for stored balances without the
need to physically transport the transponder device to the point of account replenishment.
Enforcement - In a fully unattended automatic electronic toll collection
environment, enforcement becomes more of a challenge. Most electronic toll systems
now being contemplated will utilize some form of video enforcement system. Recently
developed technologies permit use of high-resolution video, with license plate images
being recorded only when the system is triggered through a violation in an electronic toll
lane.
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Violation vehicles are then accumulated on computer files. The video enforcement
systems are designed such that the license numbers are "machine readable" and human
intervention or interpretation is required only in a small minority of the violation cases.
Where motorists are determined to have violated, depending on local policy, a fine or
administrative fee may be assessed, usually be means of a mail out announcement.
A key issue in enforcement is whether video surveillance is legal in a particular
location as a basis of assessing fines. Some states have enacted legislation which
specifically identify toll system violations as a unique category. This permits fines to be
levied against vehicle owners, based on vehicle registration information, as distinguished
from vehicle operators, which are normally the subject of motor vehicle moving
violations.
While enforcement will always be an important factor in any electronic toll system,
it now appears that the technology to facilitate a high level of system integrity and
security does exist. Enforcement issues may more relate to legal and regulatory matters,
which will require further research and analysis in future studies in light of Minnesota
statutes.
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Chapter 4
IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OF POTENTIAL PRICING CONCEPTS
A wide range of potential pricing options were identified by the study team. These
were evaluated in a two-phase program. Initially, the projects were given a broad
screening, including input and comment from the Project Steering Committee. After the
benefit of Steering Committee input, the number of options for detailed assessment was
reduced. In the second phase of the analysis, estimated traffic, revenue and other
implications of each for a reduced number of scenarios were determined.
In this Chapter, a wide range of options are discussed, in general terms. This includes
identification of various categories of transportation charges, as well as the various
methods of implementation. This Chapter will also discuss critical inputs obtained from
the Steering Committee, as well as decisions on the reduced number of potential
application options which were evaluated in more detail. Actual results of that analysis
are summarized subsequently in Chapter 5.
Methods Used for Transportation Charging
There are a number of methods that are used to collect revenue related to
transportation facilities. These methods vary in the extent to which they are directly
related to actual transportation system usage.
For purposes of discussion, a total of five categories of transportation revenue raising
techniques can be readily identified. In general, the categories range from vehicle related
taxes, which have little relation to actual usage, to specific road pricing mechanisms,
structured to directly reflect incremental levels of usage. Obviously, the more directly
related to road usage, the more likely a particular pricing strategy will be effective in
managing demand.
Road Prices Not Related Directly to Use:
a Vehicle registration taxes;
a Vehicle excise taxes; and
a Vehicle personal property taxes.
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While increases in such taxes would produce revenues, they are not likely to have an
appreciable impact on road use, congestion or pollution. They probably would not
produce increased efficiency in the road sector nor would they be equitable in the sense
that costs of improvements are borne by those creating these costs. On the other hand,
such taxes are easy to administer and are efficient in terms of the cost needed for
collection.
Prices Indirectly Related to Road Use - The most notable example of this type of
charge is the traditional gasoline tax. The tax is based on a per-gallon or percentage of
gross sales price, and therefore, is indirectly related to the amount of road use. The
effective user charge is, of course, influenced by the fuel efficiency of the particular
vehicle and the type of driving done. As such, the gasoline tax does have the potential
to affect road use and emissions to a limited extent, at least over the long term, but the
impact on congestion at particular locations is not likely to be significant. Further,
gasoline tax prices would probably need to be considerably higher than current levels to
have a significant influence on demand reduction.
Prior research suggests a total gas price/demand elasticity of about -0.10. This means
for each ten percent increase in total motor fuel costs, a decrease in demand of about 1.0
percent could be experienced. However, at present gasoline taxes generally represent
between about 1/4 to 1/3 of the total cost per gallon of fuel. Hence, to achieve a
reduction of, say, ten percent in global travel demand total gasoline prices would have to
be at least doubled (in real terms - i.e., after factoring in inflation). This would be
equivalent to an increase in the gasoline tax of as much as 400 or 500 percent from
current levels.
Road Prices Somewhat Related to Road Use - Examples of this category might
include registration fees based on vehicle miles of travel; and registration fees based on
emission levels.
Some impacts on roadway use and emissions can be expected from such fees.
However, impact on congestion at particular locations is not likely to be significant, since
these charging mechanisms would be based on total amounts of travel, not necessarily
related to the time or location of travel. The concept could be extended to a "dual
license" program (e.g., peak versus off-peak) to achieve some congestion relief, but would
indeed be a complex undertaking.
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Direct Use-Related Charges - This is the category of transportation charging which
is the focus of this study. By definition, direct user-related charges would vary in direct
proportion to the amount of vehicle or roadway usage. It can also be used to achieve
specific goals in congestion reduction in particular areas and/or transfer of travel to
different times of day.
Direct use-related charges can be made either for vehicle storage or vehicle
movement. Vehicle storage charges, obviously, relate to parking. It would certainly be
possible to implement a parking surcharge, for example, in a particular region or zone,
to encourage carpooling or otherwise discourage vehicular travel. This could be done in
conjunction with HOV pricing discounts or other related incentives.
Parking price increases have been very effective in reducing solo driving among
affected parkers. Effectiveness in an areawide or regionwide basis would depend on how
many parkers are covered under a particular parking pricing program. For instance,
increases in existing parking rates (via rate revisions, peak period supplements or parking
revenue taxes) would affect parkers only at paid facilities. In situations when a large
proportion of parkers receive subsidized or free parking, parking price increases would
need to be packaged with effective subsidy reductions (e.g. "cash out" policies) to achieve
high level of trip reductions.
In areas where a significant proportion of parking is available free at private or public
unpriced facilities, traditional parking rate charges on revenue taxes would not cover these
free spaces, and could suppress the overall effectiveness in terms of reduction in solo
driving. In such situations, non-traditional, innovative parking pricing policies can be
considered to achieve greater coverage of parkers at free spaces, which in turn, could
produce significant reductions in solo trips.
Private and public free spaces (both off- and on-street) could be covered under a
parking pricing plan using supplementary parking permits, using windshield stickers, such
as programs now in use in Cork, Ireland and several Israeli cities. Under such a policy,
all vehicles during peak periods in designated zones would be required to purchase and
display monthly or daily stickers. Such a program could cover both public and private,
priced and unpriced, off- and on-street spaces and be highly effective in reducing solo
driving.
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Supplementary -parking permits also would enable large areas to be brought under a
parking pricing scheme even where traditional parking pricing covers relatively small
zones within core areas. New "smart-card" technology holds great promise for use in
areawide parking pricing policies, since it promises to allow pricing of vehicles without
resorting to meters or controlled parking lots. it should be mentioned, however, that any
areawide parking pricing policy covering private spaces would need a special statutory
authority to enforce violations at private spaces.
Charges for vehicle movements typically would fall into two broad categories: area
entry charges; and direct road use charges. Within each of these broad categories, there
are a number of suboptions regarding the particular scope of application. For example,
direct road pricing could likely be implemented at a single location, such as a bridge or
tunnel, along a particular corridor or over an entire region. Area pricing could be focused
on a relatively "tight" congested area, such as in Singapore, or over a more broad area,
such as the full Twin Cities area for purposes of encouraging regional development goals.
As noted earlier in this report, direct road user charges can also vary based on
primary intent, i.e., congestion pricing (demand management) versus road pricing. The
road pricing concept would tend to be a broader based concept, with at least one of the
principal objectives being revenue generation. Congestion pricing would probably be
considered a sub-category within road pricing, which would focus more specifically on
particular congested areas, and would probably involve higher levels of toll charges within
those areas with the primary motivation being demand management and overall congestion
reduction.
Market-Like Variations - A fifth category of demand management-related pricing
options might involve some form of travel rationing or "cashing out" of SOV traffic. In
the first case, some type of daily or annual travel allowance would be provided for each
motorist. Those who normally use less than their allocation of travel would be free to
"sell" this on some type of open market. Therefore, a direct cost would be associated
with additional levels of travel above certain thresholds. The concept of "cashing out"
primarily relates to work trips, where employers might actually offer cash incentives for
employees not to drive to work alone.
These and various other market-like strategies have the potential to reduce congestion
without generating much competition from the public on grounds of the inability to pay,
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double taxation, etc. However, it is necessary to identify new revenue sources for future
transportation improvements and, some of the market strategies such as cashing-out could
actually result in a net additional cost to the government or individual companies
participating in the program.
Summary - If revenue generation were the only objective, any of the above strategies
would be pursued. However, since congestion relief is also a goal, the first two categories
are not likely to be very effective. On the other hand, the market-like strategies listed
above are not likely to produce revenues.
Since the objectives of any potential congestion/road pricing program in the Twin
Cities area is to include both demand management and revenue generation, it was clear
that the direct road use charges should receive the most attention. Based on discussions
with the Steering Committee, it was recognized that parking surcharges could also play
an important role, but the study team was requested to devote its full attention to specific
road pricing options, at least at this preliminary phase of analysis.
Direct road use charges can be assessed based on distance traveled or as a flat rate
for using a particular facility. Charges can also vary by time of day, travel direction and
level of congestion.
Scope of Application
The scope of application of direct road user charges can also vary depending on the
particular objective. Examples can include:
Spot Locations - Spot locations, such as toll bridges or tunnels. Rivers or other
bodies of water serve as a natural constraint to travel. By placing road use charges on
some or all crossings of that river or of a particular waterway, it is possible to affect
demand management along a broader corridor, without actually pricing all the various
roads within that corridor. Pricing could also be applied to isolated bridge locations, both
as a method of raising revenue or a particular improvement, such as bridge replacement
or expansion, or to influence demand from one crossing to another.
In theory, pricing would also be applied at other spot locations, such as particularly
congested interchange ramps or short segment of freeway. The practicality of this
-41-
application is questionable, however, especially if electronic toll collection is to be used
which will require large proportions of the motoring public to be specially equipped.
Specific Facilities/Corridors - The most common existing type of direct road pricing
relates to the specific facilities or corridors. All traditional toll roads would fall into this
category, where only the particular facility is priced and parallel routes serve as a toll-free
alternative. The objective of this type of pricing might be to redistribute demand over all
routes within a given corridor. Some facilities provide such a superior advantage over
alternative routes, that pricing the route might also emphasize demand management,
particularly in terms of encouraging shifts to transit or carpooling. This would be
particularly true if revenues generated from the facility pricing program were funneled
back into establishment of transportation options, such as transit subsidies, creation of
carpool lanes or park-and-ride lots, etc.
Areawide Pricing by Road Category - One of the most logical applications of road
pricing would involve charging for use of all roads of a particular category within a
particular region. For example, it might be logical to establish road pricing on all limited-
access freeways in a particular area. In the case of the Twin Cities, this might include
pricing of freeways within the central core area, those routes inside the belt freeway
system, those freeways inside the MUSA line or, perhaps, all freeways within the seven-
county Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. Consideration could also be given to only
assessing pricing on certain strategic freeways which are either heavily congested or
which serve traffic to and from major employment centers, etc.
Area Pricing - As noted above, the basic concept of area pricing would involve
charging for vehicle entry into the protected area. For example, one option might be to
establish a form of "toll ring" around the city centers of Minneapolis and St. Paul. These
are obviously major employment centers and by establishing a premium charge for entry
into this area, an incentive would be created to carpool or seek transit alternatives.
This concept was discussed at the Steering Committee meetings. It was felt that such
a strategy would be geographically inequitable, given the multi-nucleated development
pattern in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. In contrast, the pattern of development in
Singapore features a very concentrated core area which was relatively easy to cordon off
without introducing major intra-regional inequities.
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As an alternative, the Steering Committee suggested that the study team examine the
concept of entry tolls for vehicles entering the overall MUSA area. This is a much
broader region, and would therefore minimize any potential concerns about inequity
within the region. However, it would obviously be less effective in managing demand
and reducing congestion, since the larger the area, the more of the total trips which are
made entirely within the priced zone. Such trips would not, of course, be subjected to
pricing or demand management strategies.
A MUSA area pricing scheme would, however, provide some incentive for future
development to take place within the MUSA area, and this would be consistent with
regional planning goals.
Potential Uses of Revenue
Needless to say, most road pricing schemes would generate considerable net revenue.
The uses of this revenue will directly impact the financial feasibility of the pricing
strategy as well as the public acceptability. The study identified potential uses of
revenues generated. It was not, however, an objective of this study to recommend a
specific usage.
Some potential uses of congestion/road pricing revenue include:
a Financing of needed highway improvements, such as capacity expansions, HOV
lane construction, bridge replacements, new highways, etc.;
a HOV initiatives, such as construction of park-and-ride lots, vanpool subsidies and
the like;
Transit capital and/or operating subsidies, again to further encourage shifts from
the single-occupant auto to transit;
a Mitigation of pricing impacts on lower income motorists - a portion of the revenue
generated could actually be funneled back into a reduction in other types of taxes
and/or tax credits for lower income motorists. In this way, the road use charge
would be used to actually influence demand, while not necessarily increasing the
total tax burden to lower income people; and
* A potentially wide range of non-transportation uses.
It should be recognized that use of congestion/road pricing revenue for non-
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transportation needs may erode public support for the concept. This appears to have been
true based on actual experience in the various Norway toll ring projects and the planned
Hong Kong system among others. Potential uses of revenue are discussed in more detail
in Chapter 5.
Steering Committee Inputs
As noted previously in Chapter 1, a Steering Committee comprised of over 30
members, in addition to representatives of the Consultant Team, was assembled at the
outset of the study to provide a broad range of input from a variety of transportation
planners, decision makers and potentially impacted groups. After the full range of
congestion/road pricing options had been identified, a two-day meeting was held with the
Steering Committee to help identify evaluation criteria, as well as review and screen the
broad range of options to a manageable number for continuing analysis. The study team
received extremely valuable input from the broad cross-section of interest groups
represented on the Steering Committee. At the conclusion of that two-day work session,
the following five categories of congestion/road pricing strategies were suggested for
further evaluation:
a Pricing at spot locations, including several hypothetical bridge locations within the
Twin Cities area;
a Regionwide congestion/road pricing of the freeway system in the Twin Cities area,
using an innovative, fully-electronic tolling system;
a Implementation of congestion/road pricing on individual project facilities alone,
including one hypothetical new facility which might be constructed as a toll road
as well as one existing freeway corridor;
a Pricing strategies directly involving the existing and planned HOV network, as well
as two hypothetical LRT corridors of the future; and
a Cordon entry tolls at the boundary of the Metropolitan Urban Service Area
(MUSA).
Each of these are described in more detail in Chapter 5, including the results of
preliminary traffic, revenue, operational and other impact analyses.
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Chapter 5
EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL APPLICATION OPTIONS
A somewhat more detailed, although still preliminary assessment of the feasibility of
congestion/road pricing in the Twin Cities area was undertaken for each of the five
categories of options identified by the Steering Committee. In most cases, the five
categories of pricing concepts involve multiple scenarios. Where possible, each of these
was tested using the Twin Cities area computer network and model. In some cases, traffic
and revenue impact estimates were estimated manually.
Evaluation Criteria
With input from the Steering Committee, the following evaluation criteria were
identified:
Congestion relief, as measured through:
Reduction in single-occupant vehicle (SOV) usage;
- Congestion reduction as measured through volume/capacity ratios at
selected locations; and
Improvements in travel time.
Mode shift potential, including:
- Potential to increase transit usage; and
- Potential to increase ridesharing.
a Revenue and cost considerations, including:
- Total revenue potential; and
Ratio of revenue to cost of implementation and operation.
Operational effectiveness, including:
- Complexity of administration;
- Difficulty of enforcement.
a Public/political acceptability, including items such as:
- Perceived equity (geographic and other);
- Impacts on low-income travelers;
- Impact on businesses and development; and
- Local traffic diversions to alternative routes.
a Air quality impacts, as summarized through an evaluation of:
- Reduction in vehicle miles of travel (VMT); and
- Overall improvement in average vehicle operating speeds.
* Development impacts, i.e., the degree to which a particular pricing concept
supports regional growth management policies.
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Based on the preliminary modeling analysis, it was possible to quantify some of the
above evaluation criteria. In other cases, a more subjective comparative analysis was
undertaken.
Spot Locations
The first category of congestion/road pricing tested was several potential spot
locations. For purposes of this analysis, existing and/or planned new bridges in the Twin
Cities area were found to be ideal examples of spot pricing. As shown in Figure 3, four
individual bridges were analyzed, along with a screenline of bridges along the Minnesota
River south of Minneapolis. The four individual bridges were selected to represent urban
vs. suburban conditions, new vs. existing bridges and a planned bridge reconstruction
project.
It is important to recognize that the specific projects shown in Figure 3, as well as the
facilities tested in all other categories, were for illustrative purposes only. The Steering
Committee identified typical projects of one nature or another, simply to ensure that the
analysis would provide a meaningful, real-world assessment of revenue potential, traffic
impacts, etc. There was no intent to identify actual projects which should be priced, and
it should not be inferred that the selection of hypothetical test locations is any indication
of recommendations regarding future pricing applications. The hypothetical locations
shown in Figure 3, and all other figures in this report, were selected only to provide an
opportunity for the reader to better understand the implications of pricing, in a real-world
context, without actually identifying the specific projects.
The four individual bridges tested include two existing and two proposed new
crossings. The existing bridges include the 1-494 crossing of the Mississippi River south
of St. Paul and the Wabasha Street Bridge feeding downtown St. Paul. The other two
bridges were both proposed new facilities, including the proposed new crossing at
Stillwater and a proposed new bridge west of Anoka.
The hypothetical screenline crossing covered all bridges along the Minnesota River
between Trunk Highway 41 on the west and Trunk Highway 77 on the east. This
hypothetical concept represented both spot pricing and, a form of corridor pricing as all
bridges along a particular screenline were tolled.
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For purposes of this preliminary analysis, it has been assumed that tolls would not be
charged to high-occupant passenger vehicles. HOV traffic was assumed to be represented
by passenger vehicles with two or more occupants. Tolls would also be assessed to
commercial vehicles, regardless of occupancy. A probable exception to this would be
buses and/or vanpools.
In the case of these hypothetical bridge tolls, it would probably be necessary to offer
both electronic and traditional toll collection options. Tolls could be collected in one or
both directions, depending on location and the level of traffic divertability. In this
preliminary analysis, the traffic and revenue impacts of tolling were calculated under both
one-way and two-way toll collection, at two alternative toll levels.
The typical combination toll plaza would be as shown previously in Figure 2. Non-
stop bypass lanes would be provided for both HOV traffic and pre-registered electronic
toll vehicles. Only single occupant vehicles, and trucks, which were not participants in
the AVI program would need to use the cash lanes. Hence, this combination program
would significantly reduce the overall size of the toll plaza which might be otherwise
required in the absence of ETC. At the same time, however, construction of attended toll
lanes could result in some increase in congestion, possibly mitigating some of the benefits
intended by the pricing program. If spot location pricing were implemented, careful
planning of the toll facilities would be needed to ensure delays to users were not
significantly increased as a result of tolling.
Estimated Traffic Impacts
Estimated traffic impacts for the 1-494 (Wakota) and Wabasha Street Bridges are
shown in Figure 4. All traffic impact estimates for this, and all of the scenarios, reflect
2015 levels. However, the overall 2015 computer model traffic assignments appear to be
somewhat low in some areas, when related to existing ground counts. Hence, traffic and
revenue estimates developed as part of this preliminary impact assessment may be
considered somewhat conservative.
The existing Wabasha Street Bridge will likely carry slightly more than 26,000
vehicles per day in a toll-free condition. If a $0.50 passenger car toll were charged to
non-HOV vehicles (proportionately higher rates for trucks), an estimated 6,300 vehicles
per day would divert to alternative toll-free bridges. This represents about 30 percent of
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* Tolled Bridge
TH 149
SCENARIO
Total Volume
Toll Free
Two-Way $0.50
Two-Way $1.00
One-Way $1.00
SCENARIO
Total Volume
Toll Free
Two-Way $0.50
Two-Way $1.00
One-Way $1.00
25,400
+1,000
+1,500
+800
70TH
STREET
16,500
+1,000
+2,000
+1,000
ESTIMATED DAILY TRAFFIC IMPACTS
SPOT TOLLS ON WABASHA STREET BRIDGE
AND WAKOTA / 1-494 BRIDGE
2015 LEVELS
WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES FIGURE 4
*
WABASHA
STREET
ROBERTS
STREET TH 3
26,200
-6,300
-9,000
-4,500
26,200
+2,000
+3,000
+1,500
1-494
93,000
-3,500
-8,300
-4,200
96,800
+3,300
+4,500
+2,200
1-694
70,000
0
0
0
1-94
112,000
+ 1,000
+2,800
+1,400
TH 36
56,500
+500
+1,200
+600
T
WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES FIGURE 4
the non-HOV traffic which would otherwise be expected to use the Wabasha Street
Bridge. If peak period tolls were increased to $1.00, with off-peak tolls remaining at
$0.50, the total diversion to alternate bridges would increase to an estimated 9,000
vehicles per day, amounting to about 34 percent of total traffic and almost half of the toll-
free non-HOV traffic.
The lower portion of Figure 4 shows estimated traffic impacts of hypothetically
establishing tolls on the 1-494 Bridge across the Mississippi River. This bridge was found
to be much less sensitive to tolls, with a diversion of only about 3,500 daily vehicles from
more than 93,000 vehicles assigned under a toll-free condition. While the traffic shift
would increase at the $1.00 peak period level, it still would be considerably less than 10
percent of the total traffic which would otherwise be expected to use the 1-494 Bridge.
This indicates that there are relatively few good alternatives to the 1-494 Bridge. Note
that only routes with relatively notable impacts are shown in Figure 4. There would also
be small diversions to other local streets in the 1-494 corridor, especially north of the
bridge.
Traffic impacts for the two proposed new bridges, including the new Anoka and
Stillwater Bridges are summarized in Table 1. In both cases, toll-free traffic estimates
were taken from prior design and/or environmental studies. Diversion estimates were
developed based on manual approximations.
In the case of the Anoka Bridge, about 10 percent of the traffic would be expected
to divert to the competing TH 169 Bridge under the higher toll scenario. Again, it is
important to recognize that even under the high toll scenario, off-peak tolls would be
reduced to $0.50. Potential traffic diversions were also heavily constrained by the
capacity constraints on the competing TH 169 crossing.
An estimated 4,200 vehicles would divert back to the existing Myrtle Street Bridge
from the proposed new Stillwater Bridge, if tolls were established at the $1.00 level. If
tolls were implemented in one direction only, traffic diversions are estimated at
approximately half the levels of the two-way toll conditions. Note that Table 1 shows
that all traffic diversions from the Stillwater Bridge would go the Myrtle Street Bridge;
in practice some diversions might also go to the I-94 crossing.
Figure 5 shows estimated traffic shifts along the five-bridge screenline concept. This
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Table 1
TRAFFIC IMPACTS
SPOT LOCATIONS - ANOKA & STILLWATER BRIDGES
2015 Levels
Proposed Anoka Bridge
SCENARIO
Total Volume
Traffic Impact:
Two-Way
Two-Way
One-Way
PASSENGER
CAR
TOLL
RATE
Free
$0.50
$1.00 (1)
$1.00 (1)
Prol
Anoka
AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC
posed TH 169
Bridge Bridge
25,000
(1,500)
(2,500)
(1,300)
40,000
1,500
2,500
1,300
Proposed Stillwater Bridge
PASSENGER
CAR
TOLL
RATE
Myrtle
Brid
Total Volume Free
Traffic Impact:
Two-Way $0.50
Two-Way $1.00 (1)
One-Way $1.00 (1)
(1) With off-peak tolls discounted by 50 percent.
AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC
Proposed
*St. Stilwater
ge Bridge
11,000
2,800
4,200
2,100
23,000
(2,800)
(4,200)
(2,100)
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concept would establish tolls on all fixed crossings of the Minnesota River between Trunk
Highway 41 on the west and Trunk Highway 77 on the east. As might be expected, the
heaviest diversions would occur on the outermost crossings. Since all five bridges would
be tolled at the same rates, the interior bridges, such as TH 169, TH 18 and 1-35W would
be expected to have less diversion since the nearest alternative toll-free route would be
some distance away. The most significant increases in traffic would be expected on the
Trunk Highway 55 and 1-494 Bridges.
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts - Establishment of tolls on the various bridges tested in
this scenario would be expected to have relatively small impacts on transit ridership,
except where coincident increases in transit service could be anticipated in the immediate
corridors. In a survey conducted at 1-394 in February 1993, 22 percent of people driving
alone said they might ride the bus at some time in the future if bus fares were reduced
by half. However, less than 2 percent said they would "probably" or "definitely" ride the
bus within the next six months. This would appear to have the highest level of potential
in the southern corridor along the river screenline pricing concept. For example, the two-
way $1.00 toll on 1-35W is expected to shift approximately 1,400 persons to transit and
the anticipated LRT facility in this corridor. This reduction would be divided between
diversions to alternate routes, shifts to HOV/carpooling, and shifts to transit usage. At
the isolated bridge locations, particularly those in the more outlying area such as Anoka
and Stillwater, transit impacts would be considered negligible.
Since tolls would not be charged to HOVs, tolls may also give some increased
incentive to carpooling. The survey conducted on 1-394 in February 1993, indicated that
16 percent of people driving alone might carpool at some time in the future if their
parking costs were only $15.00 per month. This represents a cost savings of about $75.00
per month per vehicle for downtown commuters. About 11 percent said they would
"probably" or "definitely" carpool within the next six months. Again, the highest impacts
would likely occur along the heavier commuter corridors, particularly in the south corridor
in this hypothetical example where the Minnesota River Bridge screenline would be
tolled. On 1-35W, which is expected to have HOV lanes before 2015, 1,100 of the 5,300
vehicles per day reduction in traffic volume at the highest toll rate is estimated to be due
to increased ridesharing. This represents a 7 percent increase in the projected level of
ridesharing in this corridor. At those bridges where there were high opportunities for
diversion to alternate toll-free routes, such as Stillwater and Wabasha Street Bridges, the
potential for induced carpooling would be minimal.
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Revenue Potential - Estimated annual toll revenue potential for the various spot
location pricing concepts are summarized in Table 2. Estimates are shown individually
for each of the bridges and collectively for the proposed Minnesota River screenline
option. Revenue estimates were computed at theoretical 2015 demand levels, but using
toll rates, values of travel time and other modeling inputs keyed to 1994 levels.
Capital and Operating Costs - Capital and operating costs for each of the bridges
under the spot location toll concepts are shown in Table 3. These cost estimates relate
only to the establishment and operation of toll collection facilities. They do not include
capital costs associated with the bridge or approach road itself, nor do the annual costs
include expenses for bridge maintenance, deck replacement, etc.
In developing estimates of capital and operating costs, it has been assumed that for
spot location pricing projects a combination traditional/electronic toll collection system
would be provided. The estimated capital cost for constructing and equipping toll plazas
would range from about $2 million for each of the proposed new crossings to as much
as $10 million to establish a toll plaza on the 1-494 Bridge. The capital cost to construct
the five toll plazas needed along the Minnesota River screenline option is estimated at
about $28 million. Again, these costs are estimated in 1994-level prices.
For purposes of comparative analysis between options, the total estimated capital cost
was "annualized," assuming a nominal 10-year life cycle. In practice, the toll plazas will
last longer than 10 years, but significant renewal and electronic equipment replacement
is likely during that period of time. For purposes of this analysis, financing costs have
not been included for this or any of the various tolling scenarios examined as part of this
study.
Annual operating costs are also shown in Table 3 for each bridge and for the
Minnesota River screenline. At the smaller bridges, annual operating costs (in 1994
dollars) are estimated at about $400,000. This would be increased to about $2.0 million
for the 1-494 Bridge. For all five bridges of the Minnesota River screenline, the annual
operating cost is estimated at $6,150,000.
When adding together the annualized capital cost of the toll plaza construction with
the annual operating cost, the typical total annual cost of toll operations would range from
about $600,000 at the smaller bridges to almost $9.0 million per year for the five bridges
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Table 3
ESTIMATED CAPITAL AND OPERATING COST
Spot Locations
1994 Level Cost
BRIDGE
New Stillwater Bridge
New Anoka Bridge
Wabasha Street Bridge
1-494 Wakota Bridge
Minnesota River Screenline
TOLL PLAZA(1)
Total
Cost Annualized(2)
ILL.
I-------------------
$ 2,000
2,000
3,000
10,000
-------------- tnousands
$ 200
200
300
1,000
ANNUAL
OPERATING
COST
$ 400
400
400
2,000
TH 41
TH 169
TH 18
1-35W
TH 77
Screenline Total
$ 2,000
2,000
4,000
10,000
10,000
$28,000
$ 200
200
400
1,000
1,000
$2,800
$ 400
500
1,250
2,000
2,000
$6,150
NOTE: Above costs assume two-way toll collection on all bridges; costs for one-way
collection would be approximately one-half those shown above.
(1) Includes plaza buildings, apron areas and toll/ETC equipment.
(2) Annualized plaza cost based on assumed life cycle of 10 years, including equipment.
(3) Annual cost related to toll collection only; does not include bridge maintenance,
debt service or other costs not related to toll collection.
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TOTAL
ANNUAL
COST(3)
--------- )
$ 600
600
700
3,000
$ 600
700
1,650
3,000
3,000
$8,950
----------------------
/ti tl\ A
screenline across the Minnesota River. These are at 1994 level costs, and assume two-
way toll collection. For those scenarios which would involve one-way toll collection, the
total annualized cost would be about half of the values shown in Table 3.
A brief comparison of total annualized cost with estimated annual toll revenue is
provided below for each of the hypothetical bridge crossings and the Minnesota River
screenline. In all the bridge scenarios analyzed, the annual toll revenue is projected to be
considerably higher than operating costs. It is noted, however, that toll revenue estimates
are based on 2015 level traffic demands, although no inflation in toll rates has been
assumed. It is recognized that net revenue potential was not necessarily the primary
motivation in establishing road/congestion pricing on the various spot locations tested
above. However, it is clear that the revenues generated under these potential demand
management strategies would be greater than the cost of implementing and operating the
revenue collection facilities themselves.
Full Limited Access Roadway Pricing
The second major category of pricing options evaluated as part of the study included
the concept of placing tolls on some or all of the freeways and other limited access
facilities in the seven-county Twin Cities region. As shown in Figure 6, three
subcategories were identified. The first of these, depicted in darker blue, would involve
application of congestion/road pricing on all freeways within the MUSA boundary. The
second sub-option would extend the pricing to all freeways within the seven-county
region, thereby adding the lighter blue corridors. Finally, the third option would add
pricing to all other multi-lane expressway sections within the seven-county region such
as U.S. Route 52, 169 and Trunk Highway 65, among others.
Under this innovative regional road pricing concept, all toll collection would be
performed electronically. For purposes of this study, it has been hypothetically assumed
that all vehicles registered within the seven-county area would be equipped with electronic
transponders capable of being read at the various pricing locations throughout the region.
Motorists with vehicles registered outside the seven-county region who regularly use Twin
Cities area freeways would be able to also procure transponder devices. Finally, a series
of border stations would be established around the perimeter of the seven-county region
to make temporary transponders available for non-local traffic.
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It is envisioned that the border stations would fall into three categories. Those at
points where actual freeways cross the seven-county border would be constructed as
typical combination electronic/manual toll plazas, as shown previously in the lower
portion of Figure 2. Vehicles equipped with electronic transponders would simply pass
through the toll plaza and be recorded as entering or exiting the freeway system. As with
all of the pricing concepts, it was assumed that HOV and transit traffic would be allowed
to use the freeway system toll-free; hence, HOV/transit bypass lanes would also be
provided.
Only those vehicles not previously equipped with transponders would be required to
stop. Using a cash deposit or some form of credit card arrangement, temporary
transponders would be issued and placed on the vehicle windshield at the point of
entering the seven-county region. As the transient vehicle exited the seven-county region,
it would stop on the exiting toll lanes and surrender the temporary transponder, with the
appropriate toll fare deducted and any balance remaining returned to the motorist.
Since it is possible that motorists may enter the seven-county region on roads other
than freeways, but might then ultimately need to use the freeways while in the Twin
Cities area, it would also be necessary to establish certain courtesy border stations along
the side of other roadways. These are shown as squares or circles in Figure 6, delineating
between major and minor routes. At the major stations, it is envisioned that, perhaps, two
courtesy "toll" lanes would be provided in each travel direction while on the minor roads
only a single turn-out would be provide on each side of the road to provide for issuance
and retrieval of temporary transponders. Motorists passing the non-freeway stations which
did not anticipate needing to use the freeway system would not be obligated to procure
the temporary pass.
Actual revenue collection on the freeway (or expanded expressway) system would be
based on distance traveled and time of day. It is envisioned that ETC interrogator devices
would be established at all the freeway points of entry and exit of the seven-county region
as well as intermediate ramps at all interchanges within the system. As the vehicle
entered the freeway system, the point of entry would be recorded on the tag, the vehicle
transponder and/or the vehicle computer-based account. As it exited the system, as shown
in the middle section of Figure 2, which is shown previously following page 32, the
vehicle would be again identified with the appropriate toll amount being calculated based
on time of day and travel distance.
-55-
With a fully electronic toll collection system, it would be possible to vary toll rates
based on time of day or other factors to better encourage implementation of regional
policies setting increasing overall efficiency of the transportation system. For example,
it would be possible to implement pricing only during peak hours or peak periods. It
would also be possible to charge higher rates during peak travel periods, and only
moderate rates during off-peak periods. One option would be to not assess any pricing
during the late night hours, when traffic and congestion levels are particularly low.
Under this concept, it would also be theoretically possible to vary the per-mile pricing
charge based on actual or routinely experienced congestion levels on particular roadway
segments. For example, an overall road user charge of, say, $0.05 per mile might in
effect during typical peak periods on most freeways. However, those freeways which
experience highest levels of congestion might increase the per-mile rate to, say, $0.10 per
mile as a disincentive for usage of those particularly congested facilities. All of this
would be conducted electronically within the computer system and would be largely
transparent to the user. Some form of advanced warning system of the pricing levels in
effect would be needed at each of the entry ramps and at points of entry and exit from
specially price congested areas.
If the pricing program were extended to other multi-lane expressway sections (e.g.,
those shown in green in Figure 6), it might be necessary to use overhead mounted
antennas at various roadway segments. On those multi-lane expressways, there is not
always full control of access, and it might not be practical to simply install interrogator
devices at the points of exit and entry. The typical overhead antenna mounting would be
similar to the example shown in the upper portion of Figure 2.
Estimated Traffic Impacts - The full freeway system pricing concept was tested at two
alternative toll rate structures, each providing for off-peak period toll discounts. Under
Rate Level 1, it was assumed that passenger car SOV's would be charged a per-mile rate
of $0.05 during peak periods and $0.03 per mile during off-peak periods. Trucks would
be charged proportionately higher rates. Under Rate Level 2, the peak period per-mile
was assumed to be $0.10, while off-peak rates would be cut to $0.05 per mile. In both
cases, minimum tolls would be assessed, for short trips. The minimum toll for any trip
with a per-mile rate of $0.05 or less was assumed to be $0.25, while the minimum toll
at the higher peak period rate was assumed to be $0.50.
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The use of minimum tolls under the regionwide freeway congestion pricing scheme
would be a deterrent to short trips using the freeway system. This is similar in concept
to ramp metering which accomplishes the same objective by building in delay at the entry
ramp location. By contrast, however, the pricing disincentive would have the advantage
of eliminating traffic backups onto local streets that sometimes occurs during peak periods
as a result of ramp metering.
The implementation of regional road pricing would not necessarily require the
elimination of the ramp metering system. Ramp metering does have the advantage of
breaking up "platoons" of vehicles entering congested areas. The scope and location of
ramp metering might be able to be altered if a regionwide congestion/road pricing was
implemented. This issue is something that should be subjected to more detailed analysis
if further studies are conducted.
The imposition of tolls on the existing freeway system would be expected to divert
some traffic away from the freeways and onto competing arterial streets. Tables 4
through 7 show estimated traffic impacts along four screenlines throughout the regional
network. Two of the screenlines were oriented in a north-south direction while two were
oriented in a east-west direction. For each screenline, the computer traffic assignment on
each freeway link crossing the screenline under the base condition is shown. In addition,
assigned traffic under each of the two toll rates is shown, along with the net impact
associated with the change.
As can be seen in the tables, there would be a significant reduction in demand on the
freeway links, particularly at the higher toll rate ($0.10 per mile in peak periods). A
portion of the trips lost on the freeways would simply be diverted to alternative routes.
However, there would also be expected to be a net decrease in the total traffic crossing
each screenline.
The majority of the net trip reductions are a result of assumed shifts of some trips to
carpools and a slight assumed overall dampening of demand. The scope and budget
limitations of the study did not permit direct computation of inducements in ridesharing
patterns or net trip reductions through the direct "modeling" process. Rather, reasonable
approximations of carpool inducements and net trip reductions were made, and applied
manually to the raw modeling output results. Based on estimates of total average trip
costs, including vehicle operating costs and whatever toll charges might be imposed, and
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Table 4
TRAFFIC VOLUMES ON SCREENLINE WEST OF ROUTE 100
Scenario: Toll All Freeways
TOLLED ROUTES
U.S. Route 10
TH 610
1-94
1-394
Route 62
1-494
TOLLED ROUTES TOTAL
NON-TOLLED ROUTES
SCREENLINE TOTAL
Base Case
85,236
23,271
92,527
121,924
96,323
152,527
571,808
394,717
966,525
DAILY TRAFFIC
Toll Rate 1 (1)
Traffic Net Impact
78,457 (6,779)
20,436 (2,835)
79,328 (13,199)
110,109 (11,815)
92,359 (3,964)
145,538 (6,989)
526,227 (45,581)
419,878
946,105
25,161
(20,420)
Toll Rate 2 (2)
Traffic Net Impact
67,558 (17,678)
16,774 (6,497)
63,149 (29,378)
91,868 (30,056)
87,246 (9,077)
135,328 (17,199)
461,923 (109,885)
471,249
933,172
76,532
(33,353)
NOTE: Traffic shown includes reductions for shifts to HOV and reduced tripmaking.
(1) Peak period toll of $0.05 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.03 per mile.
(2) Peak period toll of $0.10 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.05 per mile.
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Table 5
TRAFFIC VOLUMES ON SCREENLINE BETWEEN 1-35W AND 1-35E
Scenario: Toll All Freeways
TOLLED ROUTES
1-35W
1-694
TH 36
1-94
1-494
I-35E
TOLLED ROUTES TOTAL
NON-TOLLED ROUTES
SCREENLINE TOTAL
Base Case
37,047
96,020
86,997
133,463
84,736
71,945
510,208
318,006
828,214
DAILY TRAFFIC
Toll Rate 1 (1)
Traffic Net Impact
34,265 (2,782)
87,142 (8,878)
78,351 (8,646)
124,767 (8,696)
82,230 (2,506)
67,520 (4,425)
474,275 (35,933)
337,465
811,740
19,459
(16,474)
Toll Rate 2 (2)
Traffic Net Impact
28,751 (8,296)
72,703 (23,317)
64,627 (22,370)
108,405 (25,058)
77,910 (6,826)
60,779 (11,166)
413,175 (97,033)
388,084
801,259
70,078
(26,955)
NOTE: Traffic shown includes reductions for shifts to HOV and reduced tripmaking.
(1) Peak period toll of $0.05 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.03 per mile.
(2) Peak period toll of $0.10 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.05 per mile.
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Table 6
TRAFFIC VOLUMES ON SCREENLINE SOUTH OF 1-694
Scenario: Toll All Freeways
TOLLED ROUTES
1-494
US Route 169
Route 100
1-94
1-35W
1-35E
TH 36
1-694
TOLLED ROUTES TOTAL
NON-TOLLED ROUTES
SCREENLINE TOTAL
Base Case
55,096
69,685
66,248
85,749
98,430
111,448
24,876
39,075
550,607
349,768
900,375
TollToll
Traffic
48,725
64,980
62,051
76,649
86,263
102,628
23,446
34,217
498,959
380,709
879,668
DAILY TRAFFIC
Rate 1 (1)
Net Impact
(6,371)
(4,705)
(4,197)
(9,100)
(12,167)
(8,820)
(1,430)
(4,858)
(51,648)
30,941
(20,707)
Toll Rate 2 (2)
Traffic Net Impact
40,533 (14,563)
57,448 (12,237)
57,396 (8,852)
65,188 (20,561)
70,755 (27,675)
84,587 (26,861)
21,730 (3,146)
27,046 (12,029)
424,683 (125,924)
439,009
863,692
89,241
(36,683)
NOTE: Traffic shown includes reductions for shifts to HOV and reduced tripmaking.
(1) Peak period toll of $0.05 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.03 per mile.
(2) Peak period toll of $0.10 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.05 per mile.
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Table 7
TRAFFIC VOLUMES ON SCREENLINE SOUTH OF 1-394/1-94
Scenario: Toll All Freeways
TOLLED ROUTES
1-494
TH 169
TH 100
1-35W
I-35E
TH 3
1-494
TOLLED ROUTES TOTAL
NON-TOLLED ROUTES
SCREENLINE TOTAL
Base Case
65,635
92,644
115,916
194,693
84,220
68,870
67,489
689,467
316,105
1,005,572
DAILY TRAFFIC
Toll Rate 1 (1)
Traffic
63,327
88,086
109,912
183,705
80,895
62,179
63,653
651,757
333,466
985,223
Net Impact
(2,308)
(4,558)
(6,004)
(10,988)
(3,325)
(6,691)
(3,836)
(37,710)
17,361
(20,349)
Toll Rate 2 (2)
Traffic
59,303
81,518
101,752
170,902
75,126
52,258
59,050
599,909
370,210
970,119
Net Impact
(6,332)
(11,126)
(14,164)
(23,791)
(9,094)
(16,612)
(8,439)
(89,558)
54,105
(35,453)
NOTE: Traffic shown includes reductions for shifts to HOV and reduced tripmaking.
(1) Peak period toll of $0.05 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.03 per mile.
(2) Peak period toll of $0.10 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.05 per mile.
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recognizing an approximate elasticity of -0.10, it was determined that tolls in the
approximate amounts tested in this analysis would result in a trip dampening of about 3
percent at the highest toll rate. Obviously, this would be applied only to trips assigned
to the limited-access facilities since only these would be assessed tolls.
It was further assumed that about 6 percent of the peak period vehicles would choose
to shift to carpools. As noted previously, the analysis assumed that passenger vehicles
with two or more occupants would not be subjected to toll charges; hence, there would
be an increased direct incentive for ridesharing. The 6 percent value was actually based
on an assumed 7 percent shift of passenger cars but was normalized to 6 percent since
commercial vehicles were assumed to be present in the total trip tables within the model.
This represents about 10 percent of the existing single-occupant passenger vehicles
traveling on Twin Cities freeways. It also translates into a net traffic reduction of about
3 percent, since it was assumed that those single-occupant motorists choosing to carpool
would simply switch to HOV-2 vehicles, to avoid toll payment.
Obviously, the total net reduction in regional travel is a very key parameter in
determining the ultimate pricing levels and strategies to be implemented. In more detailed
studies, this issue should be examined more closely, and it is recommended that the
potential pricing applications be considered in the trip distribution and modal split phases
of the modeling. The assumptions made as part of this study, however, are considered
to be reasonable approximations given the preliminary nature of this evaluation.
For example, as shown in Table 4, which depicts an imaginary screenline west of
Trunk Highway 100, imposition of tolls at $0.10 per mile on 1-94 would result in a shift
of over 76,000 vehicles per day to alternate routes, spread over a large number of
alternates. At the lower toll level, estimated diversions of about 25,000 are shown.
Principal important arterial routes would likely include Highways 7, 55, and 81, all of
which would experience daily traffic impacts of about 10,000 vehicles or more at the high
toll level in the year 2015. The base traffic estimate crossing this screenline is projected
to be more than 966,000 vehicles per day.
Similar information is shown in Table 5 for another north-south screenline located
between central Minneapolis and St. Paul. In this case, some 36,000 vehicles per day
would be diverted off the tolled freeway routes at the lower toll rate. Slightly more than
half of this would be shifted to alternative routes. The most heavily impacted of these
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would likely include U.S. Route 12/52, and County Route 23. On U.S. Route 12/52, the
impact under the low toll rate would be less than 5,000 vehicles per day. However, at
the higher toll rate of $0.10 per mile, the estimated impact would increase to more than
15,000 vehicles per day on U.S. 12/52. The total net reduction in trips along this
screenline is estimated at almost 27,000 vehicles per day at the higher toll rate,
representing about 3.2 percent of the total estimated screenline crossings at 2015 levels.
Table 6 shows an east-west screenline, located generally south of 1-694. In this case,
traffic on the freeway crossings would be reduced by almost 23 percent at the high toll
rate, as compared with the toll-free condition. Of this, about two-thirds would result from
diversions to alternative routes while about one-third would represent a net reduction in
total trips across the screenline. A much lower impact is shown at the $0.05 toll rate.
The traffic diversions would be spread over many routes, with the most notable impacts
expected to occur on Highway 81 on the westside and U.S. Route 61 on the eastside.
Finally, Table 7 shows freeway traffic impacts on an east-west screenline located
south of 1-394/1-94, generally south of the Minneapolis and St. Paul central business
districts. Freeway crossings along this screenline were found to be much less sensitive
to tolls, based on the preliminary modeling effort done as part of this study. Even at the
highest toll rate, the net total reduction in traffic away from the freeways amounted to less
than 13 percent, with slightly more than half of this resulting from diversions to alternate
routes and the remainder due to a net reduction in total trips. This net reduction
amounted to about 3 percent of the screenline total, estimated at about 1.0 million trips
per day under a toll-free condition in the year 2015. Again, traffic impacts on alternate
routes would be spread over a wide variety of streets and highways; the most notable
impacts were estimated in the vicinity of Trunk Highway 3 and included Smith Avenue,
Robert Street and U.S. Route 61/10.
Overall, traffic on the freeway segments were found to be reduced by between 5 and
10 percent along the different screenlines at the lower toll rate, $0.05 per mile during peak
periods. Traffic reductions on the freeways ranged from about 13 to 23 percent,
depending on screenline, at the higher toll rate. The net traffic reductions across the
screenlines ranged from about 2.0 to 4.1 percent, depending on toll rate and screenline.
As an approximate measure of impact on congestion, volume/capacity ratios for the
p.m. peak period conditions are shown in Table 8. Information is shown for a limited
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Table 8
COMPARISON OF VOLUME-TO-CAPACITY RATIOS
Base Scenario vs. Toll All Freeways Option
PM PEAK HOUR
ROUTE SEGMENT DIRECTION Base Case Rate 1(1) Rate 2(2)
1-494 South of 1-94 SB 0.59 0.51 0.37
1-494 South of 1-94 NB 1.13 1.04 0.88
TH 169 South of Excelsior Blvd. SB 0.75 0.72 0.67
TH 169 South of Excelsior Blvd. NB 0.83 0.81 0.71
TH 100 South of Excelsior Blvd. SB 0.98 0.95 0.89
TH 100 South of Excelsior Blvd. NB 0.90 0.87 0.78
1-35W South of 42nd St. SB 1.41 1.35 1.17
1-35W South of 42nd St. NB 1.27 1.21 1.06
1-494/5 East of 24th Ave. WB 0.90 0.89 0.82
1-494/5 East of 24th Ave. EB 1.01 1.00 0.93
1-35E West of TH 77 SB 0.90 0.87 0.75
1-35E West of TH 77 NB 0.75 0.68 0.57
TH 36 East of Lexington Ave. WB 0.90 0.77 0.45
TH 36 East of Lexington Ave. EB 1.22 1.10 0.90
(1) Peak period toll of $0.05 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.03 per mile.
(2) Peak period toll of $0.10 per mile, offpeak toll of $0.05 per mile.
(3) Assumes a.m. peak hour is 55 percent of a.m. peak period,
p.m. peak hour is 40 percent of p.m. peak period.
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number of representative locations on the freeway system, both with and without tolls.
As might be expected, as tolls are imposed and traffic on the freeway system is reduced,
the level of service improves. The lower the volume/capacity ratio shown in Table 8, the
better the average travel speeds and overall level of service.
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts - The regionwide freeway pricing system has the greatest
potential for encouraging carpooling and/or transit utilization. By pricing virtually all
limited access facilities, the overall level of toll charges would be greater and the number
of acceptable alternative routes would be less. As a result, transit or carpool options
would be more attractive.
This would be particularly true if revenue from the pricing system were funneled back
into transit improvements and/or construction of commuter lots, HOV lanes, etc. As
discussed previously, it was assumed that approximately 6 percent of SOV traffic would
elect to shift to carpools in response to the highest toll levels tested. This would translate
into a net reduction of 3 percent in vehicle trips. An additional reduction of 3 percent
was assumed for modal shifts to transit and/or overall decreased tripmaking as a result of
the toll charges. Assuming that half the reduction was due to modal shift and half due
to reduced tripmaking, a total increase of approximately 10,000 transit riders could occur
during the two peak periods if all freeways were tolled at the higher toll rate.
Other Considerations - On a systemwide basis, the broad application of road pricing
on all freeways in the region could result in reductions in travel speed on arterial routings
that could overshadow speed improvements on freeways, just as ramp meters sometimes
cause gridlock on local streets and arterials. Under the concept analyzed in this study,
those freeway segments that are not congested would be assessed the same toll as freeway
segments that are highly congested. A more focused congestion pricing scheme would
identify and toll only those segments that experience some level of congestion. This
would serve to "equalize" travel speeds on all freeway segments and result in a more
positive total impact on travel speeds on a network basis.
Revenue Potential - Implementation of electronic toll collection on the regionwide
freeway system in the Twin Cities area would have enormous revenue potential. As
shown in Table 9, revenue impacts were estimated assuming three alternative levels of
regional tolling:
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On limited access freeways within the MUSA area;
On all limited access freeways within the seven-county region; and
a On all freeways and other multi-lane expressways in the seven-county region.
Annual revenue at the lowest toll rates tested is estimated at between $302 and $348
million. This is considered to be an extremely conservative estimate, based on the
apparently low growth rates assumed in the 2015 trip tables provided to WSA and the fact
that no inflation is assumed in this analysis. The annual revenues are based on 2015
traffic levels, but 1994 level toll rates. If rates were increased due to inflation, actual
revenues in 2015 would be considerably above those shown in Table 9.
Under the higher tolling structure, which includes a peak hour rate of $0.10 per mile
and an off-peak rate of $0.05 per mile, annual revenues are estimated to range from about
$458 million for just MUSA area freeways to as much as $535 million per year for the
full freeway and expressway system.
In reviewing the estimates in Table 9, it is important to recognize that tolls would be
collected only from non-HOV traffic. Some 20 percent of the 2015 trip table was
assumed to be made up of vehicles with two occupants; hence these were removed from
the trip table and assigned to the network separately without tolls.
The average tolls per-mile shown in Table 9 are somewhat higher than nominal per-
mile rates actually used in the test assignments. This is due to the fact that tolls are also
assumed to be charged to commercial vehicles, which would have higher per-mile rates.
In addition, many of the trips are of a length which would fall within the "minimum toll"
category. For these relatively short trips, the effective rate per mile is considerably higher
than the nominal level. As a result, the effective average tolls per-mile are shown to be
somewhat higher than the nominal rates tested.
Capital and Operating Costs - Table 10 presents a summary of estimated capital and
operating costs associated with implementing and operating the regionwide freeway
electronic pricing system. The upper portion of the table calculates the one-time initial
capital cost for system implementation, all estimated at 1994 price levels. For example,
under all three of the freeway pricing scenarios tested in this category, it is estimated that
about $57 million would be required for construction of the various border toll stations
around the seven-county region. Each of the interior interchanges on the freeway system
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Table 10
ESTIMATED CAPITAL AND OPERATING COST
Full Freeway/Expressway System Options
1994 Level Cost
SCENARIO
ITEM
Full
Freeways Full Freeways
Within Seven-County and
MUSA Freeways Expressways
(----------thousands------ ------ )
CAPITAL COSTS
Border Stations
Interchanges
Mainline Tolling Zones
Central System
Communications
System Subtotal
Transponders
TOTAL with Transponders
ANNUALIZED CAPITAL COST
System Cost (1)
Transponders (2)
Subtotal
$ 57,000
62,400
3,000
5,000
10,000
$137,400
60,000
$197,400
$13,740
12,000
$ 25,740
$ 57,000
67,500
5,000
10,000
$139,500
60,000
$199,500
$13,950
12,000
$ 25,950
ANNUAL OPERATING COST
Border Plazas
ETC System
System Maintenance
Miscellaneous
Subtotal
TOTAL Annualized Cost
$15,000
14,000
3,800
1,000
$ 33,800
$ 59,540
$15,000
15,000
4,000
1,000
$ 35,000
$ 60,950
(1) Annualized system cost based on a 10-Year Life Cycle.
(2) Annualized transponder cost based on a 5-Year Life Cycle.
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$ 57,000
67,500
25,000
6,000
12,500
$168,000
60,000
$228,000
$ 16,800
12,000
$ 28,800
$ 16,500
19,000
5,200
1,500
$ 42,200
$ 71,000
would also need to be tolled, as shown previously in Figure 2. Assuming an overall
average of six ramps per interchange regionwide, and an estimated total cost per
interchange of $300,000 for ETC and AVC equipment, the tolling of the 208 internal
interchanges on the freeway system within the MUSA area is estimated at $62.4 million.
This would increase to $67.5 million if the area tolled is extended to the various county
lines.
In some locations, mainline tolling zones would be required along freeway mainline
segments. For example, under the option which would price freeways only within the
MUSA area, it would be necessary to have a point of entry/exit tolling zone in addition
to the internal interchanges. Were the full freeway system within the seven-county region
tolled, no mainline tolling zones would be needed since the points of entry and exit into
the seven county area would be equipped with border toll stations.
Where the expressway system were added into the tolling process, an additional $25
million is shown for "mainline tolling zones," since many of the expressways do not
have fully controlled interchanges and the tolling on the expressway routes is assumed to
be by means of periodic mainline tolling zone facilities. After adding in broad
approximations of capital costs for central computer systems, software and a
communications network, the total system cost is estimated to range from about $137
million to $168 million depending on the scenario.
Also inherent in the regionwide road pricing concept is the assumption that
transponders would be provided for all registered vehicles within the seven-county region.
There are currently more than 1.5 million passenger cars plus a large number of
commercial vehicles in the region. Obviously this is expected to grow over time and for
purposes of this analysis, it has been assumed that about two million transponders would
need to be manufactured and distributed to regional motorists.
Since it is assumed a relatively sophisticated read-write type transponder would be
needed, probably with a smart card interface, a unit cost of $30.00 per tag was assumed.
Actual costs of intelligent read-write tags today are slightly higher than this level, but with
improving technology and in the unprecedented quantity of two million, it is likely that
the unit cost will be reduced to at least the levels shown in Table 10. Nonetheless, with
two million vehicles in the region to be equipped, the cost for transponders would be a
sizable $60 million.
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If the local or regional governments absorb the full cost of the transponders as part
of the expenses of program implementation, the total cost including plazas, system and
transponders would generally be in the range of $200 million. Obviously, inclusion of
expressways would add significantly to the cost, estimated at a total of $228 million.
There is relatively little difference, however, between tolling freeways only within the
MUSA area or the expanded full-county area. This is due to the fact that there are
relatively few additional interchanges in the expanded freeway zone and by incorporating
these within the system it would be possible to eliminate the need for any mainline tolling
zone.
For purposes of comparative analysis, the system and transponder costs were
annualized, assuming a life cycle of 10-years for the basic system costs and 5-years for
transponder costs. This brings the total estimated annualized costs for system
implementation to about $26 million per year for the freeway pricing options and almost
$29 million per year if the other multi-lane routes are included.
Annual operating expenses were also estimated for each of the scenarios. By tolling
the full freeway system within the seven counties, an annual operating cost of $35 million
is estimated, including personnel for border station operations, expenses of the
computerized ETC system data processing and billing, system maintenance and
miscellaneous other costs. This still translates into a per-transaction cost systemwide of
less than $0.05, based on more than 700 million annual transactions. This compares with
revenue per transaction of about $0.45-$0.75 depending on toll rate.
When estimated operating costs are added to the annualized estimate of capital costs,
the total annualized costs are shown to range from $59.5 million to $71.0 million
depending on the size of the system. While these are certainly not insignificant costs,
they are well below the revenue potential of this pricing system, as described previously
in Table 9.
Individual Facility Concepts
As a variation on the full regional freeway system pricing concept discussed above,
the study team also examined the hypothetical tolling of two single limited-access
facilities within the region. As suggested by the Steering Committee, these two projects
included one existing route and one proposed new limited-access facility. Selection of
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the projects were completely at random, and should not be an indication of any particular
preference or recommendation regarding which facilities should be tolled.
The existing corridor tested was 1-94. As shown in Figure 7, the priced area would
extend from Rogers in the northwest portion of the seven-county region to downtown
Minneapolis. This would include a portion of the greater Minneapolis-St. Paul belt
freeway system, as well as an immediate radial freeway segment directly feeding the
downtown core area. In this scenario, 1-94 was not assumed to be widened for HOV
lanes.
The candidate new freeway which was selected for hypothetical toll evaluation was
proposed Trunk Highway 212 in the southwestern portion of the region. As shown in
Figure 7, this would extend from a junction with 1-494 near Edina to a junction with
existing TH 212 in Carver County. This limited-access facility has been planned for some
time and environmental studies have been completed.
In both of these single facility concepts, it would be possible to use electronic toll
collection. However, the study has found that the less broad the pricing application, in
a regional context, the more likely it is that at least partial traditional toll collection
techniques may also need to be offered. It would not be practical, for example, to equip
all vehicles in the greater Twin Cities region with electronic transponders if the devices
were to be used on only such a small portion of the total regional highway network.
Traffic and revenue impacts were estimated for each of these facilities as if fully
electronic tolling were used. As a practical matter, it would be theoretically possible to
add a limited number of cash collection locations along each of the routes, which would
make the facilities available to all potential users.
In estimating capital and operating costs for implementing tolls on each of the
facilities, a combination electronic/traditional system has been assumed. For purposes of
simplicity and recognizing the preliminary nature of this study, however, anticipated toll
revenue potential was computed on a per-mile tolling basis, as if fully electronic tolls
were used. Any cash collection system would be structured to emulate, as closely as
possible, rates which would be charged under an electronic tolling system. Even with the
combination program, over a period of time it is likely that a majority of users would
ultimately use ETC anyway.
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Estimated Traffic Impacts - The estimated traffic impacts of pricing individual
freeways would generally be similar to those shown previously with respect to the full
freeway pricing option, at least within the particular corridors affected. Overall, the traffic
diversions under the individual project scenarios would be slightly less than those under
the full system scenario, since the actual toll rates for many of the motorists would not
be as high given that only part of the system were priced.
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts - Potential impacts on transit utilization and/or ridesharing
would be similar under this concept to the full regionwide pricing program, at least with
respect to the individual corridors tested. In the case of the 1-94 hypothetical option, it
would be a greater potential for increased transit utilization, since the corridor pricing
option extended the full distance into the CBD. The analysis for this scenario did not
recognize the proposed addition of HOV lanes on 1-94. The TH 212 project would have
a somewhat more limited potential benefit on transit utilization.
It is important to note, however, that under the individual pricing options one or more
alternative freeway routings would theoretically be available as toll free alternatives. This
differs from the full regional freeway congestion/road pricing program, under which
transit and/or carpooling would likely appear to be a more attractive alternative, since
there would not be alternative freeway routing which would be toll-free.
Revenue Potential - Annual toll revenue potential for individual project scenarios are
shown in Table 11. Annual revenue potential was calculated as if fully electronic toll
collection were implemented on each of the facilities. However, as noted above, it would
probably be necessary to construct spot toll plazas to provide options for traditional toll
collection, since the extent of regional tolling under this scenario would not be sufficient
to justify equipping all two million vehicles for electronic tolls. The relative revenue
estimates shown in Table 11 are reasonable approximations of revenue potential, however.
On the proposed Trunk Highway 212 project, annual revenue is estimated at between
$6.0 and $10.5 million, depending on toll levels used. Again it is assumed that only non-
HOV traffic is subjected to a toll. It is also assumed that significant off-peak toll
discounts would be offered.
Considerably more revenue potential would exist if pricing were added to the existing
I-94 corridor between Rogers and the Minneapolis CBD. Obviously, the length of this
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project is much longer than the TH 212 project and the existing and projected traffic
levels are considerably higher. Annual revenue under this hypothetical pricing scenario
is estimated at between $26 million and $44 million, depending on toll rate level.
Capital and Operating Costs - Table 12 presents a summary of estimated capital and
operating costs for the single corridor options, including both 1-94 and TH 212 projects.
Up to three mainline toll plazas are assumed to be needed on 1-94, each of which
would provide an option for full non-stop electronic toll collection. The mainline toll
plazas would likely cost in the range of $10 million. To ensure no toll-free travel,
selected ramps along the affected segments are also assumed to be tolled, resulting in
additional cost of $20 million for the 1-94 scenario. In total, the capital cost of
implementing tolls on 1-94 is estimated at about $58.5 million. This results in a total
annualized cost, including operating costs, of almost $11 million per year, at 1994 cost
levels.
A considerably lower total annualized cost estimate is shown for TH 212. This
project would likely require only one mainline toll plaza, given its relatively short length.
A fewer number of ramp plazas are also needed, resulting in a total annual cost of about
$2.5 million.
HOV/LRT Corridor Pricing
The fourth category of road pricing options would establish tolling in connection with
existing and planned HOV and/or light rail transit (LRT) corridors. As shown in Figure
8, this would include 1-94, 1-394, TH 36, portions of 1-494 and 1-35W south of
Minneapolis. It would also allow pricing the central freeway corridor along 1-94 between
the CBD of Minneapolis and St. Paul, where LRT service is proposed. LRT has also
been proposed for the 1-35W south corridor, in conjunction with HOV lane construction.
The "mixed-flow" lanes would be tolled, with all SOV and commercial vehicle traffic
being charged while HOV traffic was toll-free. Obviously, the objective of this strategy
would be to provide a further incentive for carpooling (or LRT usage) and a further
disincentive to single occupant usage. It would also generate considerable revenue which
could, in turn, be used to finance construction of additional HOV capacity, park and ride
lots, LRT capital and operating costs, etc.
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Table 12
ESTIMATED CAPITAL AND OPERATING COST
Single Corridor Options
1994 Level Cost
ITEM 1-94 TH 212
(-----------thousands------------)
Capital Costs
Mainline Plazas $ 30,000 $ 5,000
Ramp Plazas 20,000 8,000
Toll Equip/ETC System 8,500 2,500
Total Capital $ 58,500 $15,500
Annualized Capital Cost(1) $ 5,850 $ 1,550
Operating Cost 5,000 1,000
Total Annual Cost $10,850 $ 2,550
(1) Annualized capital cost assumes 10-Year Life Cycle.
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Logistically, this option would need to be implemented using fully electronic toll
collection. It would appear logical to provide electronic toll collection devices to most
vehicles in the region, although this is something that could be looked at in more detailed
studies later.
Estimated Traffic Impacts - Estimated traffic impacts for the scenario in which SOV
lanes would be priced would be expected to be quite similar to those which would be
experienced under the full freeway tolling system, at least in the immediately priced
corridors. HOV and transit vehicles could not be tolled. However, by implementing it
in conjunction with the program of HOV lanes, the potential for increased carpooling
would be greater, therefore the demand management benefit of pricing, in conjunction
with the HOV facility, would be enhanced.
Implementation of a toll of $0.10 per mile on I-35W, with provision of HOV and
LRT facilities, would result in an estimated reduction of 3,600 single-occupant vehicles
during peak periods. Of these, approximately 1,400 persons would shift to LRT, and
about 2,100 would shift to HOV.
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts - The concept of charging non-HOV traffic along the
HOV/LRT corridors would, of course, have a significant impact on both ridesharing and
transit utilization. Indeed, these were the primary motivation behind choosing this
category of tolling options for evaluation in this study. Charging tolls for use of the
congested SOV lanes would provide a direct identifiable additional disincentive to driving
alone. If revenues generated from these vehicles were used to construct expanded HOV
lanes as well as additional commuter lots, etc. that would further exacerbate the shift to
carpooling and transit.
Similarly, in the LRT corridors pricing of the competing roadways would provide a
direct further incentive for LRT utilization. If revenues generated from those corridor
pricing applications were then used to support the construction or operation of the LRT,
or other transit initiative corridors, the transit benefits would be enhanced.
This concept does raise an interesting question regarding construction of future HOV
reserved capacity. Under the kinds of road pricing program examined in this study, it was
assumed that high occupant vehicles would generally be exempted from tolling.
Therefore, the pricing program provides some of the same incentives for carpooling as
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reserved capacity. This would probably only be a fully equivalent alternative to HOV
lanes if the tolling levels charged to non-HOV traffic were sufficiently high to reduce
congestion levels to the point where there was substantially free flow traffic conditions
on the freeways (for both HOV and non-HOV traffic). This might make reserved capacity
for HOV's somewhat superfluous. Obviously, the difference would be that the non-HOV
traffic would be paying the full cost of maintaining the free flow conditions. This is
clearly another area which should be evaluated in more detail if decisions are made to
further explore road pricing in the Twin Cities area.
Revenue Potential - Revenue potential was estimated under two alternative assumed
conditions. In the first case, tolls would be charged only during peak periods, and only
in the peak travel direction. This is due to the fact that most of the HOV network utilizes
concurrent lanes, which are reserved for HOV traffic only during certain hours of the day;
the "diamond" lane concept. Obviously, pricing during off-peak hours, or in the minor
direction, when the designated lane was not restricted to HOV's might not be necessary.
Due to the limited number of hours of operation, this scenario would produce an
estimated annual revenue of only about $26 million. As an alternative, revenue potential
is calculated assuming pricing was implemented on a full-time basis, with differential
levels between peak and off-peak periods, and assessed in both travel directions. This
would be essentially the same as the full freeway system option, except that the pricing
would apply only to those segments of the freeway system which would have
designated HOV lanes and/or LRT corridors. Under this option, annual revenue
potential would be increased significantly, to an estimated $185 million per year.
Capital and Operating Costs - Table 13 shows estimated capital and operating costs
for the scenario in which SOV pricing would be applied only in the HOV/LRT corridors.
The total annualized cost is estimated at almost $42 million. This is due to the fact that
even though a smaller portion of the freeway system would be priced, it would probably
be sufficiently large to warrant issuance of transponders to all two million vehicles in the
seven-county region. It would also be necessary to construct and operate the various
border stations, although possibly to a slightly lower standard at the actual freeway
entrance points. Hence, the estimated capital costs for border stations was reduced to $50
million.
"HOV Buy-In" Concept - An important variation on the scenarios tested in this study
would be the "HOV Buy-In" concept. All traffic, revenue and cost estimates discussed
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Table 13
ESTIMATED CAPITAL AND OPERATING COST
SOV Pricing in HOV/LRT Corridors
1994 Level Cost
ITEM
ESTIMATED ANNUALIZED
TOTAL CAPITAL
COST COST(1)
(----------------thousands----------------)
CAPITAL COSTS
Border Stations
Interchanges
Mainline Tolling Zones
Central System
Communications
System Subtotal
Transponders (2 Million)
Subtotal
$50,000
35,400
3,500
4,000
$ 98,900
$158,900
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS
Border Plaza Operations
ETC System Operations
System Maintenance
Miscellaneous
$16,500
1,000 (2)
2,000
500
$ 20,000
$ 41,890TOTAL Annual Cost
(1) Annualized cost assumes 10-year life cycle for capital costs except
transponders, when a 5-year life cycle was used.
(2) Value shown is for peak period/peak direction only. If all day tolls
were implemented, cost for this item would be $5,000,000.
-78-
$ 5,000
3,540
350
400
600
$ 9,890
12,000
$ 21,890
above assume tolls would be applied to the non-HOV traffic required to use the "mixed-
flow" lanes. There would be no tolls assessed in the HOV lanes themselves.
A concept which has received considerable attention recently is the idea of allowing
single-occupant vehicles to use HOV lanes for a certain toll. In this case, tolls would
only be applied to non-HOV traffic which wanted to realize the potential time savings
advantages of HOV lane usage. In essence, the price paid would be in lieu of the
decision to carpool.
While the concept is considerably different from the basic ideas studied above, it does
have merit, particularly where existing HOV capacity has not yet been constructed, such
as the project under construction in Orange County, California, along S.R. 91. In this
case, four additional "toll" lanes are being constructed in the median of an existing
congested freeway. Vehicles with three or more occupants will be permitted to use the
"toll" lanes for free. All other vehicles, including SOV and vehicles with two occupants,
will be required to pay tolls. Revenues generated by those choosing to avoid congestion
by paying tolls will be used to amortize the cost of constructing the HOV lanes. The
concept may even have some merit with respect to existing HOV lanes, which are often
underutilized. By allowing the pricing option for SOV use, revenues could be generated
which could, in turn, be used to further foster ridesharing and/or transit alternatives. By
allowing some SOV usage of the HOV lanes, but ensuring free-flow condition for bona
fide high-occupant vehicles through congestion pricing of SOVs, a more efficient
utilization of the overall available roadway capacity would be provided.
Supporters of the concept also argue that tolled use of HOV lanes by SOV traffic
would also put a more direct, easily recognized "price tag" on the cost of driving alone.
It would provide a more readily evident "trade off' for motorists. The HOV "Buy-In"
idea would probably have a relatively high level of public acceptability, as compared to
some other congestion/road pricing options, since only those motorists receiving the
premium level of service would be required to pay.
To date, FHWA has been largely unreceptive to the HOV "Buy-In" concept. Several
proposals of this nature were submitted under terms of the Congestion Pricing
Demonstration Project with ISTEA. There is at least some feeling that the idea may act
as a disincentive to carpooling, by providing a priced alternative as a means of using the
free-flowing reserved capacity. In recent months, however, there has been some
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indication that the federal position on the idea may be reconsidered, but at the time of this
report, no specific changes could be confirmed.
Eventually, consideration was given to evaluate an HOV "Buy-In" option as part of
this study. However, in most cases, HOV capacity is provided in the Twin Cities area
by using the "diamond lane" concept. In this case, lanes are reserved for high-occupant
vehicles only during certain times of the day, and there is no physical separation between
the mixed-flow and HOV lanes. The only means of identifying high-occupant vehicles
is through visual observation.
Without some type of physical separation between the mixed-flow and HOV lanes,
implementation of the SOV pricing option would be extremely difficult. Without a
physical barrier, vehicles are able to move into and out of the HOV lanes at an unlimited
number of locations along the corridor. It would be most difficult to identify SOV
violators in the HOV lanes from the toll paying, AVI-equipped SOV vehicles; hence, it
would be almost impossible to enforce the occupancy restrictions under the diamond lane
buy-in concept.
The enforcement problems with the HOV "Buy-In" options differ from those of a
scenario in which the mixed-flow lanes would be tolled. Enforcement in the latter case
would simply be to identify vehicles not properly equipped with valid ETC transponders,
since all vehicles not eligible to use HOV lanes would be required to be so equipped.
The enforcement problem under the HOV "Buy-In" concept relates more to violations of
HOV restrictions and not only revenue collection.
As such, this concept was not given further evaluation as part of this preliminary
study. However, it is an idea which may have merit in those areas where future HOV
lanes may be constructed with some measure of physical separation from the mixed-flow
lanes, such as a portion of the 1-394 reversible HOV lane segment. If future HOV
capacity is considered using this approach, it would be possible to also consider use of
the HOV "Buy-In" concept. This could be addressed in more detailed studies in the
future, if desired.
MUSA Area Pricing
The final set of road pricing options tested as part of this study involved the
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establishment of entry tolls at the limits of the Metropolitan Urban Service Area, or
MUSA line. Figure 9 shows the approximate MUSA boundary. The boundaries shown
in Figure 9 reflect a fairly simplistic interpretation of the actual, more detailed MUSA
line, which includes various indentations and "islands." However, it would probably not
be practical to precisely follow the MUSA line since this might result in single roadways
running in and out of the protected area.
Under this basic idea, MUSA border tolling stations would be established on all roads,
including non-limited access routes, entering the area. Per instruction of the Project
Management Team, this scenario assumed that vehicles registered inside the defined
MUSA area would be exempt from tolling, and would probably receive windshield
stickers. Vehicles registered outside the MUSA area would be required to pay a toll when
entering the area at the time of crossing the MUSA line.
For purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that there would be an option available
to motorists with vehicles registered outside the MUSA to purchase some type of "annual
pass" which would entitle the vehicle to unlimited crossings during a given year for a
predetermined annual amount.
Vehicles without the annual pass or exempt stickers would be required to pay a cash
toll for each entry trip into the area. Three levels of toll charges were tested; $0.50, $1.00
and $1.50 for passenger cars. In these cases, the cost of a typical annual pass was
assumed to be $50, $100 or $150, respectively. This would be the equivalent of about
100 round trips per year.
Tolls would be accessed only in the entry direction at each location. There would be
no charge to leave the MUSA area. At larger roads, attended toll collection facilities
would be constructed at the entry points, although bypass lanes would be provided for
vehicles with exempt or annual pass stickers. It is anticipated that a majority of traffic
crossing the MUSA boundary would be able to use these bypass lanes and only a small
proportion would actually be required to pay cash tolls.
At more lightly travelled routes, such as local roads crossing the boundary, it would
be possible to use automatic coin machines in an unattended mode for revenue collection.
It would not appear to be necessary to use electronic toll collection under this option,
since only a small proportion of the total regional vehicle population would actually be
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required to pay a toll. Recognizing that annual stickers would be made available for out
of area vehicles, it is likely that most motorists who might be inclined to use electronic
toll collection would instead opt for the discounted annual pass. Therefore, the only
remaining population which would be required to pay cash tolls would be relatively
infrequent users, including out-of-state vehicles. These would not be potential users of
electronic tolls, in any case.
Estimated Traffic Impacts - Traffic impacts associated with the MUSA line entry line
toll concept would be expected to be relatively minimal. Since all routes entering the
MUSA would be tolled, there would not be an opportunity for redistribution of traffic
between routes. Further, the actual toll charges would likely be assessed to less than half
of the total vehicles entering the region, since neither HOV traffic or any type of vehicle
registered within the MUSA area would be subjected to tolls. Overall, there would
probably be a slight reduction in the number of vehicles actually crossing the MUSA line.
This would be typically limited to a reorientation of trips to stay outside of the MUSA
area. This is estimated to amounts to only a few percent of trips crossing the MUSA line
which, in turn, amounts to a very small portion of total regional trips.
Transit/Ridesharing Impacts - Obviously, the rationale for the MUSA entry pricing
scheme is somewhat different than the other options evaluated. It would not be as much
a means of reducing congestion as it would be a means of encouraging future
development patterns in a manner consistent with current regional development goals.
That is, it would encourage more of the future development to occur within the primary
urban service area, where transit options and other non-SOV alternatives would likely be
available.
Revenue Potential - Revenue potential of the MUSA entry toll pricing concept is
shown in Table 14. Three hypothetical entry toll levels were tested, ranging from $0.50
to $1.50 per entry for passenger vehicles. As noted previously, it was assumed that
MUSA registered vehicles would not be required to pay a toll. It was also assumed that
an annual pass would be made available for relatively frequent users which would have
an effective rate per trip of about one-half the cash toll. For purposes of analysis, it was
assumed that 50 percent of the vehicles crossing the MUSA line would be registered
within the MUSA. Another 25 percent of the vehicles would opt for the annual pass,
while less than one-fourth would actually be required to pay cash tolls after excluding
HOV's. Annual revenue under the $0.50 entry toll is estimated at less than $16 million
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per year. If the rate was increased to $1.50 per entry, tolls are projected to reach $30
million.
Capital and Operating Costs - It is anticipated that the traditional toll collection
techniques would be used for collecting revenues from vehicles entering the MUSA area.
At the larger roads crossing the MUSA line, this would require construction of small toll
plazas, in one direction only. At the lightly utilized roadways, a single automatic coin
machine with a small turnout lane would be sufficient. Obviously, use of unattended toll
collection would result in significant levels of toll evasion; the annual revenue estimates
have been adjusted to reflect this. As shown in Table 15, the total annualized cost is
estimated at $18.7 million.
Summary of Revenue/Cost Relationships
Table 16 provides a useful comparative summary of the relationship between revenue
potential and annualized cost of each of the various alternative options for congestion
pricing in the Twin Cities area. Again, it is emphasized that the routes selected for this
analysis were purely hypothetical and intended to be illustrative of typical pricing
strategies to determine relative revenue, cost and traffic impact implications. The study
did not reach any conclusions regarding optimum routes for tolling or an optimum pricing
strategy for the region.
Where multiple toll rates were tested, revenue/cost ratios are provided for both
scenarios. Where more than two alternative toll rates were tested, the table shows the
lowest and highest rates. For purposes of a relative comparison between options, the
overall financial feasibility of each option was determined by simply dividing annual
revenue potential, at 2015 demand levels (but using 1994 prices) by the estimated average
annualized cost (also at 1994 levels.) As noted previously, for each scenario the
annualized cost includes estimated annual operating expenses as well as an annualized
estimate of the cost of implementation, normally assuming a 10-year life cycle.
The revenue/cost ratio is determined by simply dividing annual revenue potential by
total estimated annualized cost. Obviously, the higher the revenue/cost ratio, the greater
the net revenue potential of a particular scenario, and the greater the overall financial
feasibility. As might be expected, the highest revenue/cost ratios are shown for the full
freeway system pricing options. For example, if pricing was established on all freeways
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Table 15
ESTIMATED CAPITAL AND OPERATING COST
MUSA Line Entry Tolls
1994 Level Cost
ITEM
Number in System
Estimated Capital Cost (000)
Annualized Capital Cost (000)
LARGE
PLAZAS(1)
15
$ 24,000
2,400
Operating Cost
TOTAL Annualized Cost
$11,400
MEDIUM
PLAZAS(2)
18
$ 13,500
1,350
4,500
$ 5,850
(1) Large plazas assumed to have four toll lanes; two attended.
(2) Medium plazas assumed to have two toll lanes; one attended.
(3) Small plazas assumed to be single lane, unattended sites.
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SMALL
PLAZAS(3)
56
$ 8,400
TOTAL
89
$ 45,900
840 4,590
560
$1,400
14,060
$ 18,650
Table 16
REVENUE/COST SUMMARY
TOTAL
ANNUAL
COST
(000)
SCENARIO
LOW TOLL RATES
Annual Rev/Cost
Revenue Ratio
(000)
HIGH TOLL RATES
Annual Rev/Cost
Revenue Ratio
(000)
Spot Locations (1)
New Anoka Bridge
New Stillwater Bridge
Wabasha St. Bridge
1-494/Wakota Bridge
Minn. River Bridge
Screenline
Full Freeway System
MUSA Area Only
Full 7-County Area
Full Area with Expressways
Single Corridor Options
1-94
TH 212
HOV/LRT Corridors
(Tolling SOV Lanes)
Peak Period/Major Dir. Only
Full Time Tolling
MUSA Line Entry Tolls (2)
$600
600
700
3,000
8,950
59,540
60,950
71,000
10,850
2,550
41,890
45,890
18,650
$3,200
2,700
2,500
12,500
41,700
301,700
318,900
347,500
25,900
6,000
5.33
4.50
3.57
4.17
4.66
5.07
5.23
4.89
2.39
2.35
$4,000
3,300
2,700
16,300
51,600
457,500
482,000
534,700
44,000
10,500
-- 26,000
-- 185,000
15,700 0.84 30,300
(1) All bridge scenarios assume 2-way toll collection.
(2) Includes a reduction of 50 percent in the cash-paying component at unattended
entry locations, and 10 percent at attended locations to account for toll evasion.
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6.67
5.50
3.86
5.43
5.77
7.68
7.91
7.53
4.06
4.12
0.62
4.03
1.62
within the seven-county area, at the higher toll rate of $0.10 per mile during peak hours
with a 50 percent discount during off-peak hours, annual toll revenue would be 7.91 times
the annual cost of operation. Expressed differently, after deducting an estimated total
annualized operating cost of about $61 million, the seven-county freeway pricing system
would still generate net revenues of $421 million per year.
Limiting the system to only MUSA area freeways slightly reduces the revenue/cost
ratio, although it is still very positive. Adding in the various expressway sections would
slightly increase overall net revenue but would reduce the net ratio of revenue to cost.
The annual revenue potential of placing tolls on any of the bridges shown would
exceed the actual cost of collection, including toll plaza construction, by a considerable
margin. For example, putting tolls on the Minnesota River Bridge screenline would
produce $52 million in annual revenue, as compared with less than $9 million in
annualized costs. Annual revenue potential from placing tolls on the 1-494 Bridge would
be 5.4 times greater than the total annualized cost of establishing toll collection.
Obviously, these relative feasibility measures only relate revenue potential to the cost of
collecting net revenue; this does not suggest that the net revenue potential would
necessarily be sufficient to finance the actual construction cost of a new bridge itself.
Only two of the many scenarios tested were found to have revenue/cost ratios of less
than one (i.e., the estimated operating cost would exceed revenue potential.) Under the
lowest toll rate, the MUSA line entry tolls would produce less revenue than cost, largely
due to the need for extensive manual collection facilities at a number of locations.
Similarly, pricing only those freeway segments adjacent to HOV or LRT corridors, during
only peak periods in the major travel direction would also produce revenue which is less
than the annualized cost. This is due to the fact that it has been assumed that all vehicles
in the region would need to be equipped with electronic transponders, and order toll
stations would need to be established in support of a relatively limited tolling application.
However, if the HOV/LRT corridor option were extended to full time tolling, even for the
reduced number of freeway segments, annual revenue potential would significantly exceed
the annualized cost by more than 4 times.
Comparative Impact Analysis
The various hypothetical congestion/road pricing scenarios evaluated in this
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preliminary study covered a wide range of applications. As such, they would also vary
considerably with respect to the various evaluation criteria enumerated at the beginning
of this Chapter.
A comparative summary of the relative impact of each of the options under each of
the evaluation factors is presented in Figure 10. Given the preliminary nature of this
study, a simplified relative rating scale is appropriate, with impacts generally ranging from
unfavorable to favorable.
Figure 10 provides a convenient, simplified assessment of relative impacts; many of
the items are discussed in somewhat more detail in the pages that follow. For the spot
location option, separate categories are shown pertaining to the "individual bridges" versus
the "Minnesota River screenline" strategies, which differ, to some extent, in intent and
effectiveness. Similarly, the capital HOV/LRT corridor options are also shown with two
components, each of which is significantly different. In one case, tolls would be assessed
to non-HOV traffic using the mixed-flow lanes while in the other case, tolls would be
assessed to non-HOV traffic to gain access to HOV lanes. The remaining three concepts
shown in Figure 10 include single corridor options, the full freeway pricing scheme and
the MUSA area pricing concept.
The full freeway pricing concept would be expected to have the most significant
potential for congestion relief and the highest revenue potential. However, given its broad
application, it would probably have the most unfavorable impact on low income users and
local traffic diversions. The most direct incentive for increased transit utilization and/or
ridesharing would likely come by implementing tolls in the mixed-flow lanes in the
immediate HOV/LRT corridors. The MUSA area pricing scheme would appear to have
the least potential in terms of congestion relief and mode shift incentives, and would have
the primary advantage of fostering development in patterns which are consistent with
regional development goals. However, the same objective could also be achieved, to
some extent, through specific pricing strategies under other options, such as the full
freeway pricing system.
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SPOT LOCATIONS HOV / LRT SINGLE FULL MUSAEVALUATION
Ind. Screen- Toll HOV CORRIDOR FREEWAY AREA
CRITERIA Bridges line Non-HOV Buy-In OPTIONS PRICING PRICING
CONGESTION RELIEF
* SOV Reduction C ( OC
* Congestion Reduction C OC C C C
* Travel Time Reduction C O C
MODE SHIFT POTENTIAL
* Increase Transit O 9
* Increase Ridesharing C O " CC 0 C
REVENUE/COST
CONSIDERATIONS
* Revenue Potential O C C) 4" C)
* Revenue/Cost Ratio C 0 C C ,
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
* Ease of Use IC C C O C
* Ease of Enforcement 0 * O O C C
PUBLIC/POUTICAL
ACCEPTABILITY
* Equity/Availability of Options C C) C 0 C
* Low Income Impacts C C C C C
* Business Impacts C C C C C C C
* Local Traffic Diversions C C C 0 C)
AIR QUALITY IMPACTS
* VMT Reductions C C C
* Improve Average Speeds C C C C C o
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
GOALS O O O O *
O Unfavorable Impacts
C Moderate/Neutral Impacts
* Favorable Impacts
OVERVIEW OF
RELATIVE IMPACTS
WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES FIGURE 10
WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES FIGURE 10
Other Considerations
Beyond the traffic, revenue and cost implications discussed above, there are a number
of factors that should be taken into consideration when evaluating the viability of
implementing congestion/road pricing. The remaining sections of this chapter deal with
these considerations, both in general terms and, where appropriate, with respect to each
of the alternative options studied.
Potential Uses of Revenue - As described above, congestion/road pricing programs
are likely to generate a substantial revenue stream. The uses of these revenues will
influence public support for the program as well as the effectiveness of the program itself.
The potential uses of revenues should be based upon principles that reinforce the overall
objectives of congestion/road pricing.
a Implementation Costs - Revenues should first be applied to the annualized
operating and capital costs associated with the collection of tolls and fees. This
would include the costs of enforcement, public outreach, and administration. For
most of the scenarios analyzed, this cost represents from 10 to 25 percent of the
revenue potential;
a Provision of Travel Alternatives - Revenues should be applied to provide
reasonable transportation alternatives to peak period SOV travel. Transit services
and facilities, HOV lanes, and improving alternate routes could all be supported by
program revenues. Providing attractive options, particularly if they offer faster
travel and/or less expense travel, will help foster support for congestion/road
pricing. These alternatives should be in place at the start of a project;
a Mitigation of Negative Impacts - Revenues could be used as direct subsidies to
reduce cost impacts to low-income travelers. Such compensation would need to
be designed so as to maintain the incentive for changing travel behavior.
Compensation could be in the form of travel allowances. This use of revenues
would address equity concerns of those who might be penalized by the program;
a Implementation of the Regional Transportation Plan - Revenues could be directed
towards furthering improvements identified in the regional transportation plan.
This program would include appropriate transit and highway improvements in
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keeping with the dampened travel demand resulting from congestion/road pricing;
a Reduced Taxes - Revenues could be returned to travelers in the form of reduced
taxes. Revenues could substitute for a portion of property, gasoline and excise
taxes currently imposed. If there is opposition to congestion/road pricing because
it is viewed as a new tax and revenue source for government, one approach could
be to structure a "revenue neutral" program by reducing existing taxes; and
a Other Uses - Revenues could be applied to any number of non-transportation
public uses. However, this would weaken the "pay-as-you-go" approach to
transportation financing and would establish congestion pricing as another tax.
Revenue use decisions must reflect a variety of public policy considerations related
to transportation needs, equity concerns, and jurisdictional priorities.
Public/Political Acceptability - Congestion pricing options will be perceived as more
or less acceptable depending on the nature and extent of the pricing scheme. As the
examples of congestion pricing programs and plans suggest, several important issues can
"make or break" congestion pricing proposals. Issues include perceptions of fairness,
proposed use of funds, possible impacts on businesses and low income groups, and
privacy concerns. Acceptability will be enhanced by consulting with affected parties at
the outset of planning, as well as developing liaison with likely supporters. A revenue
neutral program may enhance acceptability as compared with a program where pricing is
perceived simply as a way to raise revenues. A preliminary public information plan is
provided in Chapter 6.
Especially important to political acceptability of congestion pricing proposals are the
number of potential winner and loser groups, and their likely positions on congestion
pricing proposals. The number of winners and losers depends on how motorists, transit,
rideshare patrons and taxpayers perceive changes in travel time and tax burdens. Winners,
for example, may be a large group of taxpayers if tolls reduce their tax burden. However,
if taxpayers receive a small benefit they will have little stake in promoting congestion
pricing. Motorists valuing reduced travel time more than the toll are winners, but they
may, or may not, actively support congestion pricing depending on their confidence in
planners and potential managers of the congestion pricing program. Motorists perceiving
the need to shift to alternative modes or other road facilities may resist congestion pricing
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proposals, even if improved facilities or modes are promised. Again, all depends on how
credible and extensive such proposals are.
Because active support of congestion pricing plans is vital to political acceptability
and agency approval of proposals, it is important to identify and involve possible
supporters early in the planning process. Possible supporters include those who benefit
from reduced congestion:
Neighborhoods where traffic might be reduced;
a Commercial enterprises highly dependent on goods delivery and traveling sales
force;
a Environmental interests concerned with air quality;
a Transit operators receiving support for expanded capital stock and
experiencing better speeds under less congestion; and
a Automobile organizations interested in expanded road facilities, provided
congestion pricing is part of a broader plan to add highway capacity at critical
locations.
Consistency with Regional Goals - This section assesses the extent to which
congestion/road pricing application options support the regional transportation goals. The
level of support for regional goals is evaluated in terms of the following factors:
m Contribution to the region's quality of life in terms of congestion reduction,
reduced travel times and improved environment;
Management of the transportation system to satisfy travel demand;
a Strengthening of transit, paratransit and rideshare;
Availability of stable funding for transportation facilities and services; and
a Support for economic development and encouragement of growth within the
Metropolitan Urban Services Area (MUSA).
This last issue is particularly important, since pricing may well influence future
geographic growth patterns. It should be addressed in more detail in future studies.
Contribution to Region's Quality of Life - Among the congestion/road pricing
applications examined, the areawide and systemwide options have, by far, the greatest
potential for reducing congestion by improving travel time and improving the
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environment, thus contributing to the region's quality of life. The areawide and
systemwide options include implementing congestion/road pricing on freeways/express-
ways within the MUSA boundary, or within the seven-county area, or on all major roads
within the seven-county area, or at a cordon line around the MUSA boundary, or on all
HOV and LRT corridors. These are regional applications and, therefore, will result in
regional congestion, travel time and environmental benefits. Depending on the
application, traffic diversion to arterials and neighborhood streets could have a negative
impact on the quality of life for existing users of those routes and residents along those
routes. For example, the freeway pricing option would cause the greatest diversion to
alternate routes regionally, while the cordon line tolls would limit diversions to the area
immediately outside the cordon line.
On the other hand, the pricing strategies would also act to reduce total demand, by
providing incentives for increased ridesharing and transit utilization. Consider, for
example, the 1-35W corridor south of Minneapolis. Projected future demands exceed
available capacity even with the addition of carpool lanes and LRT. As such, in the
absence of pricing, significant overflow onto the local street system can be anticipated.
With a pricing initiative, the overflow would cause greater utilization of the HOV lanes
and a higher shift to transit. This would tend to reduce the overall level of demand and
free up more available capacity on 1-35W, potentially reducing the severity of traffic
impacts on alternate routes.
This underscores the need for comprehensive planning of any future road pricing
initiative. Not only can future negative traffic impacts be mitigated, to some extent,
through use of revenues generated by pricing, but a coordinated program of pricing and
increased opportunities for alternative modes such as transit and ridesharing may be able
to be used together to achieve a net positive impact.
Spot or facility applications of congestion/road pricing such as on individual bridges
or freeways will have very localized beneficial impacts on quality of life. In fact, because
of the negative impacts due to spillover of traffic onto parallel routes, the net benefit is
likely to be small, if any.
Impacts on Business - The impacts of congestion pricing on business will vary with
the structure of the pricing program, the nature of the businesses affected, competition and
other factors. Generally speaking, reductions in traffic congestion will create benefits by
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reducing the travel time (and, therefore, costs) of goods delivery. These savings should
offset the direct increases in shipping expenses created by the pricing program. Concerns
about impacts on retail businesses relate to shoppers potentially facing high travel costs,
particularly if only some retail destinations are affected by the pricing program.
According to several federal studies, truck operators value their time at $25-30 per
hour (this will vary for local delivery vs. long-haul, etc.). If on a 20-mile roundtrip, with
a relatively low truck toll rate of $0.10 per mile assumed, only about five minutes of
overall travel time savings from reduced congestion would need to be realized in order
for the trucker to gain from the program.
Additional analysis of impacts on business should seek to differentiate impacts by
type of business and by general location. The focus should be on the levels of
commercial activity (sales), costs of doing business, and impacts on customers.
Management of Existing Transportation System - One of the primary objectives of
any type of road pricing system is to manage the transportation system to satisfy travel
demand while making the most effective use of limited resources. All of the options
evaluated would provide some measure of demand management. The spot application of
pricing would act to redistribute traffic between facilities and, to a lesser extent, encourage
ridesharing, or demand reduction. It could also provide incentive to changes in the time
of day trips are made. The concept of pricing mixed-flow lanes on segments adjacent to
HOV lanes would provide a more direct incentive to ridesharing and thereby achieve a
more balanced utilization of total available capacity while acting to reduce vehicular miles
of travel.
In general, the broader the application of pricing in the region, the greater the ability
to manage demand and thus achieve regional goals and policies. The placement of
congestion/road pricing on the entire limited-access freeway network would have the
greatest potential to achieve demand management objectives by both reducing and
redistributing demand more efficiently over the existing network. The use of electronic
pricing would make it possible to adjust rates by time of day and roadway section to
achieve the optimum balance and overall management of the system. If a portion of
revenues generated from the pricing system were used to create travel alternatives, such
as enhanced transit or ridesharing opportunities and/or improvements to alternate routes,
the overall system management capabilities would be further increased.
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Strengthening of Transit - Congestion/road pricing would provide a direct, highly
visible, monetary incentive for increased use of transit and/or ridesharing. The extra
"price" placed on driving alone would, at a minimum, reduce the perceived cost of transit
fares, thereby increasing the transit share especially for work trips. Congestion/road
pricing applications would also provide opportunities for generating revenue. Part of
these revenues can be used to strengthen the transit system (regular route, paratransit and
rideshare). The principle is that the better the transit system is, the greater the success of
congestion/road pricing. An improved transit system will provide increased choices for
SOV users that are unwilling to pay the road pricing fee, which in turn will make the
transit system more cost-effective.
On the other hand, effective congestion pricing would tend to reduce overall
congestion and make auto trips faster and more dependable, making them somewhat more
competitive to transit. This would be affected by the direct monetary cost associated with
the choice to continue to drive - particularly driving alone.
Availability of Stable Funding for Transportation - Because of the dollars involved,
areawide or systemwide congestion/road pricing provides a "pay-as-you-go" revenue
generating method that is relatively stable. Unlike gas tax revenues, which have
experienced a decline due to improved vehicle fuel efficiency, revenues from
congestion/road pricing would increase because of the historical growth in vehicle-miles
of travel.
Support Economic Development - The effect of congestion/road pricing on economic
development is not well understood. However, the following observations can be made
and should be tested in subsequent phases of the study of congestion/road pricing:
a It would appear that central business districts (CBDs) would benefit from
congestion/road pricing because they have the best roadway and transit access and,
thus, the most choices. This is true of commuter trips. However, shoppers might
be unwilling to pay the fee to shop in the CBD, especially during off-peak periods.
(This may be a reason to not charge a fee during off-peak periods.)
a While the great majority of the region's population and employment is within the
MUSA boundary, residential and other development outside the MUSA continues.
One of the main reasons for this occurrence is that there are no incentives to live
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closer in. The transportation system currently provides relatively congestion-free
travel to jobs in the outer rings of the region. Distance-based congestion/road
pricing would make it less attractive to live in the rural or developing areas and
work, say, in the CBDs.
Residents of counties adjacent to the seven-county area could be discouraged from
working or shopping in the region, particularly if areawide or systemwide
congestion/road pricing applications are implemented. This is particularly true if
revenues generated are used only for improving transportation facilities and
services within the seven-county area.
An unknown at this time is whether, under the areawide or systemwide options,
new businesses will make a different location decision, or whether existing
businesses would relocate, to avoid the tolls.
The conclusion is that specific geographic areas within the seven-county region could
experience an economic gain at the expense of other geographic areas but, overall, the
economic impact is likely to be neutral. The exception is the case where a business
would locate or relocate outside the seven-county area. Imposition of an entry fee at the
MUSA boundary might encourage some residents or businesses to move into the MUSA
area. Others, however, might decide to move into the rural areas and outer rings to avoid
the tolls. How these decisions are made will depend, to a large extent, on how adverse
impacts to commuters, residents and businesses, and geographic impacts, are mitigated.
Mitigation measures could include commuter rebates, peak-period-only charges, improved
services to affected business centers, various tax rebates, etc.
Impacts on Low Income Travelers
The impact of congestion pricing on low-income travelers depends upon the adopted
price level, the time savings achieved and employment locations, among other factors.
The lower the value that is placed on one's time, the less there is to gain, in an
economic sense, from congestion pricing. According to federal studies, travelers making
work trips value their time at $11.00 per hour; on average, those making non-work trips
value their time at $8.00 per hour. If, for a typical 20-mile roundtrip, a relatively low toll
rate of $0.05 per mile is imposed and five minutes of travel time is saved, then only those
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workers whose annual incomes exceed $25,000 would stand to gain based on their value
of time. For non-workers, their income would need to be 25-50 percent higher.
The impacts on low-income travelers will depend on the availability of travel
alternatives and residential and employment characteristics. Low income residents are
more likely to live in areas where transit services are available, and transit service would
tend to improve under congestion pricing.) Some would be induced to change from auto
travel to bus. However, many low income travellers must use a car because transit is not
available or for child pick-up, etc.; if employed, they may have little flexibility to alter
work hours and thus would face peak period charges. Those not employed would have
greater flexibility in altering travel times to avoid peak period surcharges. These changes
could be significant to the individual traveler especially if travel distances are long.
A carefully structured congestion pricing program that maximizes alternatives and
provides some form of subsidy would help mitigate these potential negative effects on low
income travelers. A portion of the revenue collected from the pricing program could also
be used to reduce the negative impact on the poor.
Land Development Considerations
The implementation of congestion/road pricing might be expected to have some
limited impacts on future land development patterns, depending on the scenario and the
scope of application. For example, an area entry pricing scheme focused around the
immediate central business districts, such as Singapore, might act to encourage utilization
of businesses outside the protected area and therefore might influence future commercial
development patterns. That particular scenario was not, however, among those selected
by the Steering Committee for further review. The MUSA line entry toll program was
explicitly designed as an incentive to continue future development within the MUSA area.
This is consistent with regional transportation planning goals, which state that future
highway and transit services will be focused in the urban development area. This would
be a direct positive impact of implementing pricing on regional development patterns.
As noted in the previous section, it is difficult to identify some of the more subtle
economic development impacts. For example, if all freeways in the region were subjected
to tolls, it would not be expected to result in a significant change in future development
patterns. However, if only one or a few of the freeways were tolled, this could affect
-96-
development choice locations for both residential and commercial development. As noted
previously, potential impacts on economic development patterns should be the subject of
more detailed analysis in refined studies which could happen in future phases.
Air Quality Considerations
Congestion pricing may reduce vehicle emissions by reducing vehicle trips. Trip
curtailment and shift from solo driving to HOV modes would result in reduced vehicle
trips and vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) and produce reductions in emissions. Changes in
travel routes and in trip times is likely to have more complex differential impacts on
emissions and air quality. These changes may not directly reduce VMT, but by shifting
VMT away from hot spots and hot periods, they could produce improvements at the worst
locations and times. In making the estimate of VMT reduction, evaluation analysts should
be careful to assess net reductions in VMT. This can be done by examining changes in
trip volumes and lengths not just on the priced facility, but on possible diversion routes,
and comparing results to changes in the same variables on control facilities not priced.
Studies on 1-35W have shown that traffic diversions to local streets are likely to occur
even with incentives for modal shifts on I-35W. The factors which most adversely
influence air quality on local streets are: (1) high traffic volume, (2) low traffic speed, (3)
long delays (particularly idling at intersections), and (4) intersection controls, (which
affect speeds and delays). Traffic that diverts to local streets as a result of congestion
pricing may have an adverse impact at congested intersections.
Major air quality benefits may accrue from reduction in congestion levels by
themselves. While existing models are not very good at estimating the emission impacts
of reduced congestion and resulting reduced speed change cycles, there is increasing
consensus among experts that these benefits may be dramatic.
Evaluations in the second phase can assess the air quality benefits of congestion
pricing by using data coming from the transportation impact assessment and working in
collaboration with the local air quality district and/or regional EPA and PCA offices.
With information about reduction in VMT and vehicle trips and, if possible, changes in
average speeds and speed change cycles, air quality planners would be able to calculate
emissions effects based on a profile of that particular vehicle fleet for the region.
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Equity Considerations
An important consideration in assessing congestion pricing options in the region is
equity: how costs and benefits of the options affect particular groups. While detailed
assessments of this kind are outside the scope of this first phase study, they should receive
considerable attention in the second phase. Such consideration will help chart the most
politically feasible course, help determine those made worse off and where compensation
should be focused. Some categories to consider include income group, peak versus off
peak travelers, and in- versus out-of-zone workers, businesses and residents.
Benefits
In general, one would expect positive benefits due to reduced congestion to accrue
to:
m Existing users of HOV modes and HOV service providers: A reduction in
congestion from the pricing program could significantly increase HOV mode speeds,
productivity and reliability, in those corridors where dedicated HOV lanes do not
exist. Existing users would enjoy significantly improved service even before
additional resources are put into these modes. The providers of HOV service (e.g.,
bus operating agency) could benefit from significant increases in vehicle productivity
as speeds increase.
m Road users who shift from SOV mode to HOV due to pricing incentives: Those
who voluntarily are attracted to HOV modes due to enhanced service levels (brought
on by improved productivity and reliability or by pricing incentives) would realize
positive benefits from the opportunity to use a more desirable mode.
m Road users who continue to drive and value their time highly (including most
commercial vehicles): The value of time savings produced by lower congestion and
increased speeds would outweigh the increased congestion toll payments for these
users.
a Businesses who would reap the benefits of more efficient delivery systems:
Businesses where trucking and delivery system costs are a significant proportion of
total costs of doing business would realize large savings in delivery costs.
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m Population segments who will enjoy cleaner air: Persons living/working near high
concentrations of pollutants produced by vehicle emissions would enjoy cleaner
air.
Major recipients of the revenues generated by the pricing program: Congestion
pricing promises to generate large new revenues, far in excess of program costs. For
instance, if revenues are used to expand HOV modes, the original and new users of
these modes would enjoy the benefits. If revenues are used for in-lieu reductions in
existing taxes such as registration fees, the affected motorists would gain. If
revenues are used to compensate particular road users or businesses, they would
benefit. Depending on the compensations, such distributions could partly or fully
mitigate negative impacts of pricing on these groups.
Disbenefits
a Those who do not value their time highly and/or cannot afford the increased
charges: Those who are forced to pay more than their time savings, or involuntarily
shift to other modes of travel, routes or time of travel, would lose benefits. Also
those who must decide to forgo the trip altogether. Low income travellers are
subject to the above effects.
Certain businesses in the region who might lose competitive posture compared to
those in outlying uncongested areas: While many businesses may benefit from
improved speeds for goods delivery and employee commutes, some businesses
within the prized zone may be disadvantaged vis-a-vis competition from outside the
priced zone. The level of impact would depend largely on the size and location of
the priced zone or area. Again, how complementary programs and actions are
structured can change this picture.
Users of unpriced facilities in the region: Travelers on certain facilities not priced
may experience increased costs of congestion if much traffic is diverted from priced
facilities.
a Neighborhoods: Certain neighborhoods may be affected by spillover traffic. This
is particularly true of neighborhoods where good alternative parallel arterials or
transit facilities are unavailable.
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In particular applications of congestion pricing, the magnitude and incidence of
adverse impacts would depend upon the design and scope of the congestion pricing
program. Each of the three major congestion pricing applications - areawide pricing,
single facility pricing, and pricing of regional expressway and arterial network - would
have very different distributional implications and call for different complementary
actions:
A reawide Pricing: In the downtown of a large urban area, congestion pricing
might lead to limited spillover confined to a few peripheral streets. Signal changes,
restriping and preferential parking for residents are logical complementary actions
to consider.
a Single-Facility Pricing: Congestion pricing of an expressway segment or a bridge
crossing could have more widespread distributional implications. The prices would
affect much more diverse origin-destination patterns than an area program. In this
case, the critical task would be to identify the adversely affected parties and design
appropriate complementary actions.
Regional Network Pricing: Comprehensive pricing of a regional (or subregional)
arterial and expressway system, without attention to complementary action, may
cause spillover traffic.
In short, the broader the application of congestion/road pricing, the less of an issue
equity will become. By contrast, the more narrow the application, such as an individual
facility or spot location, the more likely equity will become a focal point of opposition,
with opponents citing potential discriminatory pricing practices.
It is very important to identify the benefits generated by congestion/road pricing "in
return for increased prices." From the individual user's standpoint, the primary benefit is
time savings. For users with a high value of time, the benefits are more obvious. Other
users with relatively low values of time, however, will be losers at first glance, because
they could fail to see the benefits of reduced air pollution, economic impacts from
massive reductions in trips, etc. For these users, some form of compensation could be
developed to make them as well, or better off, than before the pricing program. It should
be recognized that congestion/road pricing, in aggregate, would generate net positive
benefits.
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Chapter 6
THE NEXT STEPS
From the results of this preliminary study, it is clear that the implementation of
most of the congestion/road pricing alternatives studied would be feasible, from a traffic,
revenue, technology and financial point of view. Almost any of the options evaluated in
this preliminary study would achieve some benefits in terms of demand modification and,
with few exceptions, would be at least self liquidating in terms of revenues and cost. In
most cases, the options were found to produce significant amounts of additional revenue,
above the cost of implementation and operation, which could be used to mitigate negative
impacts, finance future needed transportation improvements and/or establish other
corollary actions to further modify demand (such as transit and ride sharing subsidies).
This was, however, a very broad-brush preliminary study. Considerably more
detailed work will be needed before an actual pricing strategy should be implemented.
This chapter identifies a possible phasing program of future studies. In addition, it
provides a recommended program of public participation and information. This may well
be one of the single most important elements in ultimately implementing any type of
congestion/road pricing program; building public consensus for the need and acceptability
of the program.
Future Studies
This study of congestion/road pricing was intended to examine road pricing
application options, to analyze their feasibility in the Twin Cities area, and to prepare a
public participation plan aimed at securing future public acceptance for congestion/road
pricing. A variety of application options was evaluated and the conclusion was reached
that congestion/road pricing is feasible in the Twin Cities area. The following paragraphs
outline the steps needed to move toward implementation of a specific congestion/road
pricing project.
1. Conduct a Scoping Study
The scoping study would expand on the present congestion/road pricing concept
study. Its purpose would be to select a limited number of specific options and/or projects
for detailed impact analysis. The public participation process would also be initiated in
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this phase and would include market research, roundtable and focus group discussions
with stakeholders, public information/education, etc.
2. Conduct Detailed Alternatives Analysis and Impact Analysis
In this phase the options and/or projects identified in Phase
1 would be evaluated in detail. A full accounting of impacts and mitigating actions would
be made and a project would be selected. Public participation would continue in this
phase with the intent of reaching informed consent on the application option and project
selected.
3. Conduct Preliminary Design and Develop Implementation Plan
In this phase, the congestion/road pricing project would be fully designed in terms
of the toll collection method and technology, detailed cost and financial plan, revenue
distribution strategy, prioritization plan, implementation method--including build-operate-
transfer and build-transfer-operate--and schedule. Implementation of the public
involvement plan with affected parties would occur in this phase, and the responsible
agency would seek legislative approval.
Public Involvement Plan
Public understanding acceptability is a key component of implementing new
policies such as congestion/road pricing. Congestion/road pricing proposals typically
generate concerns about equity, business competitiveness, impacts on the poor, "double
taxation," and use of revenues. If a decision is made to implement a regional
congestion/road pricing program in the Twin Cities, it will be very important to structure
the program so that it is both socially and politically acceptable. This will require a long-
range, comprehensive plan to understand the public perception of need and benefit, to
involve a wide array of special interest groups or "stakeholders," and to educate the public
about the costs and benefits of the proposed program. To accomplish this objective, it
is imperative that the plan provide for public involvement in the development and
evaluation of program options.
The Public Involvement Plan is a step-by-step process for understanding public
needs and perceptions, providing information and education, bringing a wide array of
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actors into the planning process, developing pricing programs with their inputs, and
nurturing support for the congestion/road pricing concepts.
The Public Involvement Plan includes the following four key steps, as shown in
Figure 11.
1. Market Research
To better understand the transportation "customer" (transportation system
users), their understanding of transportation vocabulary, and their perception
of need.
a To test hypotheses about individual perceptions of costs, benefits,
congestion, delay, transportation funding, etc.
To identify key "stakeholders" or special interest groups that may become
strong advocates or opponents and determine their principal concerns and
perceptions about congestion/road pricing.
To identify a small group of key legislators that may be involved as
advocates or opponents of congestion/road pricing and determine their
principal concerns and perceptions about congestion/road pricing.
2. Product Development
Involve key stakeholders and legislators in the development of alternatives.
a Evaluate congestion/road pricing strategies.
Identify implementation issues (legal, legislatures, political).
3. Product Testing
a Conduct market research to test public reaction to proposed strategies.
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4. Product Marketing
a Develop a legislative strategy for gaining legislative support for necessary
legislation.
a Develop and implement a media relations plan.
Develop, implement and conduct a lengthy public education program
regarding proposed strategies.
Throughout this process, the option should always remain to delay implementation
of a congestion/road pricing project. For example, there will not be broad support for a
congestion "solution" such as congestion/road pricing if there is not broad recognition of
a congestion "problem." Under that scenario, the implementation of congestion/road
pricing strategies should be delayed until there is general recognition that these strategies
are needed to address real problems.
1. Market Research
A. Market Research to Understand "Customers" - The first step in the Public
Involvement Plan should be to develop a much better understanding of the
transportation user or "customer" and his/her perception of need. It is
suggested that several focus group discussions be held in this step to
determine the transportation vocabulary used by most lay people and their
level of understanding of various methods and technologies of
congestion/road pricing. These focus groups could also be used to gain a
general understanding of the perception of congestion as a problem and the
thresholds of delay which would tend to trigger a willingness to pay for
congestion relief. Every person is a transportation customer in some way;
however, transportation customers typically fall into the following groups:
a Auto Users - This group includes users who would directly benefit
from reductions in congestion; those who must change their travel
behavior because they are unwilling to pay users charges; and
travelers who may be at an advantage or disadvantage due to variable
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work hours or vehicle occupancy pricing. Commuter and non-work
travelers are distinct sub-groups.
a Fleet Operators - Local and long-distance trucking firms can be
expected to have strongly held positions on congestion pricing.
These positions need to be understood. Previous market research
indicates that there are differences in concern by type of firm (local
versus intercity).
Rideshare/Transit Users - These groups are likely to receive favorable
treatment with respect to user charges. These travelers would clearly
benefit if revenues were used to improve facilities and services.
They would also benefit from reductions in traffic congestion
(improved travel speeds, more reliable trips).
Businesses - Some businesses may feel at a competitive disadvantage
due to charges imposed on their customers and delivery vehicles.
Businesses would also benefit from congestion reduction by speeding
deliveries and improving access for customers.
a Low-Income Travelers - Those who cannot afford user charges could
lose access to employment opportunities, medical facilities, and other
essential destinations. If revenues are used to support alternative
modes (e.g., transit), this access could be preserved for low-income
auto users and improved for others.
B. Conduct Market Research to Test Hypotheses About Congestion/Road
Pricing - Based on a review of previous studies, it is possible to anticipate
the general reaction to alternative congestion/road pricing scenarios. Factors
found to influence acceptance include the geographic scope of the project,
the level of user charges, ease of payment, potential travel delays, perceived
equity with respect to benefits and disbenefits, and the availability of travel
options not subject to congestion/road pricing. The likelihood of public
acceptance should be one of the evaluation criteria for screening the
universe of scenarios. Scenarios that are likely to create severe
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opposition should be modified, accompanied by mitigating actions, and/or
excluded from further consideration.
In this step, a survey of a statistical sample of people would be conducted.
While a telephone survey is possible, it may be necessary to conduct
personal interviews because the subject is rather complex. The sample
population would be asked to place a value on the above mentioned factors
which influence acceptance and on various methods of congestion/road
pricing.
Further direct surveys or involvement of the general public is not
recommended until more detailed study of specific proposals is undertaken
and the objectives for a congestion pricing program are more clearly defined
(see Step 4).
C. Identify Key "Stakeholders" and Their Concerns - Stakeholders are special
interest groups that may become strong advocates or opponents of
congestion/road pricing. In this step, key stakeholders would be identified
and contacted to solicit their concerns and ideas (a preliminary list of
stakeholders is shown in Appendix B). This task could be accomplished
with a selected number of one-on-one meetings or with focus groups.
Stakeholders may also be customers, either individually or collectively, and
customers may also be stakeholders. Generally, the potential stakeholders
in a congestion pricing program include:
a Business Associations - Large employers and, in particular, retail
businesses may view congestion/road pricing as an adverse impact to
their businesses, employees and/or customers.
a Trucking Associations - Trucking associations are expected to oppose
congestion/road pricing because of the increased cost to move
products to market. However, if certain scenarios were shown to
reduce delay, provide a better opportunity for just-in-time shipping,
or be a fair way of generating revenues for transportation, they might
be supported by the trucking associations.
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Individual Communities - Depending upon the program
configuration, particular communities (for example, downtown
businesses or suburban commuters) may feel unduly burdened if they
are required to pay user charges.
Environmental Groups - The potential benefits of congestion/road
pricing (that is, congestion reduction and increased transit and
carpool use) may generate the support of environmental groups.
However, specific scenarios could contribute to concentrating,
slowing down or diverting traffic to local streets. These impacts
could result in adverse environmental impacts and, therefore,
opposition from environmental groups.
Neighborhood Groups - Neighborhoods adjacent to facilities or
within areas included in the congestion pricing program may be
affected by traffic diversions or spillover parking.
Local Officials - City officials, Metropolitan County Commissioners
and other elected and appointed local and regional officials will need
to be involved in these discussions.
a Other Groups - A variety of other stakeholders exist including
taxpayers, private "for hire" vehicles, people who use vehicles for
work (sales, service, etc.), public agencies, etc., who would be
directly or indirectly affected.
D. Identify Key Legislators and Their Concerns - Legislators who may be
important participants in decisions relative to congestion/road pricing should
be identified and contacted to explain the goals of the program, to share the
findings of the market research, and to describe alternate scenarios. These
contacts should be made in very informal one-on-one informational
meetings and should focus on gaining an understanding of legislative
concerns about the congestion pricing concept and discussing the likely need
for future legislation and the proposed process for gaining customer and
stakeholder support. Discussions regarding costs and benefits and possible
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integration with other transportation proposals would also be important for
these information meetings.
2. Product Development
A. Involve Key Stakeholders and Legislators in Development and Evaluation
of Alternatives - In this step, representatives of key stakeholders and key
legislators should be involved in the development and evaluation of
alternative congestion/road pricing strategies. Potential stakeholder support
or opposition should be clarified as part of a detailed study of congestion
pricing scenarios. It is recommended that this task be accomplished using
a committee or task force which would provide advice to the technical staff
on the project. It will be important to include both potential advocates and
potential opponents in this discussion process.
B. Address Implementation Issues - Any implementation issues such as
legislation, administrative needs, funding, use of revenues, equipment, etc.,
should also be addressed at this time. These issues should be resolved with
both legislative and stakeholder input.
The sponsors of congestion/road pricing proposals are likely to be
implementing governmental entities, and thus, may not be effective public
champions of the program. A broad-based public/private coalition could
prove far more effective, complemented by individual spokespeople.
Developing this team will require a designated individual to lead an
extensive liaison with potential supporters.
This step also provides the opportunity to develop a volunteer support group
of civic leaders for speaking to neighborhood and civic groups. These
individuals, along with agency staff, can act as "champions" and can
become highly informed participants in the public discussion about
congestion pricing.
3. Product Testing
A. Conduct Market Research to Test Public Reaction to Proposed Products -
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Market research (stated preference surveys, focus groups) and public
outreach programs (individual and group meetings) should be conducted at
this point to gauge reaction to proposed actions. This research can help
establish the acceptable limits of the congestion/road pricing program in
terms of scope, levels of user charges, use of revenues, etc. The research
should identify key concerns that must be addressed through a marketing
plan.
The market research should focus on reactions and ideas related to specific
courses of actions and outcomes. This would involve describing ranges of
options in terms of type of pricing, method of payment, amount of charges,
and use of revenues. This approach recognizes that behavior is based on a
combination of incentives and disincentives.
4. Product Marketing
A. Develop a Legislative Strategy - Armed with technical and financial
information about the congestion/road pricing proposals and extensive
information about customer and stakeholder concerns, staff and project
spokespeople would meet with key legislators to discuss legislative needs
and to develop a strategy for obtaining any necessary legislation.
B. Develop and Conduct a Lengthy Public Education Program - The previous
market research activities should have identified the key concerns that
people in the Twin Cities have regarding congestion/road pricing. In this
step, a long range public education program would be implemented to
address these concerns and to educate the public about proposed congestion
pricing programs, their costs and their potential benefits. Methods should
include a mix of written materials such as newsletters, public information
meetings, and informal meetings with interested parties. The following is
a recommended approach to a long-range public education program related
to congestion/road pricing:
S Document the Need - It is unlikely that congestion/road pricing will
be acceptable if people do not believe congestion is a significant
problem or if congestion does not change much with pricing.
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Describing current and future need in terms of existing and projected
congestion in terms of travel times, delay and cost will be a critical
factor throughout the Public Involvement Program. This might be
accomplished through the preparation of white papers addressing key
public concerns, through the publication of articles, through public
information meetings, etc.
Explain the Technology - Previous studies show a predominant
concern is related to delays associated with paying user charges. The
superiority of AVI/ETTM must be presented and confidence
established in the reliability and accuracy of this technology. The
description of proposed pricing scenarios should answer the
questions: How do I pay? How long will I have to wait? What is
monitored? What are the enforcement methods?
m Demonstrate the Benefits - The ways in which congestion can be
alleviated through pricing, and the resulting benefits (e.g., more
reliable travel times for businesses, improved air quality, more
support for transit), should be clearly documented and should become
part of the public education program. If revenue generation is the
goal, projects to be funded should be specified.
a Address Public Concerns - The public education effort should not
pretend that congestion pricing is a "win-win" approach. It should
acknowledge legitimate concerns and problems, and address them.
Where possible, mitigating actions should be supported for potential
"losers." For example, subsidies for low-income travelers (perhaps
in the form of electronic vouchers) may be warranted.
a Present a Range of Pricing Alternatives - A flexible approach to
presenting congestion pricing options would allow for a mixing and
matching of elements in response to public concerns. This "sifting
and winnowing" would allow for trial balloons and help gain public
acceptability.
a Develop Choices - Users should be given the choice of paying the
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pricing fee or put up with congestion (delay), or seek out alternate
routes, or using transit, ridesharing.
Develop Collateral Actions - Congestion pricing should be part of an
overall program of transportation improvements. This may include
transit and highway improvements and other Travel Demand
Management strategies. Such a package is more likely to have
"something for everyone" and to be more socially and politically
acceptable.
Identify Intended Use of Revenues - Congestion pricing has the
potential for generating substantial additional transportation revenues.
Potential uses of the revenues (for example, transit improvements,
roadway improvements, reduction in vehicle fees, reduction in taxes)
should be carefully explored and explained.
Address Privacy Issues - Electronic forms of payment are likely to
generate concerns about monitoring, confidentiality and right to
privacy. The public should be informed about the proposed payment
process, the limits of monitoring and the security of the information.
Be Responsive - Be prepared to modify program dimensions, as
needed, to respond to public concerns.
C. Develop a Media Relations Plan - Finally, hopefully with support from
customers, stakeholders and legislators, a media relations campaign may
need to be undertaken. Techniques for interacting effectively with median
might include feature articles, press conferences and press releases, videos,
technology demonstrations, videos, meetings with editors, etc.
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Appendix A
PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM
APPENDIX A
PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM
REPRESENTATIVE
Dennis Foderberg
Frank Lilja
Carl Ohm
Dave Engstrom
Adeel Lari
REPRESENTATIVE
Gene Ofstead
Merritt Linzie
Lee Munnich
Gary DeCramer
Tom Johnson
Lyle Berg
Dick Stehr
Fred Tanzer
Clarence Shallbetter
Nacho Diaz
Allen Lovejoy
Dwight McComb
Jim Wright
Amy Vennewitz
John Williams
Herb Mohring
Howard Blin
Jim Newland
Steve Bahler
Deb Dyson
Charles Crichton
Ron Hoffman
Chuck Sanft
Bob Morgan
Dick Braun
ORGANIZATION
Center for Transportation Studies - U of M
Mn/DOT
Metropolitan Council
Metropolitan Council
Mn/DOT
STEERING COMMITTEE
ORGANIZATION
Mn/DOT
Mn/DOT
University of Minnesota
University of Minnesota
Hennepin County
City of Bloomington
Mn/DOT
Mn/DOT
Regional Transit Board
Metropolitan Council
City of St. Paul
FHWA
Mn/DOT
Senate Counsel and Research
House Research
University of Minnesota
Regional Transit Board
Private Citizen, Transportation Advisory Board
FHWA
House Research
City of Burnsville, Transportation Advisory Board
Mn/DOT
Mn/DOT
City of Minneapolis
Center for Transportation Studies - U of M
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PRELIMINARY LIST OF ORGANIZATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS
Twin Cities Congestion/Road Pricing Study
APPENDIX B
PRELIMINARY LIST OF ORGANIZATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS
Twin Cities Congestion/Road Pricing Study
ACTIVITY CENTERS
Universities and colleges (University of MN, others)
Regional shopping centers ("Dales," MOA)
Major employers (State of Minnesota, 3M, Northwest, GM, Cargill, Pillsbury)
Medical centers
Airports
Convention centers
Major hotels
PUBLIC/PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
Neighborhood organizations (central cities, others)
Citizen League
Chambers of commerce
Convention bureaus
Transportation management associations
Automobile associations
Trucking associations
Restaurant/tavern association
Downtown business councils
Labor organizations
Environmental groups
Taxpayer groups
FLEETS
Utility fleets (NSP, Minnegasco, U.S. WEST)
Mail/package delivery (Postal Service, Federal Express, couriers)
Other delivery fleets (warehouse, consumer)
Service fleets (repair, sales)
Local trucking firms (bulk, garbage, movers)
Long distance trucking
School bus operators
For hire operators (taxi firms, private bus operators)
Transit providers (MTC, opt-outs)
Social service providers (Metro Mobility)
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APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
PRELIMINARY LIST OF ORGANIZATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS
Twin Cities Congestion/Road Pricing Study
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
Legislature
U.S. (FHWA, FTA)
Mn/DOT
Department of Public Safety
State Patrol (other law enforcement agencies)
State of Minnesota (MPCA, Trade & Economic Development)
Metropolitan Council
Minnesota Rideshare
Metropolitan Transit Commission
Regional Transit Board
Counties (metropolitan and Greater Minnesota)
Central cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul)
Suburban cities
Rural areas (metro and Greater Minnesota)
St. Paul Port Authority
Community development agencies (MCDA, others)
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